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RECONCILING THE "MORAL RIGHTS" OF AUTHORS
WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF FREE SPEECH
John T. Cross*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States may be copyright's most enthusiastic cheer-
leader. In its pursuit for stronger copyright protection throughout the
world, the United States consistently claims that copyright serves the in-
terests of both authors and society.' That view is also reflected in United
States law, as the past several decades have witnessed a continual
strengthening of copyright protection in the United States. In some re-
spects, the United States and other industrialized countries seem to be
engaged in a frenzied race to see who can offer the strongest copyright
protection.
On the other hand, the United States has steadfastly (or stub-
bornly, depending on one's view) resisted the international trend to aug-
ment the copyright with additional authors' rights. In contrast to the
civil-law nations of continental Europe, the United States has never
firmly embraced the concept of "moral rights" for authors.' Many view
copyright as the best way to encourage authors to produce and dissemi-
nate the works of art and literature that society desires.' A copyright is
* Grosscurth Professor of Intellectual Property Law, University of Louisville School of Law.
1. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954):
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights
is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
the public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in science and the useful arts.
A more recent expression of the same sentiment appears in Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("[T~he immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for
an author's creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity
for the public good.").
2. The various rights that comprise the moral rights are described in more detail in Part I
infra.
3. See, e.g., Adam Beyer, Intentionalism, Art, and the Suppression of Innovation: Film Col-
orizaton and the Philosophy of Moral Rights, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1011 (1988); Edward L. Carter,
Promoting Progress or Rewarding Authors? Copyright Law and Free Speech in Bonneville Interna-
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an economic right that can be readily transferred, allowing publishers to
recoup their costs of printing and distribution. Moral rights - which ex-
ist in the author and are usually non-transferable - are viewed as inter-
fering with this smooth distribution process, resulting in an undesirable
"anti-commons. '4
Notwithstanding these objections, it now seems clear that moral
rights are here to stay, even in the United States. A major step on the
road to acceptance of moral rights occurred when the United States rati-
fied the Berne Convention in 1988.' Article 6bis of Berne requires all
signatory nations to provide certain types of moral rights protection.6 To
help satisfy this new obligation, Congress enacted the Visual Artists
Rights Act of 1990 ["VARA"] shortly after Berne came into force.7 Al-
though far from a comprehensive moral rights statute, VARA does pro-
vide certain specific rights in "works of visual art," a small subset of the
body of works covered by copyright.8 Along with various other federal
and state moral rights statutes, VARA is evidence that the longstanding
tional Corp. v. Peters, 2002 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1155, 1176-77 (suggests that moral rights are inconsis-
tent with the goals of copyright); Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral,
76 N.C. L. Rev. 1, 85 (1997); Robert A. Gorman, Federal Moral Rights Legislation: The Need for
Caution, 14 Nova L. Rev. 421, 422 (1990) (moral rights are inefficient and "sharply conflict with
fundamental United States legal principles of copyright"); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use
Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105, 1128 (1990).
4. The term "anti-commons" describes a situation in which numerous people retain the legal
right to control use and disposition of property. The concept owes its origins to Michael A. Heller's
groundbreaking article, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to
Markets, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 621 (1998). An anti-commons creates significant inefficiency, as noth-
ing useful can be done with the property without the time and expense of obtaining the consent of
everyone with an interest.
5. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988).
6. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works [hereinafter "Berne
Convention"]. Article 6bis(l) of the 1971 Paris Text provides:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said
rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to,
the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
7. Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
8. 17 U.S.C. § 101 provides:
A "work of visual art" is -
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition
of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or, in
the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer
that are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or other identifying
mark of the author; or
(2) a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single
copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are
signed and consecutively numbered by the author.
[1:185
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MORAL RIGHTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
resistance to moral rights in the United States is finally beginning to lose
purchase.
But the debate over moral rights in the United States is far from
complete. Even though the United States has adopted certain limited
moral rights protection,9 a heated debate continues about whether such
rights serve any useful purpose. Opponents of moral rights protection
remain convinced that copyright offers sufficient incentive' ° Propo-
nents, by contrast, argue that the existing moral rights are not enough,
and should be expanded in both scope and extent."I
The smoke generated by this core policy debate largely shrouds
another important issue. Even if Congress were wholeheartedly to em-
brace broad moral rights, it is unclear whether a comprehensive moral
rights statute would be constitutional. This constitutional debate actually
has two separate aspects. First, some question whether Congress has
legislative authority to enact moral rights legislation. z Second, to the
extent an author's exercise of moral rights impairs the speech of others,
there are potentially serious First Amendment concerns with moral
rights legislation.'3
Other scholars have addressed the issue of Congress's power to
enact moral rights legislation. 4 This article explores the second consti-
9. Part II.B discusses the various federal and state moral rights laws in force in the United
States.
10. See sources cited supra note 3. See also Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral
Rights, 47 Harv. Int'l L. J. 353 (2006) (arguing that moral rights protection in the United States and
the United Kingdom have actually decreased the total legal protection for authors); Vera Zlatarski,
"Moral" Rights and Other Moral Interests: Public Art Law in France, Russia, and the United
States, 23 Colum.-VLA J.L. & Arts 201 (1999) (argues that moral rights do not provide proper in-
centives in the case of public art).
II. Otto W. Konrad, A Federal Recognition of Performance Art Moral Rights, 48 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 1579 (1991); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Inter-
ests of Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights: A Blueprint for the Twenty-First Century,
2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 151; Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 795 (2001); Burton Ong, Why Moral Rights Matter: Recognizing the Intrinsic Value of
Integrity Rights, 26 Colum. J.L. & Arts 297 (2002); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy,
114 Yale L. J. 781 (2005).
12. See, e.g., Eric Bensen, Note, The Visual Artists'Rights Act of 1990: Why Moral Rights
Cannot be Protected Under the United States Constitution, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 1127, 1133-38
(1996); Matt Jackson, Harmony or Discord? The Pressure Toward Conformity in International
Copyright, 43 IDEA 607, 625 (2003).
13. See infra note 15.
14. The authors cited supra note 12 make the case against Congressional authority. Taking a
contrary position are Konrad, supra note 11, at 1598-99, and Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright
and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 70 (1985).
Although this article will not delve into the issue of where Congress derives the power to enact
moral rights legislation, that question is not completely irrelevant to the topic at hand. As discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 166 to 174, federal copyright law enjoys a special first amendment
2007]
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tutional question: whether VARA and other moral rights legislation can
be reconciled with the free speech command of the First Amendment.
Although some limited discussion of this issue already exists in the lit-
erature, 1" no one has undertaken a comprehensive analysis of the issue.
Most of the existing scholarship focuses exclusively on VARA, ignoring
the considerable body of state moral rights legislation.1" Few consider
branches of free speech law, such as content-neutral regulation of
speech, commercial speech, and defamatory speech, that may have sig-
nificant bearing on the First Amendment analysis. 7 But perhaps most
importantly, all of the authors seem to assume that the same First
Amendment principles apply to all moral rights.'" In fact, the truth is
just the opposite. Different moral rights present significantly different
status because of its roots in Article I of the Constitution. Whether federal moral rights legislation
enjoys that same status is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 166 to 210.
15. A number of scholarly articles recognize the First Amendment issues in moral rights. Of
these, most suggest that at least some moral rights laws are unconstitutional, including Bensen, su-
pra note 12, at 1139-44; Anne K. Fujita, The Great Internet Panic: How Digitization is Deforming
Copyright Law, 2-FALL J. Tech. L. & Policy 1, 50 (1996); Gorman, supra note 3, at 422; Jackson,
supra note 12, at 625, Kathryn A. Kelly, Moral Rights and the First Amendment: Putting Honor
Before Free Speech?, 1 1 U. Miami Ent. & Sports L. Rev. 211, 246 (1994); Roberta Rosenthal
Kwall, The Attribution Right in the United States: Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright and
Section 43(a), 77 Wash. L. Rev. 985, 1029 (2002) (suggests that a non-waivable integrity right
could violate the First Amendment, but that other rights would be acceptable); Michael C. Penn,
Comment, Colorization of Films: Painting a Moustache on the "Mona Lisa?", 58 U. Cin. L. Rev.
1023, 1036 (1990) (discussing proposed Film Integrity Act); and Greg R. Vetter, The Collaborative
Integrity of Open-Source Software, 2004 Utah L. Rev. 563, 657 ("First Amendment freedom of ex-
pression traditions arguably conflict with strong moral rights."). Other articles argue that moral
rights would be justified, including Konrad, supra note 11, at 1608 (moral rights laws that prevent
distortion of author's message are valid); Strahilevitz, supra note 11, at 828-29; Geri J. Yonover,
The "Dissing" of Do Vinci: The Imaginary Case of Leonardo v. Duchamp: Moral Rights, Parody,
and Fair Use, 29 Val. U. L. Rev. 935, 995-97 (1995); and Zlatarski, supra note 10, at 219; see also
Wojnarowicz v. American Family Association, 745 F. Supp. 130, 140 (1990) (New York moral
rights provision does not violate right to free speech).
16. Notable exceptions are Konrad, supra note 11, and Penn, supra note 15, both of whom
deal with issues not covered by VARA.
17. Again, some of the articles go into more depth than others. For example, Fujita, supra
note 15, at 50, recognizes that the law of defamation may provide a useful tool in some moral rights
cases. Kelly, supra note 15, at 239-41, recognizes that some moral rights legislation will be judged
under the standard applicable to "symbolic speech." Yonover, supra note 15, at 995, recognizes that
different standards could apply in some cases, but fails to address how these standards might apply.
18. Of the articles discussing the free speech question, only four explore the First Amendment
issues in considerable depth: Bensen, supra note 12, Kelly, supra note 15; Konrad, supra note 11,
and Yonover, supra note 15 (Professor Yonover revisited the question again a year after the cited
article, see Geri J. Yonover, The Precarious Balance: Moral Rights, Parody, and Fair Use, 14 Car-
dozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 79, 114-16 (1996). However, this article closely parallels her earlier piece,
and adds nothing to the First Amendment analysis.). Of these four works, only Professor Kelly rec-
ognizes that each moral right presents its own unique First Amendment problems, and should be
analyzed under different tests.
[1:185
4
Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 1 [2007], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronintellectualproperty/vol1/iss2/2
MORAL RIGHTS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
free speech problems. Rather than a "one size fits all" approach, this ar-
ticle will demonstrate that each of the moral rights must be judged on its
own, often under quite different aspects of First Amendment doctrine.
Thus, although the current literature does provide a number of useful ob-
servations, a more complete analysis is missing. This article attempts to
provide that comprehensive, multifaceted analysis.
The article concludes that the First Amendment does not signifi-
cantly limit the enforcement of those moral rights recognized by state
and federal law. Several features of moral rights laws support this con-
clusion. First, many acts that infringe moral rights do not qualify as
speech, and therefore receive no First Amendment protection.19 For ex-
ample, the droit de suite, or resale right, is clearly constitutional under
this rationale, as it involves no speech whatsoever." Second, even when
the offending act is speech, most moral rights laws can be justified, de-
pending on the circumstances, by one or more of several arguments. In-
deed, many moral rights statutes are categorically valid under the First
Amendment. The rights to preserve the integrity of works and to pre-
vent destruction of those works21 are valid even when the offending act
involves speech, as the governing laws regulate speech without regard to
its content.22 The right to control when a work is disclosed to the public
is also a valid content-neutral regulation for the same reason. 3 The
various rights to police who can be named as author of a work24 are
categorically valid when they are applied to commercial speech, as those
rights either regulate false statements in commerce or require the disclo-
sure of additional relevant information.2 ' Taken together, these situa-
tions comprise most of the moral rights disputes that are likely to arise.
Thus, in most cases a party who seeks to enforce her moral rights will
have no difficulty overcoming a First Amendment defense.
The only moral rights laws that do not survive a constitutional
challenge under the content neutral or commercial speech arguments are
those dealing with (a) non-commercial speech about the identity of the
19. See infra text accompanying notes 151 to 161.
20. The droit de suite is discussed infra at text accompanying note 100.
21. From a moral rights perspective, the rights of integrity and destruction are closely linked.
However, as the two rights present significantly different free speech concerns, this article treats
them as separate and distinct rights.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 282 to 283 (integrity) and 276 to 281 (destruction).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 286 to 320. The law is also valid because it is a tradi-
tional part of federal copyright law. See infra text accompanying notes 390 to 394.
24. As will be discussed in Part I, the law recognizes both a right to be named as the author of
works one actually produces, as well as a right not to be named as author of works one did not pro-
duce.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 287 to 292.
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author of a work, and (b) display or publication of an unaltered work or
faithful reproduction under the Louisiana display right.26 Of these re-
maining cases, some moral rights laws can be sustained under the First
Amendment principles that apply to defamatory speech. If the author is
suing someone who made a false statement of authorship - that is, either
claiming that the author created a work that she did not, or that someone
else created one of the author's works - the law of defamation applies
directly. Here the First Amendment will allow recovery as long as the
author can demonstrate constitutional malice.27 On the other hand, the
defamation analogy is of no avail in cases of "non-attribution," where
the defendant has made no statement. Similarly, defamation law is in-
applicable when a defendant displays accurate versions of the artist's
work. These last two cases are governed by the compelling interest
standard. Under that standard they are almost certainly unconstitutional.
Thus, of all the moral rights provided by state or federal law, only a
claim for non-attribution in a non-commercial setting, and a claim chal-
lenging display of a work in violation of the Louisiana display right,
categorically violate the First Amendment.
Before beginning the analysis, a pair of caveats are in order.
First, the conclusions of this article apply only to existing moral rights
laws. The article identifies certain key features of these existing laws
that prove beneficial in a First Amendment challenge. If those features
were changed, the outcome may well differ. In the same vein, should
Congress or a state legislature adopt some of the moral rights recognized
in other nations - such as the right of withdrawal or the right to be free
of excessive criticism - the First Amendment arguments set out in this
article might not apply.
Second, this article is limited to the right to free speech under the
United States Constitution. United States free speech law is particularly
idiosyncratic. In much of the rest of the world, considerations of human
dignity temper any discussion of speech that impugns an individual's
reputation.2" Human dignity in these systems is itself a human right that
26. La. Rev. Stat. 51:2153(3) (2005). This provision is discussed in depth infra at text ac-
companying notes 138 to 141.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 363 to 414.
28. For example, the Supreme Court of Canada's landmark decision in Hill v. Church of Sci-
entology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130, held that considerations of human dignity and reputation could be
invoked to sustain a common-law defamation claim against a free expression challenge. The Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms explicitly contains a right of freedom of expression in section
2. Conversely, there is no explicit right to human dignity. Nevertheless, the Court held that the
Charter, taken as a whole, includes human dignity as a basic principle. Id. at paragraphs 120-121.
The Supreme Court of Canada employed similar reasoning in R. v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439 at
[1:185
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must be balanced against another's right to speak about that person. As a
result, the core value of human dignity might save a Canadian or Euro-
pean moral rights statute from a free speech challenge. In the United
States, by contrast, there is significantly less concern for protecting a
person's reputation and dignity. The free speech analysis in other na-
tions would proceed along very different lines than that appearing in this
article. Although the ultimate conclusions would probably be the same,
the reasoning would differ.
Finally, it might also behoove the reader if the article were to
employ a uniform terminology for the entire discussion. This article will
use the terms author and rightholder to refer to the party asserting a
moral right. It will use the term author in cases where the person assert-
ing the right is in fact the party that created the work in question,29 sav-
ing the term rightholder for cases involving the right of dissociation,
where the person asserting the right did not create the work. The author
or rightholder will always enforce her rights against a person called the
infringer.3° Moreover, to make the references even more uniform, the
author or rightholder will always be feminine, while the infringer will
always be masculine.31
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF MORAL RIGHTS
A. Moral Rights in International Law
The term "moral rights" derives from droit moral, the French
term for the collection of additional rights afforded to an author in her
creations.32 Borrowing from French is appropriate, as it was in that na-
tion that the moral rights were first fully fleshed out, and still receive the
greatest support.33 In France, the droit moral is treated as a type of natu-
paragraph 94 (per Cory, J.) (the criminal offense of defamatory libel is constitutional notwithstand-
ing the Charter guarantee of freedom of expression), and Aubry v. Editions Vice-Versa [1998] 1
S.C.R. 591 (right to prevent publication of private facts does not violate free expression, as such
right protects individual interest).
29. As used in this article, the term "author" refers to all those who produce works that qual-
ify for copyright or moral rights protection. Thus, the term includes not only novelists and poets,
but also painters, composers, architects, and computer programmers.
30. This usage is consistent with the federal Copyright Act. Section 501(a) of that Act (17
U.S.C. § 501(a)) defines infringement as a violation of any of the copyright owner's rights under §
106, or a violation of any of an author's moral rights under § 106A.
31. It is an escapable fact that English pronouns are gender-based. Rather than bemoan this
feature, this article uses it as an advantage.
32. Lee, supranote ll,at818.
33. Id. at 803-04; 2 Ralph E. Lerner & Judith Bresler, Art Law 944 (2d ed. 1998).
2007]
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ral right, a reflection of the author's infusion of her personality into her
work.34  Under this view, the moral rights are personal rights, distin-
guishable from and existing independently of the primarily economic
copyright.
However, the English translation distorts the real meaning of the
French term.35  And the adopted Anglicization has proven particularly
unfortunate, perhaps explaining in part the reluctance of the Anglo-
American legal systems to adopt moral rights. As will be demonstrated
below, the United States actually provides several rights that are the
functional equivalent of various moral rights.36 But labeling these rights
"moral" rights does not sit well with many legal scholars. First, the term
"moral rights" is often used in Anglo-American discussions to describe
rights that exist not at law, but solely because of a moral or ethical
duty.37 The moral rights of authors, however, are true legal rights that
are fully enforceable in court. Second, the adjective "moral" also sug-
gests that the author has some sort of irrefutable entitlement to certain
rights. Although that sense of natural-law entitlement might exist in
France, Germany, and some of the other ardent advocates for moral
rights, it does not sit well with traditional Anglo-American arguments
for authors' rights.
Yet one need not invoke natural law to justify a regime of moral
rights. Moral rights can also fit comfortably into Anglo-American no-
tions of intellectual property, in which rights are justified primarily be-
cause they provide incentive for people to create and disseminate their
creations to society.38 Copyright provides a monetary incentive to cre-
ate. On the other hand, authors create for a number of reasons. Al-
34. Lee, supra note 11, at 801-03; Ong, supra note 11, at 203-04.
35. Lee, supra note 11, at 801-02 and 818, contains a good discussion of the problems with
the term "moral rights."
36. See infra text accompanying notes 76 to 101 for a discussion of other state and federal
rights that are equivalent to moral rights.
37. See generally Granz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585, 590 (1952) ("'Moral right' seems to indicate
to some persons something not legal, something meta-legal."); see also United States v. John K. &
Catherine S. Mullen Benevolent Corp., 63 F.2d 48, 55 (1933) (plaintiffs claim for a right of reas-
sessment is not enforceable, with court stating, "At most there is a moral right which the Legislature
of the state can recognize and enforce and ... by ... statute); Erin E. Byrnes, Therapeutic Juris-
prudence: Unmasking White Privilege to Expose the Fallacy of White Innocence: Using a Theory of
Moral Correlativity to Make the Case for Affirmative Action Programs in Education, 41 Ariz. L.
Rev. 435, 563 (1999) (distinguishing between moral rights and enforceable legal rights).
38. "'The theory of moral rights is that they result in a climate of artistic worth and honor that
encourages the author in the arduous act of creation.' Artists' rights are consistent with the purpose
behind the copyright laws and the Constitutional provision they implement: 'To promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts."' H.R. Rep. 101-514, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 1990, 1990 U.S.
Code Cong. and Admin. News 6915 [hereinafter Legislative History].
[1:185
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though economic reward can be and often is an important motivator, an
overwhelming amount of art and literature is created in situations where
there is no possibility of reward.39 Rewards other than money may also
be important to authors. Fame, which can only occur if society contin-
ues to associate the author with her work, is an important, albeit difficult
to measure, incentive for authorship.40 Moral rights provide that un-
breakable bond between the author and her work, and accordingly help
to ensure that these nonmonetary benefits accrue to the author. Further-
more, moral rights help preserve the integrity of the author's intended
41message. In this fashion, moral rights complement the copyright,
while serving the same ultimate goal.
1. The Primary Moral Rights
At first glance, the moral rights look like an arbitrary collection
of "perks" for authors. However, there is a theme that defines the moral
rights and distinguishes them from the copyright. In one way or another,
moral rights are designed to protect or enhance the reputation that an au-
thor derives from her works.4 2 There is a general consensus that protect-
39. For example, a person making entries in a personal diary, or doodling during a boring
meeting, is not motivated by any expectation of financial reward.
40. Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1171, 1176-77
(2005).
41. Immanuel Kant justified a theory of limited moral rights on this basis. Immanuel Kant,
Von der Unrechtmaifigkeit des Bichernachdrucks (1785), as reprinted in 106 UFITA 137, at 142-43
(1987). More recent scholars have also invoked the need to preserve the author's message as a basis
for many of the moral rights. See, e.g., Konrad, supra note 11, at 163 1; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,
Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev.
1945, 1985-86 at text accompanying notes 233-34; Margaret Ann Wilkinson, The Public Interest in
Moral Rights Protection, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 193, 214-15.
42. The very first sentence of the House Report issued in connection with VARA states,
"H.R. 2690, the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, protects both the reputations of certain visual
artists and the works of art they create." Legislative History, supra note 38, at 6915. The legislative
history also indicates that the statute is concerned only with a person's reputation as an artist, not
her more general reputation in society. Id. at 6925 (focus is on the person's "professional honor;"
and that the "standard used is not analogous to that of a defamation case, where the general charac-
ter of the plaintiff is at issue."). See also Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists'
Moral Rights: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. Legal Stud. 95 (1997) (an eco-
nomic analysis of moral rights that demonstrates how such rights serve to limit "reputational exter-
nalities"). In truth, moral rights laws protect more than reputation. VARA itself speaks both of an
artist's reputation and her "honor," at least in connection with the right of integrity. 17 U.S.C. §
106A(a)(2). Professor Kwall argues persuasively that they protect the author's human spirit, a no-
tion that includes, but is far more encompassing, than reputation. Kwall, supra note 11, at 152. Pro-
fessor Ong asserts that they protect an artist's "aesthetic vision." Ong, supra note 11, at 301. And
Professor Lee argues that considerations of human dignity justify moral rights protection. Lee, su-
pro note I1, at 799. However, as notions of honor, spirit, vision, and dignity are difficult to define
with precision, much less quantify, this article will risk oversimplification and speak primarily in
2007]
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ing an author's reputation is a desirable norm, even if scholars disagree
on why that is so, or why non-author creators do not warrant similar pro-
tection.
Of course, myriad things can affect an author's reputation. As a
result, creative minds have devised a number of different moral rights.
For example, some nations give an author the right to withdraw a work
from public view even after it has been sold to another.43 Canada recog-
nizes a right of anonymity: a right to prevent others from associating the
author's name with her own work.' At least one scholar has advocated a
right to destroy a work, which would effect a permanent withdrawal.45
French law even recognizes a right to choose whether to create at all,46 a
right to compel completion of a commission,47 and a general right to be
free from "excessive criticism. '48 Even the droit de suite, or resale right,
has a sufficient reputational flavor to justify including it in a discussion
of moral rights.49 Taken together, this collection of rights helps an au-
thor thwart various threats to her reputation.5"
Many of these rights are actually fairly rare. The most common
moral rights are those of disclosure, attribution, and integrity. 1 The
right of disclosure is the right to determine when - or whether - a given
work is published. This right recognizes that the author is the best judge
of whether a work is complete. As drafts and works-in-progress lack the
terms of authorial reputation.
43. The withdrawal right - sometimes referred to by its French name droit de retrait ou de
repentir - may also allow the artist to modify the work. Lemer & Bresler, supra note 33, at 945.
However, if the work has been sold to another, the author is normally required to compensate the
owner for any harm. Id. at 945-46.
44. Copyright Act (Can.), R.S.C. chap. C 42, § 14.1.1 (1985). This provision is discussed in
depth in Wilkinson, supra note 41, at 224-31.
45. Strahilevitz, supra note 11.
46. Lee, supra note 11, at 803-04.
47. Zlatarski, supra note 10, at 205-06.
48. Lee, supra note 11, at 803-04; Kelly, supra note 15, at 219. Rights allowing withdrawal
and preventing excess criticism are fairly rare, possibly because they raise serious practical and pol-
icy concerns. Nevertheless, at least one state may recognize an analogous right. See infra text ac-
companying notes 138 to 141.
49. The droit de suite recognizes that as an author's reputation increases over time, the value
of her works - even those produced when the author was relatively unknown - will also increase.
The droit de suite does nothing to preserve or augment that reputation. However, it allows the au-
thor to reap some of the benefits attributable to that enhanced reputation. As such, it should also be
considered one of the collection of moral rights.
50. A French scholar has argued convincingly that as moral rights law has developed, it has
increasingly drifted from its roots, to the point where the law now conflicts with the core values
justifying additional authors' rights. Christophe Geiger, Droit D 'auteur et Droit du Public a
L 'information - Approche de Droit Compare 115-162 (2004).
51. Lee, supra note 11, at 801.
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refinement and quality of completed works, a right to prevent premature
disclosure gives the author significant control over how her reputation
develops.
The right of attribution, traditionally referred to as "paternity, '2
is the author's right to be acknowledged as the creator of her own works.
This right relates directly to reputation, as it ensures that the author re-
ceives credit for the work she has produced. An author may invoke the
attribution right to prevent removal or alteration of the author's name,
pseudonym, or other identifying information, or the false attribution of
the author's work to another. Although the precedent is not as clear,
there may also be a positive duty to name the author even in cases where
the person displaying the work has said nothing about authorship, as
might occur if the work was originally distributed as an anonymous
work. Many jurisdictions also recognize a right of dissociation, which is
the right not to be connected with works that the author did not create.
5 3
Although this right of dissociation is in some ways merely a corollary of
the attribution right, in other ways it goes even further. 4 Because the
dissociation right presents different free speech issues, it deserves sepa-
rate mention.55
The right of integrity allows an author to prevent alteration or
mutilation of her work. From a reputational standpoint, this right is
logically intertwined with the rights of attribution and dissociation.
Changes to a work that render it less attractive will in most cases harm
the author's reputation only if the public thinks that the altered work was
the author's product. If the public recognizes that a third party made the
changes, the author's reputation will remain unchanged. 6 Some nations
52. The term "paternity" reflects the French name for the right, Droit 6 lapaternit4. Lemer &
Bresler, supra note 33, at 946. The right is also commonly referred to as the right of "authorship."
The Berne Convention uses this last term, discussing the author's right to "claim authorship." Berne
Convention, Article 6bis(l).
53. Most courts and commentators refer to the dissociation right as the right of "non-
attribution." However, that term presents several difficulties. When discussing the right of attribu-
tion, it is sometimes necessary to distinguish between situations where the infringer makes a false
statement of authorship and those where the defendant says nothing about authorship. The word
"non-attribution" more accurately describes the situation where the infringer is silent. To prevent
confusion with the attribution right, this article will use the term "dissociation" to refer to the right
not to be associated with a work.
54. The full scope of the VARA dissociation right is discussed infra note 68.
55. In some jurisdictions, including possibly some in the United States, the dissociation right
applies even to works that the author did create. This broader right will be referred to as the right of
"disavowal". See infra note 141. A disavowal right presents serious free speech concerns. See in-
fra note 388.
56. In theory, an author's reputation could also be damaged even if the changes are not attrib-
uted to the author. This sort of harm can be likened to the trademark-law concept of "tamishment"-
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recognize an affiliated right to prevent destruction of works. Although
the difference between alteration and outright destruction is in one sense
a difference in degree rather than kind, destruction presents a special
problem from the perspective of authorial reputation. If a work is de-
stroyed, there will be no altered work for people to use to gauge the au-
thor's talents. The destruction right therefore helps to preserve the work
so that it can continue to spread the author's message, and thereby influ-
ence the author's reputation. 7
2. Moral Rights Obligations Imposed by International Law
France began to develop its concept of moral rights approxi-
mately two hundred years ago, during an era of political, social, and in-
tellectual revolution. 58 Although France's efforts to export its political
and social ideals would ultimately meet with only modest success, its
notion of moral rights received a much warmer reception, at least in
western continental Europe. Within a few decades, these same western
European nations were to spearhead an effort to internationalize intellec-
tual property rights, eventually culminating in a series of treaties that al-
low parties to transport existing intellectual property rights to other sys-
tems.59 Because the moral rights were considered part of the package of
authors' rights, it was perhaps inevitable that they would find their way
into this treaty regime.
The effort to include moral rights in the intellectual property
treaty system bore fruit in the 1928 revision to the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. 60  That revision saw the
addition of Article 6bis, which reads in relevant part:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim au-
style dilution. Suppose that someone paints a Hitler mustache on a face in a painting. That symbol-
ism carries such a strong message that it could possibly make viewers think less of the art, even if
they realize that the author is not responsible.
57. This notion of "preservation" proves particularly useful in the free speech analysis. See
infra text accompanying notes 297 to 302.
58. Lerner & Bresler, supra note 33, at 944. In the spirit of the moral right of attribution, the
French do not deserve all of the credit. Similar developments occurred in Germany at roughly the
same time. Wilkinson, supra note 41, at 195.
59. In addition to the Berne Convention, which dates from 1886, the same powers also en-
tered into the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1883, which covers pat-
ents, trademarks, and industrial design.
60. An interesting discussion of the genesis of the moral rights provision in Beme is set out in
Wilkinson, supra note 41, at 195-96.
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thorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said
work, which would be prejudicial to his honour or reputation.
Article 6bis does not effect a wholesale adoption of the western
European moral rights paradigm. Berne signatories are required to im-
plement only two of the recognized moral rights: attribution and integ-
rity. Moreover, the integrity right applies only when modification of the
work would harm the author's honor or reputation. 6' Notwithstanding
these limitations, Article 6bis affirmed that moral rights were an impor-
tant part of the overall scheme of legal protection of authorship. After
1928, all nations that joined the Berne Convention were under an obliga-
tion to amend their national legislation to provide authors effective, non-
alienable 62 moral rights of attribution and integrity.
B. Moral Rights in the United States
Moral rights have received a cooler reception in the United States
than in continental Europe. The United States resisted joining Berne for
over a century; a recalcitrance due at least in part to that treaty's moral
rights obligation.63  Even after ratification, the United States has taken
only minor steps to meet the mandate of Article 6bis. Moreover, the
adoption of TRIPS' in 1994 heralded a significant retreat from Article
61. As Professor Ong has already noted, honor and reputation are not the same. Ong, supra
note 11, at 307.
62. The Berne Convention does not explicitly state that moral rights cannot be transferred.
However, Article 6bis does indicate that the moral rights are "independent" of the economic rights,
and persist in the author even after the author has transferred the moral rights. That language lends
itself to an interpretation that the moral rights are not transferable, a view that comports completely
with the French dualist view of moral rights.
63. Part of the problem is the historic Anglo-American view of authors' rights, which focuses
more on the benefits to society rather than the direct interest of the author. Under this view, au-
thors' rights are justified mainly by measuring the extent to which they encourage creation and dis-
semination of works. For an excellent discussion of the Anglo-American "marketplace" view and
the authorial view that prevails in France and Germany, see Paul Edward Geller, Must Copyright Be
For Ever Caught between Marketplace and Authorship Norms?, in Brad Sherman and Alain
Strowel, OfAuthors and Origins 159 (1994). Copyright fits easily into the Anglo-American mold.
Moral rights - which afford non-monetary incentives and cannot be commodified because of the
prohibition on transfer - were considered at best superfluous, and possibly even counterproductive.
Wilkinson, supra note 41, at 216.
Of course, these policy arguments were not the only reason the United States hesitated to accept
moral rights. Article 6bis also suffered from guilt by association, and much of the objection to its
provisions stemmed from objection to other requirements of Berne.
64. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in
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6bis. Although TRIPS Article 9(1) incorporates the provisions of Berne
virtually wholesale, at the urging of the United States it explicitly ex-
cludes the obligations of Berne Article 6bis.65 Therefore, failure to have
effective rights of attribution and integrity violate Berne, but are not en-
forceable by trade sanctions through the World Trade Organization.
In spite of this history, it would be wrong to suggest that moral
rights have been a complete failure in the United States. In fact, the
United States affords authors a number of significant rights above and
beyond the copyright. Although these rights may not bear the "moral"
rights label, many are functionally similar to true moral rights. There-
fore, no inventory of moral rights in the United States is complete with-
out mentioning of all of the federal and state laws providing moral
rights-like protections.
1. VARA
Congress's immediate response to Article 6bis of Berne was the
Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1990.66 VARA, codified at §106A of the
Copyright Act, remains to this day the leading moral rights statute in the
United States - and the only one drafted with Article 6bis specifically in
mind. The statute provides both of the moral rights called for by Berne.
Section 106A(a)(1)(A) deals with attribution, giving the author a right to
"claim authorship" of her work.67 Section 106A(3) provides a right of
integrity, limited, as Berne allows, to situations where alteration would
affect the author's honor or reputation.
VARA also affords authors two rights that Article 6bis does not
require. Sections 106A(a)(1)(B) and (a)(2) provide a right of dissocia-
Counterfeit Goods (1994). Because of its unwieldy title, this agreement is usually referred to by the
semi-acronym TRIPS.
65. TRIPS Article 9(1) reads:
Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention (1971) and the Appen-
dix thereto. However, Members shall not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in respect
of the rights conferred under Article 6bis of that Convention or of the rights derived therefrom.
Thus, of all the requirements in Berne, TRIPS omits only the requirement to adopt meaningful
moral rights.
66. Pub. L. No. 10 1-650, 10 1st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990) (part of the Judicial Improvements
Act of 1990).
67. The phrase "claim authorship" is somewhat curious. Read literally and without an under-
standing of moral rights laws in other nations, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1)(A) could be interpreted as
nothing more than a defense for an author who takes credit for one of her own works. Nothing in
the language suggests that the author can force others to give her credit. However, Article 6bis of
Berne uses the same phrase. When it enacted VARA, Congress merely parroted the language of
Berne. Because Berne's right of attribution is widely understood to create positive duties on those
in possession of works, VARA's attribution right should be interpreted the same way.
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tion.6 Section 106A(a)(3) creates a right to prevent destruction of works
of "recognized stature." However, the destruction right is limited to in-
tentional or grossly negligent destruction of those works.
In many respects, VARA closely tracks the language of Article
6bis. Its moral rights remain in force until the death of the author.69
VARA rights cannot be transferred to others (although they can be
waived7") and exist independently of ownership or control of the work
itself.7' Nevertheless, VARA comes nowhere close to satisfying the re-
quirements of Berne. Some of the issues are technical. For example,
VARA does not apply to "works for hire,"72 and limits the integrity right
to intentional modifications of a work7 3 - two important restrictions that
are not explicitly allowed by Article 6bis. But the most important limit
on VARA is its exceedingly narrow subject-matter coverage. Article
6bis, read literally, requires moral rights protection for all copyright
works (although it is doubtful that any signatory actually goes that far).
VARA, by contrast, applies only to "works of visual art," a term that is
defined to include only original paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures,
or photos that exist in 200 or fewer copies.74 Thus, many of the most
economically important copyright works - books, poetry, films, sound
68. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(l)(B) applies to works that the author played no role in creating. 17
U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2), by contrast, applies to works that the author did originally create, but which
have been altered in ways the would harm the author's reputation if people attribute the altered
work to the author. One author has labeled the latter right the right of "disavowal." Joseph Zuber,
The VisualArtists Rights Act of 1990 - What it Does, and What it Preempts, 23 Pac. L. J. 445, 478
(1992). Although there are admittedly differences between the rights set out in (a)(1) and (a)(2), for
purposes of the First Amendment these differences are of scant, if any, relevance. The ensuing dis-
cussion will accordingly refer to both rights as the right of dissociation.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a), (e)(2).
72. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) specifies that VARA's moral rights apply only to works of visual art.
Section 101 defines the key phrase "work of visual art." Section 2(B) of that definition explicitly
provides that a work of visual art does not include "any work made for hire." Because of the way
this definition is structured, the treatment of works for hire is different under VARA than it is in the
rest of the Copyright Act. In most situations, an employer or commissioning party, rather than the
author, owns rights in a work for hire. However, because works for hire are excluded from the defi-
nition of works of visual art, there are no moral rights at all in a work for hire, either in the em-
ployer/commissioning party or the author.
73. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(A). Similarly, VARA's destruction right applies only to inten-
tional or grossly negligent acts. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B). However, the dissociation right set out
in § 106A(a)(2) is not subject to the same limitation. This discrepancy is somewhat unusual. The
dissociation right of (a)(2) is in many respects a hybrid of the attribution and integrity rights, as it
prevents associating the author with a work that she produced, but which has been altered in an un-
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recordings, musical compositions, and architecture - fall completely
without VARA's ambit. Because of these limitations, VARA falls far
short of meeting the United States' Berne requirements.75
2. Other Federal Moral Rights
VARA is not the only federal law providing moral rights. Sev-
eral other federal statutes afford rights analogous to moral rights. Al-
though Congress rarely enacted these laws for the express purpose of
preserving or enhancing authors' reputations, the laws nevertheless pro-
vide useful tools to authors concerned with their reputation.76
The Copyright Act provides at least one additional moral right.
Section 106 of the Act gives a copyright owner the rights to perform,
distribute, and display many different types of works.77 Taken together,
these § 106 rights constitute a form of disclosure right. Most acts that
would violate the right of disclosure involve performance, distribution,
or display of a work.78  Moreover, the rights of performance, distribu-
tion, and display are not limited to works of visual art, but instead apply
to almost all copyright works.7 9 Even though § 106 differs from the tra-
ditional moral right of disclosure insofar as the right can be transferred,
75. These limitations may also explain the dearth of cases brought under VARA. In its thir-
teen year history, there have been only a dozen cases brought under the statute. The vast majority
of these were brought in New York. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc., 459 F.3d 128 (1st Cir.
2006); Pollara v. Seymour, 344 F.3d 265 (2nd Cir. 2003); Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d
77 (2nd Cir. 1995), cert. denied 517 U.S. 1208 (1996); Martin v. City ofIndianapolis, 192 F.3d 608
(7th Cir. 1999); Lilley v. Stout, 384 F.Supp.2d 83 (D.D.C. 2005); Scott v. Dixon, 309 F.Supp.2d 395
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); Board of Managers of Soho Intern. Arts Condominium v. New York, 2003 WL
21767653 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (unreported); Flack v. Friends of Queen Catherine, Inc., 139 F.Supp.2d
526 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Peker v. Masters Collection, 96 F.Supp.2d 216 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Pavia v.
1120 Avenue of the Americas Associates, 901 F.Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); National Assn for
Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Scharle, 356 F.Supp.2d 515 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Hunter v. Squirrel Hill
Assoc., L.P., 413 F.Supp.2d 517 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
76. It has been recognized for some time that existing laws can provide the functional equiva-
lent of various moral rights. Indeed, in the debates concerning United States accession to the Beme
Convention, several argued that Article 6bis would actually require no changes to United States law,
as these other federal laws already provided all the rights called for by Article 6bis. H.R. Rep. No.
609, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-40 (1988).
77. The performance right is set out in 17 USC §§ 106(4) and (6); the display right in §
106(5).
78. The author's right to control presentation of her work to the public is also a factor in fair
use analysis 17 USC § 107. In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539,
551-52 (1985), the Court indicated that publishing passages from another person's book is less
likely to qualify as fair use when the book in question was unpublished.
79. 17 USC §§ 106(4), (5), and (6) list the works covered by each right. The § 106(4) per-
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this feature is not that important in actual practice, as most authors will
not transfer the copyright until they are preparing to publish the work.
Other federal laws provide additional attribution rights. For ex-
ample, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ["DMCA"]8 ° provision
dealing with "copyright management information" creates a form of
back-door attribution right. It prevents people from removing informa-
tion about the author that is physically connected to the work. 81 Because
this DMCA provision applies to all categories of copyright works, and
may be enforced not only by the copyright holder, but by "any person
injured by a violation,"82 it affords a potentially useful means for authors
to ensure they receive credit for their work. 3
Federal trademark law also creates both attribution and dissocia-
tion rights.84 The dissociative function of trademark law is well known.
The main focus of trademark law is providing a remedy for "passing off'
against a person who attempts to sell his goods or services under some-
one else's trademark. A claim for passing off is, at its core, a claim for
dissociation. Several well-known cases have extended the dissociative
principles of trademark law to works of art and literature. For example,
in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.,85 the Second Cir-
cuit held that a comedy troupe that created a television show could re-
cover against a television network that aired a significantly altered ver-
sion of the show under circumstances suggesting the troupe had
produced the altered version. Similarly, in PPX Enterprises, Inc. v.
Audiofidelity Enterprises, Inc.,86 the court held defendant liable for
falsely claiming that Jimi Hendrix was the feature performer in re-
cordings in which Hendrix either did not play, or was merely a back-
ground performer.
Less well-known is the Lanham Act's right of attribution. Courts
80. Although the DMCA and the Copyright Act are both codified in title 17 of the United
States Code, the DMCA is technically not part of the Copyright Act.
81. 17 USC § 1202(b)(1). Note that this section specifically refers to the "copyright holder,"
not the author. However, the copyright owner can prevent removal of both her name, § 1202(c)(3)
and the name of the author, § 1202(c)(2). Because it protects designations of authorship, this provi-
sion functions in some ways like a moral right.
82. 17 USC § 1203(a).
83. Of course, this right is not as broad as the attribution right envisioned by Article 6bis and
contained in VARA. 17 USC § 1202(c)(2) does not impose a positive obligation on anyone to add
the author's name, or disclose authorship. It merely prevents removal of identifying information
that has already been attached. Thus, it would not apply to anonymous works.
84. The primary federal trademark law is the Lanham Act, codified at 15 USC §§ 1051 to
1141n.
85. 538 F.2d 14 (2nd Cir. 1976).
86. 818 F.2d 266 (2nd Cir. 1987).
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interpreting § 43(a) of the Lanham Act87 have developed a doctrine of
"reverse passing off. '88  Unlike ordinary passing off, where defendant
misleads consumers into thinking that plaintiff produced or sponsored
defendant's goods, reverse passing off involves situations where defen-
dant sells goods produced by plaintiff, but under circumstances suggest-
ing the goods are produced by defendant. The reverse passing off doc-
trine has been applied in several cases involving disputes over
authorship.8 9 A claim of reverse passing off in such a case is in many
ways functionally equivalent to a right of attribution, as it allows an au-
thor to insist that her name or other identifying information remains on
her work.90 Admittedly, unlike a "true" attribution right, reverse passing
off is available only when a work is being offered for sale. However, as
statements concerning authorship are especially important in a situation
where the work is being sold, this limitation is as a practical matter not
that significant. 9' Because the Lanham Act covers virtually every good
or service sold in commerce, it could apply to all the works covered by
Berne.
However, a recent United States Supreme Court decision has
greatly limited the usefulness of the reverse passing off doctrine as an
effective attribution right in works of art and literature. In Twentieth
Century Fox v. Dastar,92 the Court held that the Lanham Act did not af-
ford a cause of action to a film company when someone else copied the
company's film footage without attributing the company in the credits.
The full reach of Dastar is not clear. Because the original film had pre-
viously been protected by copyright, the case could be read narrowly to
87. 15 USC §1125(a).
88. Although it was not the first case to recognize a claim for reverse passing off, the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) was highly influential in the
development of the doctrine. Other important decisions are Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 691
F.2d 168 (3rd Cir. 1982), and Pioneer Hi-BredInt'l v. Holden Fdn. Seeds, Inc., 35 F.3d 1226 (8th
Cir. 1994). For a critique of the doctrine of reverse passing off, see John T. Cross, Giving Credit
Where Credit is Due: Revisiting the Doctrine of Reverse Passing Off in Trademark Law, 72 Wash-
ington L. Rev. 709 (1997).
89. In Waldman Publishing Corp. v. Landoll, 43 F.3d 775 (2nd Cir. 1994), for example, plain-
tiff and defendant both produced children's versions of classic novels. Defendant's work borrowed
heavily from plaintiff. However, defendant sold its works under the name of a different author. Id.
at 778-79. The court held defendant liable for reverse passing off under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
90. Whether reverse passing off covers cases of complete non-attribution is less clear. On its
face, Section 43(a) applies only when defendant makes a false statement of origin. If the defendant
says nothing at all about origin, but merely fails to tell consumers who the true source is, some
courts will not hold the defendant liable. See, e.g., Morita v. Omni Publications International, Ltd.,
741 F.Supp. 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
91. For the same reason, most attribution disputes involve commercial speech, an area of free
speech law governed by a special standard. See infra text accompanying notes 384 to 385.
92. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
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prohibit use of the Lanham Act reverse passing off claim only when a
work formerly protected by copyright has entered the public domain.93
However, much of the language in the opinion is broader, focusing on
the language of the Lanham Act. Dastar may stand for the proposition
that a reverse passing off claim under the Lanham Act 94 is never avail-
able when a person merely copies something designed or produced by
another and sells the copy under his own name.9" Under this broader
reading, reverse passing off would be actionable only in so-called "re-
sale" cases, 96 where a party resells an original tangible item manufac-
tured by another without crediting the actual manufacturer. In the case
of resale of a work of visual art, VARA already provides a remedy for
failure to attribute authorship. Although the Lanham Act does expand
the scope of the attribution right to works not covered by VARA, the re-
sult of Dastar is to deny the potentially most valuable use of the Lanham
Act reverse passing off claim; namely, use by an author to demand attri-
bution when her works are copied. 97
3. State-Law Moral Rights
The federal laws discussed in the prior section augment VARA
by affording additional moral rights. However, federal law is not the
only source of moral rights in the United States. Sixteen states and
Puerto Rico also give authors some form of moral rights protection."
93. Certain portions of Dastar stress the fact that the work had been previously protected by
copyright. Id. at 33-35.
94. State law may also afford a right to recover for reverse passing off. Cross, supra note 88,
at 742-51. The effect of Dastar on these state laws is not clear. Language in the Dastar opinion
suggests that the Copyright Act may trump any other laws that would purport to provide a cause of
action. Dastar, 539 U.S. at 36-37.
95. Most of the Dastar opinion is devoted to defining the term "origin" in Section 43(a). The
Court concluded that in the case of a good that is copied from another, the "origin" is the producer
of the physical copy, not the party that produced the original that served as the model. Dastar, 539
U.S. at 35-37.
96. See Cross, supra note 88, at 722-23 for a discussion of the difference between resale and
copying cases.
97. If the broad § 43(a) right of attribution is limited to resale cases, the United States may not
be in compliance with its obligation under Berne. Article 6bis of Berne does not limit the integrity
and attribution rights to physical art works. Thus, nations may be obligated to provide those rights
even when a work is copied. And some nations do, in fact, word their moral rights statutes broadly
enough to cover both originals and copies. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act (c. 48)
(U.K.) § 77; Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works (Sweden) Art. 3 (1996).
98. Cal. Civ. Code §§ 985, 986, 987, 989, & 997 (2006); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 42-116s &
116t (2004); Off. Code Ga. Ann. § 8-5-7 (2005); La. R.S. § 51.2151-2156 (2005); 27 Maine R.S. §
303 (2005); Annot. Laws Mass. GL ch. 231, § 85S (2005); Mont. Code. Ann. § 22-2-407 (2005);
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 597.720, 597.730, 597.740, 597.750, & 597.760 (2005); N.J. Stat. §§
2A:24A-I - 24A-8 (2006); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-4B-1 - 4B3 (2006); N.Y. CLS Art & Cult. Affairs
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Read literally, many of these state statutes give rights equal to or greater
than those set out in VARA.99 California, for example, has both a droit
de suite and a residual ownership right in certain derivative works; rights
nowhere recognized by federal law.1"' Louisiana law allows the author
to prevent disclosure not only of altered versions of her work, but in
some cases unaltered versions.0 1 Similarly, while VARA rights termi-
nate at the death of the author, 10 2 several states allow moral rights to pass
to the author's heirs. 10
3
As a practical matter, however, these state laws do not add much
to the collection of moral rights. Article VI of the United States Consti-
tution provides that federal law preempts state law under certain circum-
stances. A law that is preempted has no legal effect. Several authors
have argued that most state moral rights laws are preempted by VARA
or other provisions of federal copyright law."° Although these analyses
mainly consider the New York, California, and in one case Massachu-
setts moral rights statutes, they are nevertheless useful in dealing with
preemption under all of the state moral rights regimes. Even these au-
thors concede that not all state moral rights laws are preempted. Limited
§ 14.01 - 14.07 (2005); N.Y. CLS Penal § 275.35 (2005); 73 Penn. Stat. § 2101 - 2110 (2005);
Leyes de Puerto Rico Anotadas tit. 31 § 1401 (2005); R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-62-2 - 5-62-6; 42-75.2-8
(2006); S.D. Codified Laws § 1-22-16 (2006); Utah Code Ann. § 9-6-409 (2005); Wis. Stat. § 44.57
(2005). The Puerto Rican law is analyzed in depth in Pedro G. Salazar, The "Acuff-Rose " Parody
Case: Give Unto the Congress What is the Congress' and to the States What is the States', 29 Rev.
Jur. U.I. P. R. 159 (1995).
99. For example, several state laws explicitly deal with reproductions. La. R.S. § 51.2153(2)
(2005); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 597.740(1); N.J. Stat. § 2A:24A-3 (2006). Puerto Rico's statute con-
tains rights of publication and retraction of authorship. Leyes de Puerto Rico Anotadas tit. 31 §
1401 (2005).
100. The droit de suite is contained in Cal. Civ. Code § 986 (2006); the residual ownership
right in § 988.
101. La. R.S. 51.2153(3) (2005), discussed in greater depth infra at text accompanying notes
138 to 141.
102. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d). Section (d)(2) contains an exception for certain works created prior
to VARA's effective date.
103. Several states provide that their moral rights remain in force for fifty years following the
death of the author. Cal. Civ. Code 987(g)(1) (2006); Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-116t(d) (2005); An-
not. Laws Mass. G.L. ch. 231, § 85S(g) (2005); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-4B-3(E) (2006); 73 Penn. Stat.
§ 2107(1) (2005); The South Dakota right (which applies only to state-acquired art) expires twenty
years after death. S.D. Cod. Laws § 1-22-16(6) (2006). Several of the remaining state statutes do
not specify whether the right survives the author's death.
104. Zuber, supra note 68, at 492-508 (1992); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, How Fine Art Fares
Post VARA, 1 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 1, 29-45 (1997); Joshua H. Brown, Creators Caught in the
Middle: Visual Artists Rights Act Preemption of State Moral Rights Laws, 15 Hast. Comm./Ent. L.
J. 1003, 1005-1030 (1993); Neil Netanel, Copyright Alienability Restrictions and the Enhancement
of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 Rutgers L. J. 347, 351 n. 9 (1993), Salazar, supra
note 98, at 165.
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state moral rights protection remains available for authors to use in ap-
propriate cases. To determine what state-law protections continue to be
available, it is necessary to discuss the scope of preemption.
Copyright preemption is in some ways unusual. Unlike the typi-
cal case of preemption, the Copyright Act explicitly defines when fed-
eral copyright law preempts state law. When state-law moral rights are
involved, there are two separate steps to this analysis. The first step in-
volves § 301(f) of the Copyright Act, a special preemption provision
added to the Copyright Act along with VARA. The second - and often
overlooked - step in the analysis involves § 301(a), the general preemp-
tion provision of the Copyright Act. Even if a state law is not preempted
under the special VARA preemption provision of § 301(f), it can be pre-
empted if it parallels ordinary federal copyright too closely.
a. Preemption under § 301(f)
Congress's main goal in enacting § 301(f) was to ensure that
VARA is the exclusive source of integrity and attribution rights for
works of visual art. If a state law provides protections in works of visual
art that parallel the protections provided by VARA, it is likely pre-
empted. The section provides:
(f)(1) On or after the effective date set forth in section 9(a) of the Vis-
ual Artists Rights Act of 1990, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the rights conferred by section 106A with respect
to works of visual art to which the rights conferred by section 106A
apply are governed exclusively by section 106A and section 113(d)
and the provisions of this title relating to such sections. Thereafter, no
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any work of
visual art under the common law or statutes of any State.
(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) annuls or limits any rights or remedies
under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to -
(A) any cause of action from undertakings commenced before the
effective date set forth in section 9(a) of the Visual Artists Rights
Act of 1990;
(B) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not
equivalent to any of the rights conferred by section 106A with re-
spect to works of visual art;
(C) activities violating legal or equitable rights which extend be-
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yond the life of the author.105
Basically, there are two broad sets of laws that escape preemption
under this provision. First, under § 301(f)(2), three types of state laws
are categorically valid. Second, subsection (1) provides that even if a
law does not qualify for one of the categorical exceptions, it will be pre-
empted only if it affords rights that are "equivalent" to those afforded by
VARA.
The three categorical exceptions will save a handful of the state
moral rights provisions. First, although this exception is of increasingly
little importance, a state can apply all of its moral rights laws to acts that
occurred prior to VARA's effective date of June 1, 1991.1°6 Second, as
VARA's protections terminate on the death of the author, state law is not
preempted to the extent it provides posthumous protection." 7 Given that
several states extend moral rights protections for fifty years after the au-
thor's death, this provision will allow state law to apply once federal pro-
tection under VARA terminates.
The third of the categorical exceptions appears at first glance to
offer the most promise. Both subsection (1) and subsection 2(B) specify
that state laws protecting works that do not qualify as "works of visual
art" are not preempted." 8 None of the state laws use the phrase "works
of visual art" to define its scope of coverage. They instead use terms
such as "fine art"109 or simply "art. ' 0'°  On the other hand, a careful
105. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f).
106. 17 USC § 301(f)(2)(A). For a case applying this provision, see Pavia v. 1120 Avenue of
the Americas Associates, 901 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). One scholar has suggested that this
exception applies only if the author actually files her moral rights claim prior to June 1, 1991.
Zuber, supra note 68, at 493. This conclusion seems directly at odds with the statutory language,
which requires only that the "undertakings" giving rise to the cause of action, not the cause of action
itself, be "commenced" prior to VARA's effective date.
107. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(2)(C). Accord Brown, supra note 104, at 1028-1030; Zuber, supra
note 68, at 500; Kwall, supra note 11, at 33.
108. 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(1). Accord Gegenhuber v. Hystopolis Productions, Inc., 1992 WL
168836 (N.D. Ill.) (because VARA does not apply to puppets, states are free to grant moral rights
protections to authors in their puppets); Brown, supra note 104, at 1013-1015; Zuber, supra note 68,
at 494; Kwall, supra note 104, at 38-39. Professor Kwall's analysis also demonstrates how this re-
sult is consistent with Congress's policy concerns. The only arguably contrary authority is Board of
Managers of Soho International Arts Condominium, 2003 WL 21403333 (S.D.N.Y.) (unpublished),
where the court indicates in dictum that this exception applies only if the state law covers works that
fall entirely outside the subject matter of copyright, not merely outside the definition of "works of
visual art." Id. at *13. Indeed, Section 301(f)(1) by its very redundancy underscores the point that it
does not preempt state efforts to protect non-VARA works. Both sentences in that section make it
clear that states are prevented only from offering VARA-type rights in works of visual art.
109. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code. § 987(a) (2006); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-116t(a) (2005); La. R.S.
§ 51:2153 (2005); 27 Maine R.S. § 303 (2005).
110. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 597.740 (2005).
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analysis of the definitions of these terms reveals that the state laws by
and large protect the same kinds of works as those falling under VARA:
original or limited edition paintings, sculptures, statues, and other static
visual works, where the expression is embodied in a discernable original
or set of originals rather than in mass-produced copies."' Other works
that might fall within the lay definition of "fine art," such as music and
poetry, are excluded from these state laws, just as they are excluded
from VARA. Nevertheless, in a few cases significant differences exist
between the scope of VARA and state law. California and Connecticut,
for example, extend moral rights to graphic arts, as well as "crafts in
clay, textiles, fiber, wood, metal, plastic, and like materials.""' 2 Massa-
chusetts law likewise covers crafts, and further protects films, audio and
videotapes, and holograms." 3  Moreover, while VARA excludes works
for hire from the definition of works of visual art,"14 many states give
moral rights protection without consideration as to whether the work is
produced by an employee or is commissioned." 5 For these works that
fall without VARA, states are free to provide rights of attribution and
integrity, even if those rights are identical to those provided by
VARA.
116
Even if a state law does not fit within one of these categorical ex-
ceptions, § 301(f)(1) preempts it only if it provides rights that are
equivalent to any of the rights set out in VARA. There is almost no
111. The New Jersey statute is fairly typical. It defines a "work of fine art" as:
any original work of visual or graphic art in any medium, which includes, but is not lim-
ited to, paintings, drawings, prints, and photographic prints or sculptures of a limited edi-
tion of no more than 300 copies; provided, however, that a work of fine art shall not in-
clude sequential imagery as in motion pictures.
N.J. Stat. §2A:24A-3(e) (2006). As discussed infra at text accompanying notes 138 to 141, Louisi-
ana law also contains a unique right to prevent the display of authentic originals produced by the
artist. Unlike the other moral rights in Louisiana law, this right extends to all "works," not merely
works of fine art. La. R.S. § 51:2153(3) (2005). To the extent this right protects items other than
VARA works of visual art, it is not preempted by § 301(f).
112. Cal. Civ. Code §982(a)(1) (2006); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §42-116s(2) (2004).
113. Annot. Laws Mass. G.L. ch. 231, § 85S(b) (2005).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of"work of visual art" part 2(B)).
115. Compare Cal. Civ. Code § 987 (2006) (no rights in work prepared under contract for
commercial use); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-116s(2) (fine art does not include works prepared by em-
ployees within the scope of their employment); and Annot. L. Mass. G.L. ch. 231, § 85S(b) (2005)
(definition of artist excludes employees acting within scope of employment), with Utah Code Ann.
§ 9-6-409 (2005) (rights exist even in commissioned works).
116. As will be discussed below, § 301 (a) of the Copyright Act also preempts some state law.
However, a state law is preempted under that section only if it affords rights that are equivalent to
those provided by § 106. Rights of attribution and integrity are not equivalent to any of the rights
set out in § 106.
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precedent directly dealing with what § 301(f) means by "equivalent"." 7
However, because § 301(f) is modeled after § 301(a), the general pre-
emption provision of the Copyright Act, courts should use a similar ap-
proach to both provisions. Like § 301(0, § 301(a) turns on "equiva-
lency." And there is plenty of case law under § 301(a) defining that
term. The basic analysis under § 301(a) involves the "extra element"
test. Under this approach, a state law that is similar to copyright is pre-
empted unless it contains a meaningful extra element that distinguishes it
from an ordinary § 106 copyright infringement claim."' Applying this
test to § 301(f) requires dissecting the VARA and state-law rights to
compare their elements.
Certain state-law rights are not equivalent to any of VARA's
rights, and are accordingly not preempted. For example, VARA has
nothing like the California droit de suite or residual ownership right. But
most of the state-law rights are generally similar to the rights set out in
VARA. Like VARA, the state laws focus on attribution, dissociation,
and integrity." 19 Nevertheless, when one turns to the particulars, there
are numerous differences between the state laws and VARA. While
technical differences alone are not enough to make rights non-
equivalent, significant differences may save the state law from preemp-
tion.
There are six major differences between various state laws and
VARA. First, while VARA's integrity right covers only intentional al-
terations, many state laws also allow recovery when the alteration is ef-
fected by gross negligence. 120 In this case, two scholars have argued that
the state law right is still equivalent to VARA's integrity right.'2 ' This
117. The only case directly dealing with the question is Board of Managers of Soho Interna-
tional Arts Condominium, 2003 WL 21403333 (S.D.N.Y.) (unpublished), which held that the integ-
rity right in New York law was preempted because it was equivalent to the integrity right set out in
VARA.
118. Del Madera Props. v. Rhodes & Gardner, 820 F.2d 973, 977 (9th Cir. 1987), overruled on
other grounds, Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (unfair competition and unjust enrich-
ment claims preempted); Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 288 n.3 (6th Cir. 2005) (state-court
contract action preempted).
119. See, e.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 597.730 (attribution and dissociation), 597.740(1) (dis-
play of altered work); 73 Penn. Stat. §§ 2103 (attribution and dissociation), 2104 (integrity); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 5-62-4 (2006) (right of attribution and to disclaim authorship of altered work).
120. Cal. Civ. Code § 987(c)(2) (2006) (person who damages work in the process of framing,
conservation, or restoration can be liable for gross negligence); Annot. Laws Mass. G.L. ch. 23 1, §
85S(c); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 597.774(c) (no state of mind requirement other than reasonable fore-
seeability of harm); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-4B-3(A) (2006); 73 Penn. Stat. §2104(b) (2005) (person
who damages work in the process of framing, conservation, or restoration can be liable for gross
negligence) S.D. Cod. Laws § 1-22-16(3) (2006) (no state of mind requirement).
121. Kwall, supra note 104, at 32; Robert A. Gorman, Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 38 J.
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conclusion is correct. This difference in the infringer's state of mind
does not affect the author's core right to protect the integrity of her work.
Second, some state laws differ from VARA in the types of acts
that violate the integrity right. VARA deals with the act of alteration it-
self. Under some state laws, however, the author cannot sue unless
someone displays the altered work.'22 This difference can be significant.
Because the person who alters the work and the person who displays it
could be different, the state laws could create rights against different in-
fringers. Notwithstanding these differences, state laws that turn on dis-
play rather than alteration should be preempted.123 Note that VARA
does not give the author the right to sue for all alterations. Instead, al-
teration of a work is actionable only when that alteration could affect the
author's honor or reputation. If an alteration occurs in private, and the
altered work is never viewed by the public, the author's honor or reputa-
tion will not suffer, and VARA's integrity right would not apply. Thus,
even though the VARA integrity right is sometimes viewed as nothing
more than an art preservation law, the requirement of harm to reputation
suggests that Congress was also concerned with protecting the author's
good name. Because VARA and the state laws serve the same ends, and
because the integrity right under both only comes into play when the al-
tered work is available to the public, state integrity rights are preempted
regardless of whether they make alteration or display the operative act.
The third difference between VARA and state laws likewise in-
volves the integrity right. As noted just above, VARA allows an author
to sue for an alteration of her work only when the alteration could dam-
age her honor or reputation. While many state statutes contain a similar
limit, at least five states purport to allow the author to sue for any altera-
tion, without requiring her to prove such damage.'24 Although these
state laws involve a similar concern with artistic reputation, 125 these
states let the author, rather than a court, determine when such harm has
occurred. These state laws should also be preempted. Indeed, the House
Copyright Soc'y 233, 240 (1990).
122. La. R.S. §§ 51:2153, 2154 (2005); 27 Me. R.S. § 303(2); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
597.740(1) (2005); N.J. Stat. §2A:24A-4 (2005); N.Y. CLS Art & Cult. Aff. § 14.03(1) (2005); R.I.
Gen. Laws § 5-62-3 (2006).
123. Although Professor Kwall has discussed this issue, she never concludes whether the state
laws that turn on display are preempted under § 301(f). Kwall, supra note 104, at 34-35.
124. Cal. Civ. Code § 987(a) (2006); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-116t(a) (2004); Annot. Laws
Mass. G.L. ch. 231, § 85S(c) (2005); 73 Penn. Stat. § 2104(a) (2005); R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-75.2-8
(2006).
125. Four of the state statutes contain explicit findings that alteration and destruction affect an
artist's reputation. Cal. Civ. Code. § 987(a) (2006); Annot. Laws Mass. G.L. ch 231, § 85S(a)
(2005); N.J. Stat. § 2A:24A-2 (2005); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 13-4B-1 (2006).
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Report for VARA directly touches upon this particular question:
For example, the new law [VARA] will preempt a state law granting
the right of integrity in paintings or sculptures, even if a State law is
broader than Federal law, such as by providing a right of attribution or
integrity with respect to covered works without regard to injury to the
author's honor or reputation. 1
26
The state-law ight is not qualitatively different than the VARA in-
tegrity right; it is merely a difference in degree.
127
Fourth, there is occasionally some discrepancy between state-law
and VARA dissociation rights. VARA gives an author the right to pre-
vent use of her name both in connection with works she did not create,
and in connection with works that she did create, but have since been al-
tered in a way that could harm her reputation. Several state laws provide
a similar right, but with significantly different conditions. Under these
state laws, the author can dissociate herself from her prior work for any
"just and valid reason."'' 28  Some statutes specify that a just and valid
reason "includes" situations where the work has been altered in a way
that may harm the author's reputation.129 The Nevada statute is slightly
different, giving the author the right to disclaim authorship whenever
necessary to protect her reputation, but providing that defacing or muti-
lation is "presumed" to harm reputation. 3 ° However, as the term "in-
clude" does not necessarily mean "limited to," these statutes leave open
the possibility that there could also be reasons to dissociate that have
nothing to do with the author's reputation. The California, Massachu-
setts, and New Mexico statutes go still further, as they do not attempt to
define what constitutes a just and valid reason.' Puerto Rico law ar-
guably goes the furthest, giving the author a right to retract her claim of
authorship without any conditions whatsoever. 3 2 Because all of these
126. Legislative History, supra note 38, at 6931.
127. Nor do these state laws contain an extra element. Indeed, they actually contain one fewer
element than the VARA integrity right, as the author need not demonstrate harm to reputation in
order to recover under state law.
128. Cal. Civ. Code § 987(d) (2006); La. R.S. § 51:2154(C) (2005); 27 Maine R.S. § 303(3)
(2005); Annot. Laws Mass. G.L. ch. 231, § 85S(d) (2005); N.J. Stat. § 2A:24A-5 (2005); N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 13-4B-3(B) (2006); N.Y. CLS Art & Cult. Aff. § 14.03(2)(a) (2005); R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-62-
4(a) (2006). Pennsylvania, by contrast, provides that mutilation is a per se reason to disclaim au-
thorship. 73 Penn. Stat. § 2103 (2005).
129. La. R.S. § 51:2154(C) (2005); N.J. Stat. § 2A:24A-5 (2005); N.Y. CLS Art & Cult. Aff. §
14.03(2)(a) (2005); R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-62-4(a) (2006).
130. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 597.730(2) (2005).
131. Cal. Civ. Code § 987(d) (2006); Annot. Laws Mass. G.L. ch. 231, § 85S(d) (2005); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 13-4B-3(B) (2006).
132. Leyes de Puerto Rico Anotadas tit. 31, § 1401.
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laws may allow for dissociation in cases where dissociation would not
be available under VARA, they arguably go further than VARA's integ-
rity right. Nevertheless, there is a clear consensus that these state laws
are preempted.133 Although the legislative history quoted above is less
directly on point, it also supports this conclusion. '
Fifth, while VARA's rights only apply to original works, several
of the state laws extend moral rights to situations where the infringer has
reproduced the original. This extension can affect both the integrity and
dissociation rights. With respect to integrity, some state statutes allow
the author to prevent public display of distorted reproductions.'35 Simi-
larly, once a distorted reproduction is produced, some states allow the
author to sue for dissociation when her name is used in connection with
that reproduction.1 6  Although these rights are in one sense merely
broadened versions of the VARA rights, they are qualitatively different,
and therefore should not be considered equivalent under § 301(f). With
respect to the dissociation right, the legislative history to VARA indi-
cates that VARA would not preempt a cause of action for misattribution
of a reproduction of a work of visual art.'37 Although the legislative his-
tory does not discuss integrity rights in copies, it stands to reason that §
301(f) would not preempt such state laws. A right to control the integ-
rity of a reproduction is fundamentally different than VARA's right to
control the integrity of the author's own physical works. Thus, while
state-law dissociation and integrity rights would be preempted when ap-
plied to originals, they are not preempted by § 301(f) when applied to
reproductions. Unless these state laws are preempted by § 301(a) - an
issue to be discussed below - they would remain available to authors in
the appropriate case.
The sixth difference between state-law moral rights and VARA
involves the Louisiana moral rights statute. That statute contains a
unique "right of display," which gives an author the right to prevent dis-
play or other publication of work.38 in circumstances where such display
133. Zuber, supra note 68, at 499; Kwall, supra note 104, at 32; Brown, supra note 104, at
1019.
134. See supra text accompanying note 126.
135. La. R. S. §§ 51:2153(2) & (3) (2005); 27 Maine R.S. § 303(2) (2005); Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 597.740(1) (2005); N.J. Stat. § 2A:24A-4 (2005); N.Y. CLS Art & Cult. Aff. § 14.03(1)
(2005).
136. L.A. R. S. § 51:2154(C)(2005); 27 Maine R.S. § 303(2) (2005); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §
597.730(2) (2005); N.Y. CLS Art & Cult. Aff. § 14.03(2)(a) (2005); R.I. Gen. Laws § 5-62-3
(2006).
137. Legislative History, supra note 38, at 6931. Accord Zuber, supra note 68, at 503-04.
138. As noted supra in note 111, the display right applies to all copyright works, not merely
works of visual art. To the extent that an author uses this provision to protect a work that does not
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or publication would harm the author's reputation.139 This right is equiva-
lent to the VARA dissociation right in situations where the work itself
has been altered, or where lighting or some other aspect of display alters
the appearance of the work.14 However, the Louisiana law on its face
also applies to originals or reproductions that are displayed without any
alteration or distortion. For purposes of discussion, this right to disown
one's own work can be labeled a right of "disavowal." 4 ' Although
VARA would preempt use of this provision in situations where someone
presented a distorted alteration or original to the public, nothing in
VARA deals with the display of accurate versions of the author's work.
Indeed, under VARA any harm to the author caused by the way a work
is presented to the public is actionable only if it modifies the appearance
of the work, such as poor lighting. 42 To the extent that this section ap-
plies to display or publication of the author's own work, or faithful re-
production, it provides rights that are not equivalent to any rights in
VARA. On the other hand, like state moral rights laws that apply to re-
productions, the Louisiana law may also run the risk of preemption un-
der § 301(a), as the rights it affords look much like the § 106 rights of
display and reproduction. The issue, then, is whether these moral rights
laws that are valid under § 301(f) are nevertheless preempted under §
301(a).
b. Preemption under § 301(a)
Like § 301(0, § 301(a) employs an equivalency analysis to de-
termine the scope of copyright preemption. 143 But it focuses on a differ-
qualify as a VARA work of visual art, § 301(0 clearly does not preempt the law.
139. La. Rev. Stat. § 51.2153(3) (2005).
140. Admittedly, the VARA rule governing lighting (17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2)) applies only in
situations where the infringer acted with gross negligence, while the Louisiana law on its face im-
poses strict liability (La. Rev. Stat. § 51.2153(3) (2005)). However, that difference in level of cul-
pability is not enough to render the laws non-equivalent. See supra text accompanying note 121.
141. The Louisiana law is not the only one that can be read to create a right of disavowal. The
absolute right of retraction in the Puerto Rican law, if read literally, allows the author to dissociate
herself from her work for any reason, or for no reason. Similarly, under the state laws which allow
dissociation for any just and valid reason (see supra note 128), an author could possibly demon-
strate a reason even if the work is not altered. To the extent the statutes actually do create a right of
disavowal, they present a very different preemption problem. Arguably, the disavowal right is
qualitatively different than anything provided by VARA, and accordingly would not be considered
"equivalent." However, this author strongly doubts that either the Puerto Rican law or the state laws
discussed in supra note 128 were intended to create a right of disavowal. There are certainly no
cases recognizing such a right in those jurisdictions, nor any of which this author is aware where
such a claim was even asserted.
142. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2).
143. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
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ent set of federal rights. Whereas § 301(f) asks if the right in question is
equivalent to a right afforded by VARA (§ 106A), § 301(a) asks if the
right is equivalent to any of the exclusive rights of a copyright holder
under § 106.'" A state law right that is not equivalent to VARA may
nevertheless be equivalent to one of the § 106 rights.
Section 301(a) could in theory affect any state-law moral right
that is not preempted by § 301(f). 45 In truth, however, § 301(a) is likely
to play a role only in the two cases discussed above; namely, moral
rights in reproductions and Louisiana's display right as applied to unal-
tered works. In the other situations where § 301(f) does not preempt -
attribution and integrity rights in originals that qualify for one of §
301 (f)'s explicit exceptions (e.g., rights in non-VARA works) - the right
in question is qualitatively different than anything afforded by § 106,
and is therefore not equivalent for purposes of § 301(a).'46 Discussion
will therefore focus only on reproduction and the display right.
A state-law right to control reproductions resembles both the §
106(1) right to reproduce a work and the § 106(2) right to prepare de-
rivative works."' Notwithstanding this facial similarity, however, state-
law moral rights in reproductions should not be preempted under §
301 (a) because they contain a significant extra element that distinguishes
them from the § 106(1) and § 106(2) rights. Unlike a copyright owner
suing under § 106, under most state laws an author suing because of an
144. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
145. Of course, if a law is preempted by §301(f), it is unnecessary to consider whether § 301(a)
might also apply. The discussion accordingly ignores laws such as the state integrity laws that ap-
ply only when a work is displayed. See supra text accompanying notes 122 to 123.
146. Professor Kwall has suggested that in the case of one of § 301(f)'s explicit exceptions - a
state-law right of integrity that protects non-VARA works - the state-law right would be preempted
by § 301(a) because it is equivalent to the § 106 right to create derivative works. Kwall, supra note
104, at 41. But that conclusion is problematic. Professor Kwall's argument turns on the premise
that if copyright law affords someone a remedy in a particular situation, state law cannot also allow
recovery. However, that argument reads all meaning out of the "extra element" test. Under that
test, it is often possible for both federal and state law to allow recovery. The key to the preemption
issue is whether state law requires the claimant to prove a significant fact that she would not need to
prove in a copyright infringement claim. Thus, regardless of whether alteration of a work violates
the right to produce derivative works (a point that is itself in some doubt; compare Lee v. A.R.T.
Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997) (mounting art on a ceramic tile is not preparation of a derivative
work) with Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co., 865 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1988) (same
situation, court finds that mounted work is a derivative work), the state law preventing alteration
will survive preemption as long as it conditions recovery on a meaningful extra element. As dis-
cussed in the next paragraph of the text, state law integrity rights do contain a meaningful extra
element.
147. A derivative work, after all, is essentially a work that is based upon another, but is suffi-
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altered reproduction must demonstrate harm to her reputation.1 48 That
requirement of harm to reputation makes it clear that the moral right fo-
cuses on a concern not directly pertinent to either the § 106(1) or §
106(2) right, and should accordingly qualify as a distinguishing extra
element.
For the same reason, the Louisiana display right should survive
preemption under § 301(a). That right turns on the same operative
events as several § 106 rights, including the rights of display and distri-
bution.149 But like state laws dealing with reproductions, the Louisiana
law contains the extra element of proving harm to reputation. 5° The
purpose of the law is to protect the author's reputation rather than the
economic and proprietary interests that are the focus of copyright.
In summary, most of the state-law moral rights are preempted.
But several categories of state moral rights laws will escape preemption.
These unpreempted rights complement the rights set out in federal law,
and may present similar First Amendment issues.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES IN MORAL RIGHTS
LEGISLATION
A. When Moral Rights Laws Clash with the First Amendment
At the risk of sounding tautological, the First Amendment free
speech clause protects only speech. However, the definition of speech
includes more than the spoken word. All forms of verbal communica-
tions, including books, sign language, and software, are covered. 5' The
First Amendment also protects non-verbal communication such as mu-
sic, painting, and sculpture." 2 Generally speaking, the First Amendment
definition of speech includes all recognized forms of communication.'53
Some moral rights disputes clearly involve speech. Cases involv-
148. Of the statutes cited supra in notes 135 and 136, only La. R. S. § 51:2153(2) and R.I. Gen.
Laws § 5-62-3 (2006) do not require the author to demonstrate harm to her reputation. These two
laws would be preempted because they lack an extra element.
149. The right of display is set out in 17 U.S.C. § 106 (5), while distribution is set out in §
106(3).
150. La. R. S. § 51:2153(3) (2005). For some reason, while the display right requires proof of
harm to reputation, the right of integrity in § 51:2153(2) does not require proof of harm.
151. See, e.g., Universal City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2nd Cir. 2001) for an excellent
discussion of how the First Amendment protects software.
152. Lerner & Bresler, supra note 33, at 667 et seq.
153. However, not all forms of speech are actually protected by the First Amendment. Certain
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ing the rights of attribution and dissociation are the most obvious exam-
ples. These moral rights regulate verbal statements that the infringer
makes about who created the work, statements that undoubtedly qualify
as speech. In some cases, the infringer is prevented from making false
statements of attribution. 154 In others, the infringer may be under a posi-
tive obligation to speak.'55 Because the First Amendment right to free
speech includes the right to refrain from speaking, coerced speech is also
a First Amendment concern.'56 Therefore, all attribution and dissocia-
tion cases will involve First Amendment speech.
Other moral rights cases typically involve non-verbal acts rather
than words or symbols. For example, one can destroy or alter a painting
without uttering a word. But that fact alone does not render the First
Amendment inapplicable. In some situations, conduct may qualify as
First Amendment speech. However, conduct is protected as speech only
if it is "sufficiently imbued with elements of communication."' 157 If con-
duct lacks that communicative aspect, nothing in the First Amendment
in any way limits government's power to regulate it. To determine
whether conduct is speech, courts consider both the actor's intent and the
audience's perception. 58 Some forms of conduct, such as flag-burning
and marching, are so often used to communicate that they almost always
qualify as speech, 159 while other cases call for a more individualized in-
quiry.
A considerable number of moral rights disputes will involve only
non-communicative conduct, and accordingly present no First Amend-
ment issues. Consider, for example, the droit de suite. This right to re-
154. The right of attribution prevents the infringer from stating that anyone other than the au-
thor created the work. The right of dissociation involves the converse, as it prevents the infringer
from saying that the author produced a work actually produced by someone else.
155. In some dissociation cases, a person has stated that the author is the source of a particular
work which she did in fact not prepare. These cases involve a limit on voluntary speech. But disso-
ciation cases may also involve coerced speech. For example, if the person displaying the work says
nothing about source, but the circumstances surrounding the display lead people to believe the
plaintiff author is the source, the person displaying the work may be required to make a statement
that the author is not the source.
156. West Virginia State Board ofEduc. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (requiring the pledge
of allegiance in schools violates First Amendment).
157. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
158. Id.at410.
159. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (buming draft cards); Tinker v.
Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (black armbands); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405 (putting a peace symbol on a flag); Bames v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (nude
dancing); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (flag burning), United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S.
310 (1990) (same); Boy Scouts of American v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (exclusion of member of
a group based on sexuality).
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ceive a percentage of the profits on resale does not implicate the First
Amendment for the simple reason that the regulated act - the payment -
communicates money, not ideas. Although there are situations where a
forced payment has been found to implicate the First Amendment, the
sort of payment required by the droit de suite is not one of them. 160 The
payment of a percentage of the sales price conveys no message by itself.
Nor is the money earmarked to fund particular speech with which the
person disagrees. 16  The droit de suite has no greater effect on the pur-
chaser's speech than a sales tax, and is therefore constitutional under the
First Amendment.
The integrity and destruction rights are a closer question. Suppose
the owner of a statue purposefully drops it on the pavement and smashes
it. If the sculpture is a work of "fine art" or of "recognized stature," that
act violates the destruction right. However, the simple act of dropping a
statue does not constitute speech protected by the First Amendment.
Even if the infringer intended the destruction as a comment on the qual-
ity of the statue, and even if the act of dropping the statue occurred in
public, it is unlikely that the act would be perceived by the audience as
conveying any message. On the other hand, it is easy to conceive of
situations where destruction or mutilation of a work would qualify as
speech. Burning a book or painting in a public square is speech. Alter-
ing a painting by adding well-recognized symbols such as a blindfold, a
swastika, or a fig leaf would likewise be recognized as an act of commu-
nication.162  Therefore, a court adjudicating an integrity or destruction
claim would need to evaluate all the underlying circumstances to deter-
mine whether an alteration or destruction would qualify as speech. 163 If
it concludes that the alteration or discussion was either not intended or
not understood as speech, allowing the author to recover presents no
First Amendment concerns.
The moral right of disclosure presents a similar situation. Merely
displaying a work publicly does not in and of itself qualify as speech.
Although the work is the speech of the author, the act of disclosure need
160. For example, in Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990), the Court held that
compulsory bar dues could not be used to endorse views with which a member disagreed.
161. The money goes to the author, who can choose what to do with it. The author may use it
to produce more art, or simply take a trip.
162. For this reason, one commentator has suggested that the integrity right is the moral right
that intrudes most greatly on artistic expression. Ong, supra note 11, at 298.
163. Several integrity and destruction cases have involved a landowner who wants to alter or
raze a building that contains an integrated mural or sculpture. In these cases, the landowner is not
engaging in speech. Although erecting a new building may be speech in certain cases, tearing down
the old building is not a comment on the work of art.
216 [1:185
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not involve speech by the infringer.1" Again, however, this conclusion
is not absolute. There could well be situations in which, given the over-
all context, the act of presenting the work to the public could both be in-
tended and perceived as a communication by the presenter. Like the de-
struction and integrity rights, whether the disclosure right involves
speech depends on the circumstances.
The remainder of this article focuses on cases where the in-
fringer's act is speech. Note, however, that these cases are a minority of
all moral rights cases. Many moral rights disputes will not involve any
form of speech protected by the First Amendment. In these cases, the
infringer cannot invoke the First Amendment as a defense to liability.
Concluding that a particular moral rights violation involves no speech
spares one the trouble of dealing with the multi-part analysis set out be-
low.
B. Special Considerations That May Apply to Moral Rights Protections
in Federal Copyright Law
VARA and the § 106 disclosure right are the most important of
the moral rights laws currently in force in the United States. Although it
protects fewer works than some of its state-law counterparts, 165 VARA is
more influential because of its nationwide reach. That VARA and § 106
are federal laws may also prove helpful in dealing with the First
Amendment. Two theories could conceivably give these federal laws an
edge in any First Amendment challenge. The first turns on the fact that
they are part of federal copyright law, a body of law than itself enjoys a
somewhat special First Amendment status. The second theory, which
applies only to VARA, relies on the Supreme Court precedent dealing
with the effect of a treaty on Congress's legislative jurisdiction.
1. Copyright and Free Speech
Moral rights are not the only authors' rights that implicate the
First Amendment free speech clause. Copyright itself limits speech. A
copyright gives the owner the power to prevent others from reproducing,
disseminating, or making public her expression. 166 In addition, the right
to produce "derivative works" prevents anyone other than the copyright
164. A similar conclusion would apply to the Louisiana display right in La. R. S. § 51:2153(3),
which has some of the traits of a right of disclosure.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 99 to 103 for a discussion of how some provisions of
the state laws are broader than VARA.
166. See 17 U.S.C. § 106.
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owner from producing a work that is merely recognized as based upon
the author's work, even if the derivative work is a sequel or otherwise
notably different. 167  The infringing work in all of these cases usually
qualifies as a form of speech under the First Amendment. 68  Remedies
for copyright infringement include not only actual damages and injunc-
tions, but also "statutory damages," which bear no direct relation to the
copyright owner's actual harm.169 Thus, copyright substantially limits a
potential infringer's speech.
Debate persists in the academic literature about whether copy-
right is consistent with the First Amendment. 170 To the Supreme Court,
however, the answer is clear. In its 1985 decision in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,7' the Court held that the First
Amendment did not shield a media defendant from liability for repro-
ducing portions of President Ford's copyrighted memoirs.1 72  The Court
confirmed that ruling almost twenty years later in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 173
where it held that nothing in the First Amendment or the Copyright
Clause 174 precluded Congress from extending the term of existing copy-
rights by twenty years. The opinions in both cases suggest that federal
copyright law, by its nature, presumptively satisfies the First Amend-
ment. If copyright is categorically exempt from the First Amendment,
VARA and the § 106 disclosure right might be per se constitutional
167. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).
168. Even a verbatim reproduction could qualify as speech by the reproducer. The infringer
might be choosing to send his message by using another's words or drawings.
169. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c).
170. See, e.g., Floyd A. Abrams, First Amendment and Copyright, 35 J. Copr. Socy 1 (1987);
Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limitations on the Protection of
Expression, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 283 (1979); Gary L. Francione, Facing the Nation: The Standards for
Copyright, Infringement, and Fair Use of Factual Works, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 519 (1986); Charles C.
Goetsch, Parody as Free Speech - The Replacement of the Fair Use Doctrine by First Amendment
Protection, 3 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 39 (1980); Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment,
70 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1970); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600; Melville B.
Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17
UCLA L. Rev. 1180 (1970); L. Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L.
Rev. 1 (1987); David E. Shipley, Conflicts Between Copyright and the First Amendment After
Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 1986 BYU L. Rev. 983 (19860; Alfred C. Yen, A
First Amendment on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's "Total Concept and
Feel", 38 Emory L.J. 393 (1989).
171. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
172. Id. The holding in Harper & Row is especially noteworthy because the work in question
- President Ford's memoirs - arguably involved political speech of significant public interest, which
lies at the "core" of First Amendment protection.
173. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
174. U.S. CONST. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 8.
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simply because they are part of the federal Copyright Act.
a. VARA
Because VARA is in the Copyright Act, it is tempting to con-
clude that the ruling of Harper & Row and Eldred applies with equal
force to VARA's moral rights. But that conclusion does not automati-
cally follow. Although VARA is part of the Copyright Act, it is differ-
ent in many respects from the copyright rights at issue in those cases.
Before concluding that Harper & Row and Eldred govern the constitu-
tionality of VARA, it is important to consider why the Court in those
cases held that copyright enjoys a special First Amendment status.
VARA shares copyright's presumption of validity only if it shares the
features of copyright that the Court identified as important in those
cases.
Harper & Row and Eldred cited several features of copyright that
helped make it consistent with the right to free speech. These various
features can be grouped in two broad categories: protections and pedi-
gree. Harper & Row focused on the former, citing two significant doc-
trinal limits on copyright that reduce its impact on free speech. The first,
commonly called the "idea/expression" distinction, is the core concept
that copyright protects only expressions of an idea, not the idea itself.175
Even if someone has a copyright in a particular expression, everyone is
free to express the same idea (or equally importantly, a competing idea)
using different words or symbols.'7 6 Second, the Court noted that copy-
right's "fair use" defense allows others to use even the copyrighted ex-
pression itself for educational, critical, or in some cases even personal,
purposes."' Both of these limits temper copyright's effect on speech, as
they leave a potential infringer with a number of ways to deliver any
message he might desire to convey.
Eldred affirmed the importance of these protections, but also bol-
stered the case for copyright by invoking copyright's "pedigree." The
Eldred Court made considerable weight of the fact that copyright itself is
175. Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 556.
176. Id. A corollary to the idea/expression rule in copyright is the notion of "idea/expression
merger." In those rare cases where there is only one, or a very few, number of ways to express an
idea, even the chosen expression cannot be protected, out of a concern that allowing protection
would give the copyright owner a monopoly on the idea itself. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble
Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (no copyright protection for rules to simple game, because of lim-
ited number of ways those rules can be expressed).
177. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560.
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a constitutional value. 7 8 Article I's Copyright Clause explicitly gives
Congress the authority to enact copyright laws.179 Although the First
Amendment was adopted after the Copyright Clause, the two provisions
were adopted quite near to each other in time. 180  To the Court, this
"proximity in time" indicates that the Framers saw no clash between
copyright's limited monopolies and free speech. 8' Had the Framers con-
sidered copyright a free speech problem, they would have included lan-
guage in the First Amendment explicitly addressing the issue. 182 That
the Framers were instead silent is strong evidence that they perceived of
copyright, as least as it existed at that time, as a right that presented no
real threat to freedom of expression. 1
83
It is crucial that neither Harper & Row nor Eldred suggests that
copyright is completely exempt from the First Amendment. 184  The
Copyright Clause is not a blanket exception to the Bill of Rights. The
Supreme Court in both cases makes it clear that it is necessary to look
beyond the label and consider the particular aspects of the law in ques-
tion. First, it is essential that the law provide certain protections to
speakers, either the idea/expression and fair use limits or possibly some-
thing equivalent. Second, Eldred stresses that the law in question should
not only be enacted under the Copyright Clause, but should comport
with the Framers' perception of copyright law.'85 Thus, VARA benefits
from the rationale of Harper & Row and Eldred only if it shares the pro-
tections and pedigree of the rights at issue in those cases. As both cases
dealt with § 106, 186 it is necessary to compare VARA with that section.
VARA does afford some of the same protections as § 106. For
178. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, §. 8, cl. 8.
180. The original Constitution took effect in 1787, while the First Amendment came into force
in 1791.
181. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. The appellate court in Eldred found that "copyrights are categorically immune from chal-
lenges under the First Amendment." Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The Su-
preme Court expressly disavowed this broad statement. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 221. Other courts and
commentators share the sentiment of the appellate court. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v.
Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979) ("The first amendment is not a license
to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual property.").
185. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 199-200.
186. Eldred technically deals with 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), which defines the term of a copyright.
However, the real effect of that provision is to define the life of the § 106 rights. Note that the term
of VARA rights is not defined by § 302(a), but is instead specifically defined by VARA itself. 17
U.S.C. § 106A(d). Because the amendment at issue in Eldred had no effect on VARA, the Court
had no occasion to consider whether its argument applied to moral rights.
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example, while there are no cases on point, the idea/expression distinc-
tion certainly applies to VARA. 187  Even when an act that violates a
moral right qualifies as speech,'88 VARA does not foreclose all possible
ways of conveying the underlying idea. An infringer could choose to
alter a painting either to criticize the original, or because he feels that the
message of that painting could better be expressed in a different way.
VARA prevents him from conveying that idea by altering the original.
However, it does not prevent him from expressing that idea in other
ways. The infringer could have criticized the work by writing a critical
essay.189 Similarly, if he wants to express the core idea of the painting in
a better way, nothing in VARA prevents him from creating his own
painting, provided that he does not attribute his painting to the author.' 90
As adequate opportunities for expressing the idea will always be avail-
able, VARA does not squelch the infringer's underlying message. 9'
Fair use, the second inherent protection cited by Nation and El-
dred, presents a more difficult question. True, the Copyright Act explic-
itly provides that a fair use defense is available in a VARA case. 92 But
the statutory language provides no clues as to how the § 107 fair use fac-
tors apply in moral rights cases.'93 And the legislative history for VARA
hints that few moral rights defendants would prevail on a fair use de-
fense.'94 Because the nature of a moral rights violation is different than a
187. Professor Kelly has stated that the idea/expression principle "does not apply to moral
rights." Kelly, supra note 15, at 244. The basis for this statement is unclear. Professor Kelly is
certainly correct when she goes on to state that every work of visual art is a "unique expression"
entitled to protection. Id. However, underlying that particular expression is an abstract idea. Moral
rights laws protect the expression. But like copyright, they do not protect the idea.
188. See supra text accompanying notes 152 to 171 for a discussion of what sort of moral
rights violations will qualify as speech.
189. Moreover, the doctrine of fair use, discussed just below, would allow him to make limited
use of photographs or other reproductions of the original in crafting his critical essay.
190. Of course, the painting would have to be different enough from the original so as not to
qualify as a reproduction or derivative work of the original. However, that requirement stems from
§ 106, not from VARA.
191. It is possible, although hardly conceivable, that in some rare cases the only way to criti-
cize a work would be to alter it. In this situation, the "idea/expression merger" doctrine would come
into play, and allow the person to alter the work. Under that doctrine, when there is only one or a
very few ways to express an idea, all expressions are deemed to be the idea, and are accordingly not
protected by copyright.
192. The first sentence of 17 U.S.C. § 107 provides that the fair use defense is available in
cases under both § 106 and§ 106A.
193. Accord Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal Sys-
tem of Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 39 Cath. U. L. Rev. 945, 986 (1990). Yonover, supra
note 15, at 997-1001 also contains a good discussion of this issue.
194. Legislative History, supra note 38, at 6932 ("it is unlikely that such claims [that is, moral
rights claims] will be appropriate").
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§ 106 violation, it is not immediately clear that fair use affords a suffi-
cient First Amendment safeguard in moral rights cases.
To illustrate, consider a hypothetical variation on the well-known
Supreme Court fair use case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.195
That case held that a "rap" version of a rock song was likely to qualify as
a fair use, based mainly on the conclusion that the song was intended as
a parody of the original.196 To make the case fit the context of VARA,
suppose that an infringer alters a painting instead of a song, intending
the alteration to parody the original. The author of the original painting
sues under VARA. It might seem that the fair use argument would pro-
ceed along the same basic lines as in Campbell. After all, defendant's
use is for purposes of criticism or commentary, uses explicitly recog-
nized by § 107. However, certain key differences between the hypo-
thetical situation and Campbell might affect how the fair use factors ap-
ply.
First, it is unclear whether the "nature of the work" and "percent-
age of the work used" factors would have any impact on the analysis at
all. The former factor recognizes that copyright protects a wide variety
of works, ranging from maps and factual works (where greater borrow-
ing tends to be allowed) to works of pure fiction or imagination. VARA,
by contrast, only applies to a very narrow category of work - works of
visual art - which are typically works of fiction or imagination.197 Simi-
larly, VARA applies only when someone alters the original itself. Thus,
in one respect every defendant in a VARA case will have used all of the
original work. 98 Because Campbell noted that the defendants in that
case had taken no more than necessary, 99 the ultimate conclusion in that
case does not easily translate to the different VARA context.
Applying the other two fair use factors to the scenario suggests
that it is even less likely that the hypothetical alteration would qualify as
fair use. Consider the "nature of defendant's use" factor."' The in-
fringer did intend to parody, just as in Campbell. However, the infringer
could have accomplished that parody in other ways - including, as in
Campbell, producing his own work that merely reproduces identifiable
elements of the original. The infringer's choice to use the original also
implicates the fourth fair use factor, which considers the effect of the de-
195. 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
196. Id. at 588.
197. Accord Yonover, supra note 15, at 998.
198. Accord id. at 999. The legislative history for VARA also stresses this point as one reason
why fair use is unlikely to prove a viable defense. Legislative History, supra note 38, at 6932.
199. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586-88.
200. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
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fendant's act on the potential market for or value of the work.201 This
factor often proves the most important in the case law.20 2 The infringer's
alteration of a painting may cause far more market harm than the altera-
tion at issue in Campbell. First, that alteration destroys the market for
that original painting, as that original no longer exists. Second, the al-
teration reduces the value of the work to the author. Although VARA,
unlike a droit de suite, gives the author no legal right to the profits
earned on future resales of a painting, the incentive that VARA provides
is reputational rather than purely proprietary. If the painting is changed
into a parody of itself, the author will not receive the credit she would
otherwise have received from exposure of her work to the public. A
parody that engenders criticism of the author will diminish the value of
the work to the author, and accordingly her incentive to produce addi-
tional works.
This discussion is not meant to suggest that the fair use analysis
would clearly come out different in the hypothetical case than it did in
Campbell. The ultimate outcome might be the same - although more
likely because of the language of VARA rather than that of § 107.203
The point is merely that fair use does not necessarily protect speakers in
VARA cases the same way, or to the same extent, as in ordinary copy-
right infringement cases. Because fair use operates differently, the ra-
tionale of Harper & Row and Eldred may not apply.
Eldred also made it clear that copyright's pedigree was an impor-
tant part of the First Amendment analysis.20 4 Here, an argument analo-
gizing VARA to copyright is more likely to flounder. Even if VARA
protects free speech to the same extent as § 106, it does not have the
same pedigree as the copyright rules at issue in Harper & Row and El-
dred.
Reduced to its essentials, the Court's pedigree argument turns on
the temporal proximity between the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment. The First Amendment was enacted so shortly after Article
I that, had those who drafted the provisions perceived a significant con-
flict between copyright and free speech, they would have included spe-
201. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
202. The case of Video-Cinema Films, Inc. v. Lloyd E. Rigler-Lawrence E. Deutsch Founda-
tion, 2005 WL 2875327 (S.D.N.Y.) is typical. The court's discussion of fair use focuses primarily
on the effect of the infringer's use on the market, largely ignoring the other statutory factors.
203. If people recognize the work as a parody, there is unlikely to be any effect on the author's
reputation, precluding any claim under VARA. By requiring harm to reputation, VARA itself deals
indirectly with parodies.
204. See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20.
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cific language addressing the conflict.2" 5 But this argument turns on the
ever-elusive notion of the "Framers' intent." One must consider what the
Framers had in mind when they envisioned the sorts of "exclusive
rights" that Congress might create pursuant to the Copyright Clause.
Modem conceptions of the scope of the Copyright clause do not control.
The Court in Eldred specifically confirmed the importance of this his-
torical perspective when it stated, "when, as in this case, Congress has
not altered the traditional contours of copyright protection, further First
Amendment scrutiny is unnecessary.""2 6 If Congress goes outside these
traditional contours, the presumption of validity will not apply. Only if a
particular sort of copyright rule was anticipated by the Framers can one
imply anything from the fact that the Framers did not see to address it
when they enacted the First Amendment. 0 7
What, then, did the Framers envision by a copyright? There is lit-
tle doubt that as a general matter they perceived of copyright as a purely
economic right that afforded the owner control over dissemination of the
protected work.20 8 The rights in § 106 generally comport with this his-
torical understanding. 209 The fundamentally different moral rights -
rights borrowed from continental European law during the past fifty
years - were unknown in the Anglo-American legal system of the late
eighteenth century.210 Thus, whatever picture of copyright was in the
Framers' minds when they enacted the First Amendment would not have
included most of today's moral rights. There is accordingly no guarantee
that the Framers, had they been presented with the question, would not
have perceived a clash between VARA and the First Amendment.
For these reasons, one cannot conclude that the Supreme Court
would apply the reasoning of Harper & Row and Eldred to VARA. Al-
205. Id. at 219.
206. Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
207. The historical lens used in First Amendment analysis of author's rights differs from the
historical analysis used to determine whether moral rights fall within Congress's legislative jurisdic-
tion. When considering the First Amendment, we are not asking whether Article I, section 8 is
flexible enough to allow Congress to adopt new sorts of authors' rights such as moral rights. In-
stead, the issue is the narrower question of what the Framers could possibly envision at the time of
the First Amendment.
208. The first Copyright Act gave the copyright owner the exclusive right to printing, reprint-
ing, publishing, selling, and importing, protected works. Copyright Act of 1790 § 1 and 2, 1 Stat.
124. Taken together, these rights allowed the owner to regulate distribution of the work.
209. Current copyright law gives the owner the rights to reproduce the work, prepare derivative
works, and, for certain categories of works, to distribute copies, perform, display, and perform by
digital audio transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
210. Traditional copyright law gave the copyright owner no control over what a buyer did to or
said about the work after the work is sold. A buyer was free to alter the work in any way, and to
make whatever statement of authorship he chose.
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though both copyright and VARA may represent the valid exercise of
Congress's authority under the Copyright Clause, there are significant
differences between the VARA rights and traditional copyright. These
differences, both historical and practical, may create a clash between
moral rights and free speech.
b. The § 106 Disclosure Right
Unlike the rights set out in VARA, the § 106 disclosure right 1' is
likely to benefit from the presumption established by Harper & Row and
Eldred. As far as pedigree is concerned, the basic notion of a disclosure
right would have been familiar in the late 1700s. Since its very begin-
ning in the United States, federal copyright law has given the author
control over if and when her work is published.212 Current § 106 there-
fore fits neatly into the historical notion of a copyright incorporated in
Article I, § 8.
In addition, the § 106 disclosure right affords potential infringers
the forms of free speech protections deemed essential in both Harper &
Row and Eldred. The disclosure right does not squelch expression of
any idea, but prevents people from borrowing the author's particular
means of expressing that idea. The infringer is free to express that idea
in his own words. The disclosure right also readily accommodates the §
107 fair use factors, enabling others to use even the author's own ex-
pression in limited situations.213 Because the § 106 disclosure right en-
joys traditional copyright's pedigree, and gives the same protections
against undue encroachment on speech, it should categorically satisfy
211. As discussed above at text accompanying supra notes 77 to 79, § 106's rights of perform-
ance, distribution, and display, taken together, are highly similar to the traditional moral right of
disclosure.
212. The first copyright act protected unpublished works, giving the author the exclusive rights
to print and publish those works. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 24, § 1. By the 1909 Act, how-
ever, federal protection was available only from the point of publication. Copyright Act of 1909, §
2. Nevertheless, prior to publication an author could invoke a "common law copyright," which
included the right to prevent others from publishing the work. For an excellent discussion of com-
mon-law copyright and the notion of "publication," see Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr. v. CBS,
Inc., 194 F.3d 1211 (1999). One of the main features of the 1976 Act was that it accelerated the
point at which federal copyright was available from publication to fixation. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
Therefore, the current act clearly gives the author a right to control disclosure to the public.
213. Admittedly, Harper & Row suggests that it is tougher to demonstrate fair use if a work is
unpublished. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) ("The
fact that a work is unpublished is a critical element .... "). However, the Court did not establish a
per se rule that use of an unpublished work could never be fair. Indeed, such a rule would contra-
dict the statute. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) explicitly provides, "The fact that a work is unpublished shall
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the First Amendment. z14
2. The Treaty Power and Free Speech
Congress enacted VARA after the United States finally acceded
to the Berne Convention. Article 6 bis of this treaty requires signatory
nations to provide a right of attribution, and a limited right of integrity,
to authors.215 The provisions of the Berne Convention are not self-
executing, but depend on implementing legislation in the member na-
tions."' VARA represents the United States' main implementing legisla-
tion.
VARA's roots in a treaty may also have constitutional ramifica-
tions. In Missouri v. Holland,217 the Supreme Court held that Congress
may enact laws "necessary and proper" to implement the terms of a
211treaty. 8 More importantly, Holland indicates that the treaty adds to
Congress's base legislative power, enabling it to enact laws on subjects
otherwise outside its constitutional authority.219 Although criticized in
the literature, 220 Holland has never been overturned.
The possible implications of Holland for VARA are obvious.
The First Amendment is a constitutional limit on Congress's authority.
But the Berne Convention requires the United States to enact certain
moral rights legislation. If Holland stands for the proposition that a
treaty trumps existing constitutional limits on federal legislative jurisdic-
tion, Congress could enact a law to enforce the obligations of Berne
without regard to the First Amendment. All that Congress would need
to show in the case of VARA is that it enacted that law at least in part to
satisfy the United States' obligations under Berne.
214. The § 106 disclosure right can also be sustained under another argument, set out infra at
text accompanying notes 286 to 288.
215. The newer and more comprehensive GATT TRIPS incorporates many of the terms of the
Berne Convention. However, TRIPS does not incorporate the moral rights provisions of Article 6
bis. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Coun-
terfeit Goods of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article 9(1) (incorporates most of
Berne, but explicitly excludes Berne Article 6bis). Therefore, a nation that refused too provide the
moral rights called for in Article 6 bis would be in violation of Berne, but not TRIPS.
216. Berne Convention, supra note 6, Article 5(1), 6bis (3).
217. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
218. Id. at 432.
219. A similar, albeit more limited, rule applies in Australia. In Koowanta v. Bjelke-Petersen,
(1982) 56 SLJR 625, 39 ALR 417 (High Court), the High Court held that a treaty could augment the
legislative jurisdiction of the federal Parliament, but only if the treaty involved "external affairs"
within the meaning of Section 51 (xxix) of the Australian Constitution.
220. For a recent criticism of the rationale of Holland, see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Exe-
cuting the Treaty Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1867 (2005).
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However, nothing in Holland frees Congress from the First
Amendment. When applying Holland, it is important to distinguish be-
tween issues involving how to interpret positive grants of legislative au-
thority (primarily but not exclusively Article I) and the effect of affirma-
tive limits on that authority (primarily the Bill of Rights and the post
Civil War amendments, but also other scattered provisions elsewhere).
Holland dealt with the former. The issue in the case was Congress's
power to enact laws governing migratory birds."' Congress had enacted
a federal statute designed to implement the terms of a treaty dealing with
migratory birds.222 Because nothing in the Constitution explicitly gives
Congress the power to regulate migratory birds, and because precedent
suggested that the states owned wildlife, the state of Missouri argued
that the statute encroached on the authority reserved to the states by the
Tenth Amendment. 223 The Court rejected the argument, reasoning that
Congress had the power to implement the treaty.224 However, the Court
was careful to note that, "[t]he treaty in question does not contravene any
prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. " 225 The clear import
of this language is that the result would have been different if a different
provision of the Constitution barred Congress from enacting such a law.
The First Amendment, which clearly states that, "Congress shall pass no
law ... "is an example of just such a prohibitory clause. 6
The Supreme Court confirmed this more limited interpretation in
Reid v. Covert.227 That case held that civilians could not be tried before
a court martial in another nation, even though an international agreement
with the nation allowed those civilians to be tried before a United States
military court rather than a foreign domestic court.228  The Supreme
Court found that it would violate the civilians' constitutional rights to try
them before a court martial. 229 Nor was that result in any way inconsis-
tent with Holland. Unlike Holland, where there was no specific provi-
sion barring Congress from acting, the Court found several provisions in
the Constitution that limited Congress's power to subject civilians to
221. Holland, 252 U.S. at432.
222. Id. at 430-31.
223. Id. at 431.
224. Id. at 435.
225. ld. at 433.
226. David M. Golove, Treaty Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Na-
tionalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 1075, 1083 (2000).
227. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
228. See id. at 7-14.
229. Id. at 7-10.
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military tribunals. 3° No mere treaty could give Congress the authority
to violate those explicit restrictions."' Similarly, the Berne Convention
cannot authorize Congress to enact laws that violate the First Amend-
ment.
Reid does not render the Berne Convention completely irrelevant
to a discussion of VARA's constitutionality. Because a treaty can aug-
ment Congress's authority relative to the states, Berne is an answer to the
claim that Congress lacks the constitutional authority to enact moral
rights legislation. 32 But beyond this issue of federalism, Berne has no
effect. Berne does not, and cannot, limit the First Amendment. Thus, the
fact that VARA stems from an international treaty is irrelevant to the
free speech issue that is the focus of this article.
In conclusion, neither VARA's origins in the Berne Convention
nor its current status as part of federal copyright law affect the First
Amendment question. Harper & Row and Eldred do suggest that tradi-
tional federal copyright law enjoys a virtual presumption of First
Amendment validity. However, although the reasoning of those cases
can be applied to the § 106 disclosure right, the VARA rights are so sig-
nificantly different than traditional copyright that those cases are inappo-
site. Similarly, VARA's roots in the Berne Convention provide no de-
fense against a First Amendment challenge. VARA should therefore be
analyzed like any other law under the First Amendment.
IV. APPLYING THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO MORAL RIGHTS
In many cases the First Amendment will provide little or no pro-
tection to a party who infringes another's moral rights. Many acts of in-
fringement do not involve speech, and accordingly receive no protection
from the First Amendment. For this reason, the First Amendment will
not be a factor in virtually all cases involving the droit de suite, as well
as most cases involving the rights of destruction, integrity, and disclo-
sure. Second, one of the moral rights - the federal disclosure right cre-
ated by § 106 of the Copyright Act - will survive a First Amendment
challenge even in cases where the disclosure would constitute speech.
Because the right to control when a work is disclosed to the public lies at
the core of traditional copyright, it enjoys the de facto presumption of
validity established by Harper & Row and Eldred.
230. Id. The Court discusses the right to a jury in Article III, § 2 and the Sixth Amendment, as
well as the grand jury right in the Fifth Amendment.
231. Id.
232. Seesupra notes 12 and 14.
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In all other situations, however, the First Amendment stands as a
potential obstacle to imposing liability for a moral rights violation.
Many moral rights infringements do involve speech. Holding an in-
fringer liable for that speech is sufficient government involvement to sat-
isfy the "state action" requirement of the First Amendment, even though
the suit is instigated by a private party.233 Regardless of whether the
remedy is an injunction or damages, the First Amendment limits a
court's authority to impose legal consequences on speech.
Of course, the law of free speech is a complex, multifaceted
topic. Different situations present their own idiosyncratic policy con-
cerns, making a unitary analysis of free speech impossible. Because of
the widely different concerns, there is no single approach used to resolve
First Amendment cases. Instead, the courts have developed a Byzantine
array of tests for use in different circumstances. 4  Moral rights cases
likewise present different types of policy concerns, suggesting that no
one approach fits all situations. Determining how a particular moral
rights dispute will be analyzed under the First Amendment requires one
to identify which test applies.
Any decent primer on free speech law will discuss a number of
tests. The Supreme Court has developed tests to deal with the particular
issues of obscenity, 35 hate speech,236 speech posing a danger to social
order or life,237 and speech in schools,238 to name just a few. However,
233. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
234. See Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla and Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 2:13 (2006). See,
e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public official plaintiff must prove actual
malice standard to recover in a libel suit); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (speech
that poses danger of lawless action may be prohibited by law only if it is directed at provoking im-
minent lawless action).
235. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 250 (1957); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)
(First Amendment does not protect obscene speech). The test to determine whether speech is ob-
scene depends on "whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest." Roth, 354 U.S. at
489.
236. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (First Amendment protects person
from liability for burning cross on another person's yard).
237. Id.
238. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.503 (1969) (school pol-
icy against wearing armbands violated students First Amendment right to free speech). Under the
Tinker test, a student's right to free speech may not be infringed unless the speech "materially and
substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the
school." Id. at 509. See also Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 679, 683 (1986) (First
Amendment does not protect students from punishment for "lewd and obscene" speech that is
"plainly offensive to both teachers and students."); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier 484 U.S.
260, 273 (1988) (First Amendment does not protect student speech from school principal "exercis-
ing control over style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so
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only a few of these tests are relevant to the question of moral rights. Be-
cause of the nature of moral right disputes, such cases are likely to in-
volve only four of the free speech tests: the default "compelling interest"
standard, the more lenient tests that apply to commercial speech and
content-neutral regulations, and the special rule that applies to defama-
tion and similar torts.
A. Determining the Applicable Standard
Freedom of speech, along with its First Amendment cousins free-
dom of religion and freedom of the press, are central tenets of the United
States legal system. Although all constitutional rights are important, the
Supreme Court has indicated that freedom of speech, religion, and press
occupy a "preferred position" among the panoply of civil liberties.239
This preferred position makes it extremely difficult for government to
justify a regulation of pure speech when that regulation is based on the
content of that speech. Unless the case falls into one of several special
categories, government may regulate speech only if it can demonstrate a
compelling interest, and if its regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest.
240
Laws rarely satisfy the compelling interest standard. First, few
interests qualify as compelling. Aside from speech that poses an imme-
diate threat to life or limb, or incites specific illegal acts, government
usually cannot show that its interest is compelling.2 ' Second, most laws
also fail the "narrowly tailored" part of the test. To determine if a law is
narrowly tailored, a court will ask if the regulation is the least restrictive
means to accomplish government's goals. 242 If government could effec-
long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.").
239. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
240. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991)
(content-based discrimination is only constitutional if it can pass the strict scrutiny standard).
241. John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law 1131 (7th ed. 2004). Profes-
sors Nowak and Rotunda mention several areas in which the high standard is typically satisfied,
including obscenity, child pornography, defamation, commercial speech, and campaign financing.
However, in these cases it is not clear whether government has a compelling interest, or whether
courts apply a more lenient standard because of the limited value of the speech.
242. See Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989):
The Government may, however, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech
in order to promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to fur-
ther the articulated interest ... The Government may serve this legitimate interest, but to
withstand constitutional scrutiny, "it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations designed
to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment free-
doms... It is not enough to show that the Government's ends are compelling; the means
must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.
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tuate its interest through a different regulation - one that restricted less
speech, or existing speech less - the law is unconstitutional. In most
cases, a court finds one or more less restrictive alternatives available.
24 3
The problem of "coerced" speech involves a variant on this basic
theme. Most free speech cases involve situations where the government
wants to restrict speech. Sometimes, however, government wants to
force people to speak. "Coerced speech" is a First Amendment issue, as
the right of free speech includes a right not to speak.24 Moreover, again
assuming the speech does not involve one of the exceptions discussed
below, a court will apply the same basic standard to a law that coerces
speech as it applies to a law that restricts speech. Thus, government may
coerce speech only if it has a compelling interest, and only if the statute
is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.245 As it is difficult for gov-
ernment to demonstrate a compelling interest, and there will usually be a
less restrictive alternative than forcing someone to speak, most statutes
that coerce political or everyday speech will fail a First Amendment
challenge.246
If the compelling interest applies, moral rights laws are likely to
be found unconstitutional. None of the policy reasons supporting moral
rights laws qualify as compelling interests. Moral rights violations cer-
tainly pose no risk to human safety or health. And even if the interests
somehow were deemed compelling, it is easy to contemplate other
means of achieving those interests that involve less of a restriction on the
infringer's speech. A system of government grants, for example, would
encourage art without restricting speech. 247  Likewise, if government
considers it important to ensure the accuracy of an author's reputation,
government itself could publish information about the author; a method
that while perhaps not as effective does not affect the infringer's speech.
243. See Hynes v. Major of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (municipal ordinance requiring no-
tice be given to police by people wishing to solicit door to door violated the First Amendment be-
cause less restrictive means were available); Sable Communications, (ban on lewd telephone mes-
sages violated the First Amendment because it went beyond what was necessary to prevent minors
from accessing such messages); Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (mu-
nicipal ordinance designed to protect citizens from fraud found to be overbroad).
244. West Virginia State Board of Educ. v. Bumette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
245. State v. Lundquist, 262 Md. 534 (Md. 1971) (statute requiring teachers and students to
take part in flag salute ceremony unconstitutional).
246. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (U.S. 1977) (forcing a Jehovah's Witness to
display state motto "Live Free or Die" on license tag violated First Amendment; state interest in
promoting state history and state pride not compelling enough to justify law that motto be dis-
played).
247. In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), the Supreme Court
upheld a system of government grants for the arts against a First Amendment challenge, even
though the grants turned on the content of the art.
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Moral rights protection may be a lofty and laudable goal, but it is
unlikely to trump the "preferred" position of free speech under the com-
pelling interest analysis.
Yet it is entirely possible that a moral rights claim will not be
governed by the compelling interest standard. The compelling interest
test is in some ways a default rule. The Supreme Court has developed a
number of other specific tests for particular First Amendment situations.
These tests are significantly less demanding than the compelling interest
test, and a challenged law is thus more likely to be upheld.
Therefore, rather than plunging directly into a detailed discussion
of how each of the moral rights laws would fare under the compelling
interest test, we will first venture down another path. If one of the
Court's more lenient First Amendment tests applies to a particular moral
rights law, an author seeking to enforce that right will not need to deal
with the compelling interest standard. This section will demonstrate that
most moral rights laws actually fit into one of three special First
Amendment cases: content-neutral laws, commercial speech, or laws
dealing with defamation. Moreover, the analysis will show that in most
cases, the moral rights statute should survive the analysis applicable to
these special situations.
B. Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech
Laws can limit speech in a number of different ways. Most dis-
cussions of free speech in the case law and literature focus on a law that
punishes or imposes liability based on what the speaker said. The com-
pelling interest test is designed to deal with such content-based laws.
Still, many laws restrict speech based not on the message contained in
that speech, but instead on other attributes. For example, a law might
bar anyone from speaking in public places after midnight, regardless of
what a particular person might be saying. Or, a law could prevent peo-
ple from loitering outside the mayor's office, regardless of whether the
act of loitering was intended as speech (for example, a sit-in) or merely
as conduct.
Restricting speech for reasons other than its content may stifle
communication every bit as effectively as content-based regulation.
However, content-neutral regulation generally poses less of a threat to
core First Amendment values. Because the First Amendment considers
most messages of equal worth, it prevents government from controlling
which messages will be heard. But when government regulates a mes-
sage based not on its content, but for other non-speech reasons, it is not
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trying to police what messages are available to the public. Of course,
facially content-neutral regulations should not escape all scrutiny, as
there is a risk that government will use a facially content neutral law as a
way to restrict disfavored speech.248  To accommodate these concerns
the Supreme Court has developed a separate test to evaluate content neu-
tral laws. Although this test does review government's ends and means
carefully, 249 it is noticeably more lenient than the compelling interest
standard.
1. The Law Dealing with Content-Neutral Regulation
a. The Meaning of "Content Neutral"
There is much confusion about which laws qualify for the content
neutral test.25" The trouble stems from the Supreme Court's failure to de-
fine precisely what it means by a content-neutral law. The Supreme
Court considers both the effect of the law and the governmental purpose
underlying the law, although it remains unclear which, if any, predomi-
nates in the analysis.251 With respect to a law's effect, the notion of con-
tent neutrality has two distinct aspects. The first is viewpoint neutrality.
A law that restricts speech critical of an author, but allows speech that
praises the author, is not content neutral because it distinguishes based
on the viewpoint expressed.2  The second aspect of content neutrality is
subject matter neutrality. Continuing with the same example, a law that
prohibits all speech - positive, negative, or neutral - about an author is
not subject-matter neutral, even though it is viewpoint neutral. A law
must be both viewpoint and subject matter neutral to qualify for the con-
tent neutral analysis. 3
248. For example, a law that makes it a crime to bum a flag is on its face content neutral.
However, because flag burning is a common and effective way to voice displeasure with govern-
ment, courts closely analyze flag burning laws. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990);
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
249. See Smolla, supra note 234, at 3-3, where the author indicates that content neutral laws do
not receive a "free pass."
250. See James Weinstein, Database Protection and the First Amendment, 28 U. Dayton L.
Rev. 305, 330-1 (2002).
251. Compare Smolla, supra note 234, at 3-5 to 3-7 ("principal inquiry" focuses on intent) with
Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 904 to 909 (2d ed. 2003) (main
inquiry is the effect, although a valid purpose can save a law with a content based effect).
252. See, e.g. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 189, 197-200 (1983).
253. Chemerinsky, supra note 251, at 904. A third aspect of neutrality can arise in some cases.
In addition to being viewpoint and subject matter neutral, a law must be "speech neutral" to qualify
as a content neutral law. In other words, when a law regulates conduct, it is not content-neutral if it
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The Court will occasionally consider a law's purpose in determin-
ing whether it is content neutral. In some cases, the Court has concluded
that a law which is content-based on its face is nonetheless content neu-
tral because government had a content neutral purpose when it enacted
the law. In Hill v. Colorado,254 the Court applied this reasoning to a law
that prohibited people from approaching others outside a health care fa-
cility for purposes of education, oral protest, or counseling. 2 5 Although
this law was subject matter based - it would allow a person to approach
another to discuss the weather, but not to educate the listener about
global warming - the Court considered it content neutral because gov-
ernment's demonstrated purpose was to protect the privacy of people en-
tering health facilities such as abortion clinics. 256  Similarly, in City of
Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 2 57 the Court upheld an ordinance pro-
viding that theaters showing adult films could not be situated within one
thousand feet of certain other uses. Although the law applied only to cer-
tain types of speech, the Court deemed it content neutral because the
City's purpose was to regulate crime and other "secondary effects" of
adult theaters, not the speech itself.258 The Court's application of this
"purpose" analysis has been inconsistent and confusing.259 Others have
argued 260 that the Court is conflating the threshold issue of whether a law
is content neutral with the separate question of whether it is valid under
the test that is used to judge the constitutionality of content neutral laws
- a test that also considers government's purpose in passing the law.
Nevertheless, the case law does suggest that although a party challeng-
ing a content-based law need not demonstrate a bad intent to prevail,261 a
convincing content neutral purpose can sometimes save a facially con-
applies only in situations where that conduct involves speech. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406
(1989) (government may not "proscribe particular conduct because it has expressive elements);
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 570 (1991) (upholds a law barring nude dancing; Court
notes that state was not limiting such speech because of its message).
254. 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
255. The law was clearly intended to protect those entering abortion clinics. It barred anyone
from coming within eight feet of a person who was within 100 feet of a health care facility, unless
the person who is approached consented. Id. at 703.
256. Id. at 723.
257. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
258. Id. at 47.
259. Compare Hill (law upheld because purpose was to prevent emotional harm to those enter-
ing abortion clinics) with Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (a law that prevented critical speech
near a foreign embassy violated First Amendment notwithstanding government's argument that the
prohibition was intended to protect the dignity of foreign ambassadors).
260. Chemerinsky, supra note 251, at 906-07.
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tent-based law.262
Two other Supreme Court cases present a variation on this purpose-
based theme, which involves notions of "commodification." Because
both cases involve a form of intellectual property right, they are poten-
tially significant to any discussion of moral rights. In Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,2 63 the Court held that the First
Amendment did not protect a broadcast company from liability for airing
a recording of a performer's fifteen-second "human cannonball" act on a
news broadcast. In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States
Olympic Committee 64 the Court held that it did not violate the First
Amendment for Congress to give the United States Olympic Committee
the exclusive right to use the term OLYMPICS and related symbols in
commerce. The Court considered both laws content neutral. And yet,
on their face, the laws in both cases were content based. Liability in
both cases turned on the content of what defendant said. The broadcast
company in Zacchini was liable for showing the film of the performance,
but would not be liable if it had devoted the same fifteen-second seg-
ment of the news to some other subject. Similarly, the defendant in San
Francisco Arts was liable for using the word OLYMPICS, while it
would be free to use almost any other term to describe its event.265
The key to both Zacchini and San Francisco Arts lies in the Court's
characterization of the underlying rights as "property." The performer's
state-law right of publicity in Zacchini was a property right.266 The fed-
eral law in San Francisco Arts similarly gave what the Court called a
"limited property right" in the Olympic name and symbols.267 Because
the plaintiffs' rights were property, the Court could characterize govern-
ment's purpose as the content neutral and important purpose of protect-
262. Whether the converse of this proposition is true is unclear. The Supreme Court has never
squarely addressed whether a law that is on its face content-neutral can be held to violate the First
Amendment if the government's purpose in enacting the law was to discriminate against certain
particular views or categories of speech. Although there are a number of statements in the case law
that suggest such an invidious purpose would render the law unconstitutional, the issue remains un-
decided. And the O'Brien test seems to make it clear that a bad purpose (that is, one designed to
suppress speech) is enough to render the law invalid. However, as moral rights laws do not present
the problem of invidious purpose, this article need not consider the question of whether a discrimi-
natory purpose is alone enough to make a law violate the First Amendment.
263. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
264. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
265. See San Francisco Arts, 483 U.S. at 536 (where the court stated that "neither Congress
nor the USOC has prohibited the SFAA from conveying its message," and SFAA has called its
event other names without using the word Olympic).
266. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573.
267. San Francisco Arts, 483 U.S. at 534.
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ing private property, rather than restricting speech. 68 Speech using a
tape of Zacchini's performance, or the word OLYMPIC, violated that
property right, and could result in liability.
The broader implications of Zacchini and San Francisco Arts are
intriguing. Both cases suggest that government has a limited ability to
create a property right in certain words, symbols, or other elements of
speech.269 If it creates such a property right, a law that bars use of those
symbols or words will be treated as a content neutral law protecting that
property, even though liability turns on what defendant said.2"' This
broader argument may have implications for both moral rights and copy-
right.
b. General Analysis of Content-Neutral Speech
Once a court determines that a law is content neutral, it analyzes
that law under the O'Brien standard.2 1' A government regulation is valid
under that test if
[11] it is within the constitutional powers of government,
[2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest,
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and
[4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is
268. Id. at 536 (law giving property right protects Congress's interest in "encouraging and re-
warding" owner's activities); Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576-77.
269. San Francisco Arts, 483 U.S. at 536; Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576-77.
270. Zacchini and San Francisco Arts are not the only cases supporting this proposition. See
also Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (government may punish trespass on country property
even when that trespass is a protest); DVD Copy Control Assoc., Inc. v. Andrew, 75 P.3d 1, 14 (a
law barring disclosure of a trade secret does not violate the First Amendment because a trade secret
is a form of "property"); Chicago Joint Board v. Chicago Tribune Co. 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970)
(right to speak does not give speaker the right to command use of someone else's newspaper). But
see O'Grady v. Superior Court, 139 Cal.App.4th 1423, 44 Cal.Rptr.3d 72 (2006) (when there is a
clash between property interest in a trade secret and the First Amendment, the property interest
"must give way").
271. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the case that created the standard, involved
expressive conduct. As a result, the O'Brien test is sometimes referred to as the standard for "sym-
bolic speech." However, the test is not limited to cases involving conduct. It applies instead to any
case involving a content-neutral law. The reason the standard is evolved in, and continues to be af-
filiated with, symbolic speech cases is because the government regulation at issue in those cases is
often content neutral. Many statutes regulating conduct apply regardless of whether the conduct
involved is speech, or the nature of any messaged conveyed by that conduct. Instead, they apply to
any conduct of a particular nature.
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no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
2 72
The threshold requirement of an "important or substantial" interest
is considerably more forgiving than the "compelling interest" standard
applied in pure speech cases. State interests that would not be consid-
ered compelling - such as preserving public decorum, protecting prop-
erty rights, or ensuring peace and quiet - will be held important or sub-
stantial.273 Similarly, the proportionality element of the O'Brien test,
which asks whether the restriction on speech is "greater than necessary,"
is in practice far easier to satisfy than the compelling interest test's "least
restrictive means" analysis. 274  O'Brien demands only that the law be
reasonably proportional, which means that a law can satisfy the test even
though other less restrictive means might be available.275
2. Application of the Standard
a. Moral Rights Laws as Content-Neutral Regulation
The first step in applying the O'Brien analysis is to determine
whether the law in question is content neutral. Many of the moral rights
laws will meet the two-part test used to determine neutrality. Consider
the right of destruction. All of the laws governing the right of destruc-
tion are content neutral. They apply to all acts of destruction, regardless
of whether it is intended as speech 276 or, assuming the destruction is
speech, the message or viewpoint conveyed.
A law preventing destruction is likely to affect certain viewpoints
more than others. Those who destroy physical objects as a means of
272. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
273. See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (law prohib-
iting posting of signs on public utility poles did not violate the First Amendment; government inter-
est in preventing visual clutter and preserving public decorum was substantial enough to validate a
total ban); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (ordinance controlling the volume of
music in Central Park bandshell with purpose of preserving peace and quiet for those using sur-
rounding grassy area did not violate the First Amendment); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104 (1972) (anti-noise ordinance prohibiting persons nearby a school from making noise that dis-
rupts peace and order did not violate the First Amendment).
274. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 286 (2000) (city ordinance prohibiting pub-
lic nudity did not violate the First Amendment; restricting exotic dancers by requiring them to wear
minimal covering was proportional to the government interest in prohibiting nudity).
275. Id. The Court mentioned the possibility of zoning as an effective alternative to the ordi-
nance prohibiting public nudity but reiterated that the "least restrictive means analysis" did not ap-
ply.
276. If it did, the law might well be deemed objectionable because it singled out speech for less
favorable treatment than non-speech. See supra note 253.
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communication usually do not intend their message as a compliment.
Instead, the destruction is almost always meant as a criticism. Flag burn-
ing is a good example. A law imposing liability for destruction of art
will disproportionately affect critical messages, while leaving laudatory
messages unaffected. Nevertheless, this disproportionate impact on
critical messages is not enough to make the law content-based. After all,
there could be many different critical messages underlying an act of de-
struction. The destroyer could intend the destruction as criticism of the
technical quality of the art. Or, as in book burning, destruction could be
intended to criticize the message contained in the art itself. Indeed, de-
struction of a work of art need not even be intended as criticism of the
art. If the author espoused a different political or social view than the
infringer, or engaged in some act deemed reprehensible to the infringer,
destruction of the author's works could be - and often has been in his-
tory - intended as a comment on the author rather than the art. Finally, in
some cases destruction of the work may have little to do with the art or
author, but instead with some other connection that people make. Thus,
if an infringer burned the art collection of a brutal dictator, the destruc-
tion would send yet another message. 277 The destruction right treats all
of these situations exactly the same. Because the destruction right does
not distinguish between messages - or depend on whether the destruc-
tion even sends any message - it is content neutral.
Nor does the fact that the destruction right is limited to works of
"visual art" 278 or "fine art" 279 affect this conclusion. Admittedly, this
limitation means that someone who criticized a work of fine art by de-
stroying it would be liable, while that same person would not be liable if
he criticized a different work in the same manner. But that distinction
does not make the law content based. Focusing on the destruction of dif-
ferent works approaches the question from the wrong perspective. In-
stead, the analysis should consider the different messages that could re-
sult from destruction of the same work. A law is content based only if it
treats the same act differently depending on the message being con-
veyed.280 For the same reason, VARA's limitation to works of "recog-
277. A variation on this theme is the destruction of the Buddha statues in Afghanistan by the
Taliban government. Paul Salopek, Buddha icons are huge in their absence; Ancient heritage
among Taliban's many victims, Chicago Tribune Nov. 28, 2001, at 4.
278. 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
279. Supra note 109 cites the state statutes creating rights in "fine art."
280. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) presents a useful
analogy. The law in that case prohibited camping in a public park. Certain people wanted to camp
in the park as a protest, and accordingly challenged the law under the First Amendment. The Court
found that law content neutral, because it barred camping regardless of whether it was intended as
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nized stature" does not make it content based.28'
The right of integrity, which prevents alterations and mutilations
of a work, is closely related to the destruction right.282 The content-
neutral analysis of integrity laws accordingly proceeds along the same
lines as the analysis of the destruction right. Like the destruction right,
the right of integrity does not distinguish between alterations intended as
speech, and those with no intended communicative element. Similarly,
even when the alteration is intended as speech, the governing laws im-
pose liability regardless of the message or viewpoint being presented.
Alteration of a work can be intended as a parody of the work or the au-
thor. In the alternative, the alteration may have a satirical purpose, criti-
cizing or commenting on some other aspect of society.2 83 Although par-
ody and satire are certainly protected as speech, the right of integrity
does not treat parodical or satirical messages any more or less favorably
than any other message.
The only potentially significant difference between integrity and
destruction laws is that VARA and many of the state integrity statutes
apply only to alterations that have a negative effect on the author's repu-
tation or honor.2 84 This additional limitation is arguably a viewpoint-
based distinction. A person is free to alter a work in ways that flatter the
author, while alterations that criticize the author or the work would result
speech, and regardless of any message conveyed.
Note that a law like that in Clark would not be content based even if it prevented camping in public
parks but not in national forests. Regulation of different acts may well result in certain messages
being limited, while others are freely allowed. While that may possibly create an Equal Protection
challenge, it does not by itself render the law content based for purposes of the First Amendment.
281. See also the extensive discussion of content neutrality in Board of Managers ofSoho In-
ternational Arts Condominium v. City of New York, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17897 (S.D.N.Y.). That
case, which dealt with application of a historical landmark law to a mural, held that the law was not
content based merely because it applied only to works of historical significance. Id. at *38-39.
282 . In one sense, destruction and mutilation are merely differences of degree. However, be-
cause a private act of destruction will not necessarily directly affect the artist's reputation, forcing
the artist to sue under the integrity right might prevent her from recovering. To recognize the indi-
rect effect that destruction has on the artist's reputation, as well as society's interest in preserving
works of recognized stature, VARA also contains a destruction right. Legislative History, supra
note 38, at 6926.
283. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Co-op. Productions, Inc., 479 F.
Supp. 351, 357 (1979) The court held:
[a] parody must do more than merely achieve comic effect. It must also make some criti-
cal comment or statement about the original work which reflects the original perspective
of the parodist--thereby giving the parody social value beyond its entertainment function.
Otherwise any comic use of an existing work would be protected, removing the "fair"
aspect of the "fair use" doctrine and negating the underlying purpose of copyright law of
protecting original works from unfair exploitation by others.
284. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) & 3(a); 27 Maine R.S. § 303(2) (2005); N.J. Stat. § 2A:24A-4
(2005); N.Y. CLS Art & Cult. Affr § 14.03 (1) (2005).
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in liability. But this argument falls short. The reputation or honor pro-
visions in integrity laws do not distinguish between messages based on
what they say, but instead on the statement's effect. If a vandal paints a
mustache on a painting, that act will result in liability only if there is
harm to the author's reputation. Note that liability does not turn on what
the vandal is trying to say with his added mustache. The law draws a
distinction based only on whether the message has any effect. In this re-
spect, the honor or reputation limitation in integrity laws is more of a
standing requirement than it is a content-based distinction. These stat-
utes do not allow the author to protest petty changes, but only those that
cause real harm to the author.285
The § 106 disclosure right presents a more difficult question. Part
II.B of this article demonstrated that the disclosure right that can be cob-
bled from §§ 106(4), (5), and (6) would probably be held valid based on
the precedent of Harper & Row and Eldred.25 6 However, because the
disclosure right presents unique issues when analyzed as a content neu-
tral law, it is a useful exercise to consider whether and how the O'Brien
test applies to that right. The threshold issue of whether § 106 is content
neutral presents difficulty. The statute does involve subject matter dis-
tinctions. Defendant is not free to speak by publicizing the works of an-
other. On the other hand, that same party can speak by presenting his
own works, or the works of a consenting copyright holder.287 Because
liability depends on the symbols the defendant uses to convey his mes-
sage, the law is facially content based.
Nevertheless, the § 106 disclosure right involves a situation
where a court should apply the "purpose" doctrine. Congress's goal in
preventing disclosure was not to prevent others from speaking. Instead,
the disclosure right recognizes that the timing of publication of a work
can have a significant effect on the value of that work. Uncontrolled dis-
closure is harmful not because it is speech, but because it has the secon-
dary effect of reducing the economic benefit that the author receives
from the work, which in turn may lessen the author's incentive to pro-
duce. Thus, rather than intending to squelch one person's speech, Con-
gress meant to maximize the amount of speech by ensuring the author
has the opportunity to earn the optimal return on her investment. More-
285. Some have argued that the integrity right is unconstitutionally vague, because of the diffi-
culty in measuring honor and reputation. However, at least one court disagrees. Carter v.
Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev'd in part on other grounds 71 F.3d 77
(2nd Cir. 1995), cert. denied 517 U.S. 1208 (1996), which finds that honor and reputation are not
unconstitutionally vague.
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over, Congress protected the author's investment by providing her a
property interest in her work, much like the commodification cases dis-
cussed above.288 Congress's primary purpose in giving the author the
right to control disclosure was not to restrict speech, but to protect the
author's proprietary interest in her copyright. Therefore, the disclosure
right is a content neutral law that should be analyzed under the O'Brien
test.
A similar analysis applies to Louisiana's display right. On the
surface, the law is content-based, as it imposes liability only on those
who speak by using the author's work,289 not those who speak by other
means. However, the purpose of the law is to protect reputation, not to
limit speech.290 The Louisiana law is in some ways similar to the flag
burning laws at issue in Texas v. Johnson291 and United States v.
Eichman,2 92 where the Court applied the content-neutral analysis to a law
that barred only speech with a certain content.
By contrast, the remaining two moral rights - attribution and dis-
sociation - involve statutes that are content based. Both rights focus ex-
clusively on statements concerning the authorship of works. Both im-
pose liability based on the viewpoint expressed in those statements. In
other words, the infringer is liable for saying that X is the author of a
particular work, but not liable if he states that Y is the author. Similarly,
in cases where the infringer has said nothing about authorship, he can
avoid liability only by making a particular statement; namely, that the
author is the source of the work. Although these statements may involve
completely non-controversial assertions of fact, the state and federal
laws governing attribution and dissociation draw distinctions based on
the content of the speech at issue.
Nor are attribution and dissociation laws saved by the line of
cases which allows a valid content-neutral purpose to redeem a content
based law. In all of the cases where the Supreme Court has employed
this argument, the legislature could demonstrate a government interest
unrelated to the suppression of speech, such as protecting privacy2 93 or
limiting crime.294 Government regulates speech in these cases to control
288. See supra text accompanying notes 263 to 270.
289. Display of another's work will not always qualify as "speech." Of course, if display of the
work is not speech, the First Amendment is not an issue.
290. The statute states that no person may display a work if damage to the artist's reputation is
reasonably likely to result. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:2153(3).
291. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
292. 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
293. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
294. Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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the secondary effects of the manner in which the speech is presented, not
the speech itself. In the case of attribution and dissociation, by contrast,
government wants to limit the particular message, regardless of the con-
text or way in which it is made.
The commodification variant also offers no help. At first glance,
the commodification cases appear to have promise. Moral rights do bear
some of the hallmarks of property, just like the rights at issue in the
commodification cases. Most moral rights are exclusive to the author.2 95
They relate to a specific "thing": a particular work. If attribution and
dissociation rights represent laws designed to protect the author's prop-
erty interest, they could be evaluated as content-neutral laws.
However, the analogy to the commodification cases is not con-
vincing. Considering attribution first, the right to be named as the author
of your own work could be considered a property right. 96 However, any
such right is not of the same genre as that involved in Zacchini or San
Francisco Arts. In those cases, the laws gave one person the right to
control the elements of speech itself. In an attribution case, by contrast,
the infringer's speech does not use any of the words or symbols "owned"
by the author. The infringer has not named the author, but instead used
the name of someone else, or in the case of non-attribution, no name at
all. As the author cannot claim that the infringer has used her name or
anything else she owns, the attribution law cannot be justified as a way
to protect any property interest the author may have.
In a dissociation case, the infringer has used the rightholder's
name. However, the dissociation right is also different from the property
rights at issue in the commodification cases. The dissociation right does
not really give the rightholder any property interest in her name. It only
gives the right to prevent use of her name in one relatively narrow con-
text, namely, in connection with works that someone else prepared.
Anyone remains free to use the rightholder's name in other contexts,
such as in news reporting. The law in Zacchini, by contrast, prevented
the defendant from using the tape of the performance for any purpose
that threatened the value of the performance. Therefore, the dissociation
right - which is not connected with any particular work and does not af-
ford the rightholder ownership of her name for most purposes - cannot
295. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e) (moral rights cannot be transferred, although they may be
waived); Cal. Civ. Code § 987(d) (2006) ("artist shall retain at all times" certain rights); Conn. Gen.
Stat. § 42-116t (d) (2004) (rights non-waivable).
296. Property is often analogized to a bundle of sticks, with each stick representing a particular
right in a res. The right to be named as creator of a certain work can be viewed as one of these
sticks. Even if the author conveys most of the sticks to another, it is certainly possible to allow him
to retain the stick representing attribution.
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be considered a law protecting a property right. As neither the attribu-
tion nor the dissociation right is analogous to the rights involved in Zac-
chini and San Francisco Arts, the rights must be considered content-
based, and the O'Brien analysis will not apply.
Of the various moral rights, only the rights to prevent destruction,
preserve integrity, and control public disclosure involve content-neutral
laws. The following subsections explore how the O 'Brien test applies to
these laws. The different considerations relevant to these three rights
call for a separate discussion of each.
b. Destruction
Under the O'Brien analysis, a statute creating a destruction right
would be valid if it (1) lies within the constitutional power of govern-
ment, (2) furthers an important or substantial interest, (3) involves an in-
terest that is unrelated to the suppression of speech, and (4) imposes an
incidental burden on speech that is no greater than necessary. 297 The
first step has nothing to do with the First Amendment.298 A statute that
lies without a legislature's jurisdiction is invalid regardless of whether it
satisfies the remaining parts of the test - indeed, regardless of whether
the activity it regulates is even speech. The first part of the test involves
questions of Congress's legislative authority under Article I or other
provisions granting legislative powers; or in the case of state laws, pre-
emption. Some of these issues have already been addressed, and no fur-
ther discussion of the first part of the test would be useful, either here or
with respect to the integrity or disclosure rights. Accordingly, the analy-
sis will focus only on the last three parts of the test.
The second and third parts of the analysis can be considered to-
gether. Here, it is necessary to consider the purpose or purposes of the
legislation. The O'Brien test looks for an "important or substantial" in-
terest. Although the interest need not be compelling, the test requires a
stronger interest than government would be required to demonstrate in
ordinary rational basis analysis. 99 Moreover, at a minimum the gov-
ernment's purpose must be something other than the regulation of
speech.
The legislative history for VARA lists two distinct reasons justi-
297. See supra note 272.
298. Accord Smolla, supra note 234, at § 9:8 (first step is "superfluous").
299. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), where the Court found the "must-
carry" provision of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act to be content
neutral. The Court stated that a degree of higher scrutiny than rational basis was required. Id. at
640. See also Smolla, supra note 234, at 3:2.
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fying a right to prevent destruction of works. The first purpose of a de-
struction law is to preserve works of art for future enjoyment."' The
second is to encourage additional artistic creation by allowing the author
to continue to garner the reputational benefit that flows from her earlier
work.30 ' To the extent that the notoriety from prior works is an incentive
to produce future works, ensuring the continued existence of prior works
adds to the total amount of art.
That legislative history alludes to, but does not elaborate on, a
crucial feature of cases involving the destruction right that distinguishes
them from garden-variety free speech disputes. In a typical free speech
case, only one party - the defendant - is speaking. By contrast, a de-
struction case involves a clash between two speakers: the infringer and
the author. When government seeks to preserve art, it is actually at-
tempting to ensure that the author's speech remains available to soci-
ety.3°2 Preserving the author's speech requires placing limits on the
speech of the infringer, because the infringer's speech threatens to sup-
plant that of the author. This clash between two different speakers di-
rectly affects the analysis of government interest, as it calls for a solution
that ensures that both bodies of speech remain available.3 3
Viewed in this light, the two interests cited in the legislative his-
tory are "important or substantial" under O'Brien. The First Amendment
itself makes it clear that there is a strong societal interest in ensuring that
speech remains available to potential listeners, an interest that supports
preservation of art.3 0 Government likewise has an interest in encourag-
300. Legislative History, supra note 38, at 6926.
301. Id. at 6924.
302. Others have recognized this feature of the destruction right. See Strahilevitz, supra note
11, at 829; Michael Spence, Intellectual Property and the Problem of Parody, 114 (Oct.) L.Q.R.
594, 609 (1998); Konrad, supra note 11, at 1606-07; Ong, supra note 11, at 302.
303. Professor Ong takes this argument one step further, introducing a third speaker into the
calculus. He argues that the very existence of moral rights laws sends a message to society that art
should be respected. Ong, supra note 11, at 311. In other words, government is also speaking when
it protects art. Although fascinating and intuitively correct, the argument adds little to the First
Amendment discussion. Most government regulation sends a message. But the First Amendment
requires government to allow people to speak, especially when government wants to send a compet-
ing message. First Amendment law already accommodates government's message to some extent;
not as speech in its own right, but as part of the government "interest" in regulating private speech.
304. In Whitney v. California, Justice Brandeis indicated that the prevailing purpose of the First
Amendment is enlightenment. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J. concurring). Professor Meik-
lejohn similarly listed "education" as a core value of the amendment. Alexander Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 257. One author argues that the message
conveyed by "creative" speech, such as that of the author, is more valuable than the message created
by destruction of another's speech. Strahilevitz, supra note 11, at 828-29. Although creative speech
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ing more speech, which allows it to provide incentives for additional au-
thorial creation.
Moreover, neither interest involves the suppression of expression.
To the contrary, the preservation interest aims to maximize the amount of
expression by ensuring that the author's voice, as expressed in her work,
continues to be available to society.30 5 The destruction right exists in
part because of the way in which art communicates. The spoken word is
fleeting in nature. The message is conveyed at the instant the speaker
speaks. Paintings, sculpture, films, sound recordings, and books gener-
ally have a much longer communicative life. All of these works may
continue to communicate as long as they exist, for every time someone
new encounters them, an additional communication may take place. The
law of free speech, which evolved in large part in situations involving
short-lived speech such as marches, oral communication, and news arti-
cles, has not had to consider the question of "preserving" speech, as the
speech involved in most cases was time-sensitive. Nevertheless, there is
no reason why the First Amendment cannot recognize government's in-
terest in preserving speech that continues to communicate for a long pe-
riod of time. This government interest in increasing the public discourse
easily satisfies O'Brien's requirement of an important or substantial in-
terest unrelated to the suppression of expression.3"6
Finally, the right of destruction does not restrict speech more than
is necessary. First, any effect on speech is relatively minor. The in-
fringer may be barred from speaking in one particular way: the symbolic
speech represented by destroying the work. But in most cases that nar-
row restriction will have little impact on the infringer's ability to deliver
his message. Regardless of what message the infringer wishes to con-
vey, there are other means of getting across the same idea. If the goal of
destruction is to criticize the art or the author, the infringer may convey
that criticism through words and reproductions of the work.307 Indeed,
305. Accord Spence, supra note 302, at 609.
306. Nothing in Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) is to the contrary. The Court in that
case admittedly held that the state interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of unity was directly
related to the suppression of speech. Id. at 410. A key feature of that case, however, was the
Court's observation that an interest in preserving unity through a flag is impaired "only when the
person's treatment of the flag communicates some message." Id. See also United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 314 (1990). Accidental or other non-expressive destruction of a flag does
not affect government's interest in preserving unity. In the case of preserving art, by contrast, any
destruction of a work impairs government's preservation-related goals, regardless of whether it is
intended as speech. Government regulates destruction not because it is speech, but merely because
it destroys art.
307. A reproduction of the work for purposes of criticism or commentary is likely to qualify as
fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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because these other means leave the original work intact for the public to
evaluate, they may be a more effective means of conveying the critical
message. If the goal of the destruction is to criticize not the author but
instead the owner of the work, there will also be myriad other ways to
deliver the message. All of these alternate methods are legal under
moral rights law.3°8
Second, the limited effect on the infringer's ability to convey his
message is the only practical way of achieving government's twin aims.
There are other ways for government to enhance an author's reputation
and encourage artistic production, such as government funding and rec-
ognition programs. However, it is by no means clear that any of these
alternatives are as effective as the right to prevent destruction. And with
respect to the other aim - preserving art and the author's message - there
is truly no other way to accomplish that end. Unless government im-
poses some legal consequences on those who destroy art, there is no way
to prevent the loss to society and to culture that results from that destruc-
tion.309 Therefore, because the destruction right is the only effective way
to accomplish the important goals of enhancing reputation and preserv-
ing art, it does not restrict speech more than necessary. The destruction
rights that exist in VARA and state law accordingly comply with the
First Amendment as valid content-neutral laws.
c. Integrity
Much of the analysis set out above for the destruction right ap-
plies with equal force to the integrity right. Both rights serve similar
purposes. The integrity right helps to protect the author's reputation
(thereby providing a continued incentive to produce), and preserves the
underlying work in its intact form for the benefit of society. As stated in
the legislative history to VARA:
The Visual Artists Rights Act is of the utmost importance to profes-
sional artists who build their future on the integrity and authenticity of
... [art] in public and private collections and to the public for preserv-
ing its cultural legacy ... Any distortion of such works is automati-
cally a distortion of the artists' reputation and cheats the public of an
308. Of course, other laws may come into play, especially when a critic conveys inaccurate
information. A demonstrably false statement about an artist's work might be grounds for a success-
ful defamation suit.
309. Several moral rights laws limit the impact on speech by limiting the destruction right to
famous or well-known works. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) ("work of recognized stature);
N. M. Stat. Ann. § 13-4B-2(C) ("recognized quality"); 73 Penn. Stat. § 2102 ("recognized quality").
Society's interest in preservati6n is arguably the greatest where well-known works are involved.
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accurate account of the culture of our time ... Artists ... must sustain
a belief in the importance of their work if they are to do their best. If
there exists the real possibility that the fruits of this effort will be de-
stroyed after a mere ten to twenty years the incentive to excel is dimin-
ished ... 310
Although these interests are not identical to those underlying the
destruction right, they are equally important and substantial. Like de-
struction cases, integrity cases involve a clash between speakers, where
the infringer's speech threatens to erase that of the author. Government
is attempting to preserve the integrity of the author's speech, which of
necessity requires some restriction on the infringer.311 Likewise, these
interests are completely unrelated to suppressing speech. Government's
goal is not to limit the infringer's message, only the way that message is
delivered. An integrity right may likewise increase the total amount of
speech by requiring a critic to create his own work. Finally, the integrity
right does not limit speech any more than is needed to accomplish gov-
ernment's goals. The infringer may still express his criticism of the art
by means other than physically defacing an original. Again, because
these other means of expression leave the original available for compari-
son, they may actually prove more effective at delivering the infringer's
message.
There is, however, a twist. Just as the integrity right involved ad-
ditional considerations relevant to the issue of whether the law is content
neutral, it also exhibits certain features that complicate the O'Brien
analysis. In this regard, it is useful to divide integrity laws into two
categories. The first, exemplified by VARA, prevents alterations only of
original, physical copies produced by the author. In this category, the
arguments set out above apply in full, and the laws should be found to
310. H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 6915, 6916 (1990) (quoting statement of
Weltzin B. Blix). California cited a third rationale for integrity protection when it enacted its land-
mark California Art Preservation Act of 1979. In addition to the interest in preserving authorial
reputation and the integrity of existing works, the statute indicates that the integrity right protects
the "artist's personality." Cal. Civ. Code § 987(a).
311. Accord Konrad, supra note 11, at 1607; Fujita, supra note 15, at *50. One federal district
court, dealing with the integrity right provided by Massachusetts law, suggested that government
has a compelling interest in preserving the integrity of art. Phillips v. Pembroke Real Estate, Inc.,
288 F.S.2d 89, 104 (D. Mass. 2003). As the ensuing analysis will demonstrate, it is unnecessary to
conclude that the government interest satisfies this more rigorous standard. Arguably, government's
interest in preserving art is reflected not only in the destruction and integrity rights, but also in the
right of attribution. A viewer will in many cases understand a work more fully if he knows who the
author is. The attribution right ensures that the author's name stays connected to her work, and
thereby helps to preserve the maximum communicative value of that work.
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comply with the First Amendment.312
The second category of integrity laws comprises those few state
laws that extend the integrity right beyond originals to copies or deriva-
tive works that present the same basic expression as the original, but in
an altered or distorted way.313 Here, application of the O'Brien analysis
is more difficult. The most significant problem posed by this second
category of integrity laws is that the purported goals served by the right
are less persuasive. When a work is reproduced, the original remains in-
tact. And if the original remains available, society has not been deprived
of that cultural asset. By the same token, if the original is still available
for the public to see, the public is still fully able to evaluate the author's
reputation based on the author's actual artistic product.
Notwithstanding these differences, an integrity right that extends
to reproductions should be found to serve an important and substantial
government interest. A key feature of all of these laws is that they allow
the author to recover for an alteration or modification only when that
change is attributed to the author.31 4 To borrow a term from trademark
law, these statutes prevent the infringer from "passing off' the altered
work as a work of the author. That sort of passing off directly implicates
the government's twin aims of preserving the authorial message and pro-
tecting the author's reputation. The reputational interest is obvious: if
the public thinks that the altered works are produced by the author, they
will judge the author's reputation based on inaccurate information."'
The preservational interest is more subtle. To understand it, one must
understand why government is interested in preserving art at all. The
goal is not merely to preserve art for its own sake. Government also
wants to preserve art because art provides insight into the general culture
of a given period. If inaccurate copies are held out as examples of a cer-
tain author's work, or as exemplars of a particular artistic period or
genre, the public's perception of the culture is distorted or diluted. As
312. The only potential complications arise in those few states where an author suing for viola-
tion of the integrity right need not demonstrate harm to the author's reputation. See supra note 124.
Application of the O'Brien analysis is slightly more difficult in these states, as the laws only further
the government interest in preservation, not the interest in protecting reputation. Nevertheless, even
these laws should be held valid. The interest in preserving works of art for later enjoyment is itself
a sufficiently important and substantial interest to justify the extremely minor limit on speech posed
by a moral right of integrity.
313. La. R.S. §§ 51:2153(2) & (3) (2005); 27 Maine R.S. § 303(2) (2005); Nev. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 597.740(1) (2005); N.J. Stat. § 2A:24A-4 (2005); N.Y. CLS Art & Cult. Aff. § 14.03(1)
(2005).
314. Id.
315. In this vein, it is also interesting to note that all of the state laws cited in supra note 313
condition recovery on proof that the alteration is likely to damage the author's reputation.
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the legislative history of VARA indicates, mutilation of a work of art,
when attributed to the author, "cheats the public of an accurate account
of the culture of our time."3" 6 Government's interest in preserving an ac-
curate cultural snapshot, coupled with its interest in ensuring that the au-
thor's reputation is based on fact, qualify as important and substantial in-
terests even in cases where the art is distorted in the process of
reproduction.
Similarly, government's interest in preventing distorted reproduc-
tions is unrelated to the suppression of speech. Government is not trying
to limit speech criticizing the art or the author. It is only insisting that
that speech be accurate. An infringer is free, within the bounds of copy-
right's fair use doctrine, to produce a distorted copy. The law asks only
that he not deceive the public into thinking that the author produced that
work. That rule ensures the altered copy will be judged by its own mer-
its, and as the work of the infringer.
Finally, an integrity right that extends to reproductions does not
restrict speech more than necessary. Once it is recognized that distorted
copies pose a threat to government's interests in authorial reputation and
preserving culture, the most direct way to deal with the threat is to regu-
late the copies themselves. The infringer remains free to comment in
any way that does not involve a reproduction of the work.3 17 By limiting
the integrity right to situations where the altered work is attributed to the
author, the integrity laws affect only speech that poses a threat, not any
other speech.318 Therefore, all the integrity rights currently in force in
the United States are valid under the First Amendment, regardless of
whether they cover only originals or extend to reproductions.
d. Disclosure
Because the § 106 right of disclosure is presumptively valid un-
der the rationale of Harper & Row and Eldred, it is technically not nec-
essary to discuss whether the disclosure right can be justified as a con-
tent neutral law. 319  There is nevertheless much to be gained from
316. Legislative History, supra note 38, at 6916.
317. C.f Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), which confirms
that there will usually be many ways to express an idea without copying.
318. One author has suggested that an author's reputation could be preserved simply by requir-
ing the infringer to disclose any changes made to the original. Konrad, supra note 11, at 1618-1620.
Such a remedy would preserve the infringer's right to express himself by adapting the author's work.
The suggestion does have some appeal. However, as the author himself recognizes, it does not ob-
viate the free speech question, but merely converts the issue from one of suppressed speech to one
of coerced speech.
319. See supra text accompanying notes 211 to 214.
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applying the content neutral test to the disclosure right, as that right pre-
sents certain interesting issues. In addition to the question of whether a
disclosure law is content neutral, the disclosure right presents unique
questions when applying the O'Brien test.
Assuming that a particular act of disclosure is speech,32 § 106
does regulate that speech in a content neutral fashion.32' Therefore, the
first step in the O'Brien analysis is to identify Congress's interest in cre-
ating a disclosure right. The relevant interests here are not necessarily
the same as those underlying the destruction and integrity rights. The
primary interest in regulating disclosure involves the economic and re-
putational incentives created by copyright. By giving the copyright
owner control over when (or even whether) a work is disseminated to the
public, § 106 allows an author to maximize the profits she can earn from
that work. The greater the profits, the classic argument continues, the
greater the incentive to produce art. The desire to encourage more au-
thorship is unquestionably an important and substantial goal. That de-
sire undergirds the entire Copyright Act.322 It is confirmed by the Con-
stitution itself;32 3 a fact that should carry significant weight in a First
Amendment analysis. Similarly, the goal of encouraging authorship is
not related to the suppression of speech. Congress provides copyrights
to encourage authors to write more, not to force society as a whole to say
less. Finally, the right does not restrict speech more than necessary. The
effect on the infringer's speech is minimal. Although others are barred
from speaking in a way that involves public use of the author's words or
symbols, they are free to convey their message in any other way. There-
fore, even if the disclosure right is not automatically valid under Harper
& Row and Eldred, it should easily pass the O'Brien test and survive a
First Amendment challenge as a content-neutral law.
320. As text accompanying supra note 164 indicates, because many acts of disclosure will not
qualify as speech, those acts receive no First Amendment protection.
321. See supra text accompanying note 169.
322. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003).
323. The Constitution gives Congress the power to enact copyright laws to further the progress
of knowledge. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8. Generally, it is assumed that the best way to encourage the
progress of knowledge is to encourage the greatest quantity of works. Maximizing quantity, with-
out any concern for quality, may or may not be the best way of furthering knowledge. Indeed, gov-
ernment may actually do a better job of furthering knowledge by regulating what works are avail-
able, as it does in elementary education. Nevertheless, the notion of "more is better" certainly has
support in some corners of classic political philosophy. For example, it is fully consistent with He-
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e. The Louisiana Display Right
As noted above, Louisiana's display right is preempted to the ex-
tent it deals with altered works, or situations where lighting or some
other aspect of display modifies the appearance of the work.3 24 How-
ever, the right remains available in situations where the infringer uses an
unaltered original or faithful copy. Because the Louisiana display right
regulates display in a content-neutral fashion, it is subject to the O'Brien
analysis.
The Louisiana provision fails the O'Brien test. The state's inter-
est in enacting the law is apparent on the face of the statute, as it explic-
itly deals with protecting an artist's reputation.325 On the surface, this
interest may seem analogous to the interest in protecting an author's
economic position that underlies the § 106 disclosure right. But there is
a crucial difference. An infringer can interfere with an author's eco-
nomic interests by purely non-expressive conduct. Interfering with repu-
tation, by contrast, occurs only when the infringer engages in conduct
that sends a message. As a result, the state's interest in protecting repu-
tation is, in effect, an interest related to the suppression of First Amend-
ment speech. The flag burning case of Texas v. Johnson3 12 6 is similar. In
that case, the Court noted that Texas's purported interest in preserving
unity was not unrelated to the suppression of speech because the only
acts that could affect that unity were those with a "communicative im-
pact. '3 27  Similarly, because only speech can harm reputation, Louisi-
ana's interest in protecting reputation is an interest directly related to the
suppression of speech, and the law fails the first element of the O'Brien
test.
The discussion to this point has demonstrated that the moral
rights of destruction, integrity, and disclosure are valid content-neutral
laws regulating speech. The same conclusion obtains regardless of
whether the rights are created by federal or state law. As these three
rights are the moral rights most often invoked in actual litigation,328 the
First Amendment will not be a significant factor in the majority of moral
rights disputes that are likely to arise. Nevertheless, three moral rights
remain. The Louisiana display right fails the content-neutral test, even
324. See supra text accompanying note 140.
325. The statute makes display actionable only when "damage to the artist's reputation is rea-
sonably likely to result therefrom." La. R.S. § 51:2153(3).
326. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
327. Id. at 411.
328. For example, the vast majority of the VARA cases cited supra in note 75 deal with altera-
tions to a work.
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though it is arguably a content-neutral law. And because the laws estab-
lishing the moral rights of attribution and dissociation are not content
neutral, the arguments of this section do not apply. It is therefore neces-
sary to determine whether these laws fit within any of the other special
free speech categories, or whether they must be evaluated under the
compelling interest standard.
C. Commercial Speech
For much of United States history, speech involving advertising
or incident to a commercial transaction received little or no First
Amendment protection.329 Since Bigelow v. Virginia in 1975,330 how-
ever, it is clear that commercial speech is protected. Nevertheless, the
standard that applies to such speech is less demanding than the compel-
ling interest standard. Although commercial speech does lie under the
umbrella of First Amendment protection, there are many situations in
which government may freely limit it or bar it entirely.
1. The Law Governing Commercial Speech
a. Commercial Speech Defined
The logical starting point in any discussion of commercial speech is
to identify exactly what speech is "commercial." Defining commercial
speech has proven to be one of the thornier issues in this area of First
Amendment law. It is clear that unadorned advertising is commercial
speech.33' Beyond that, however, the Supreme Court has provided little
guidance on this important threshold issue.332 One of the few cases to
analyze the question in depth is Bolger v. Young Drug Products Corp. ,"
which involved "informational pamphlets" about condom use prepared
and distributed by a company that manufactured condoms. The Court
concluded that the pamphlets were commercial speech, even though they
included some general medical information. The Court considered three
329. In 1942, the Supreme Court actually held that the First Amendment provided no protec-
tion for commercial speech. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
330. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
331. 4 Ronald D. Rotunda and John E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law, §§ 19.1 to
20.61, §20.26, West Group (3rd ed. 1999).
332. The Supreme Court's lack of guidance on this issue is sharply criticized in Joel Anderson,
What's Wrong with this Picture? Dead or Alive: Protecting Actors in the Age of Virtual Reanima-
tion, 23 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 155, 177-180 (2005).
333. 463 U.S. 60(1983).
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factors in arriving at this conclusion: whether the speech was a form of
advertisement, whether it referred to a particular product, and whether
the speaker had an economic motivation.334 As all three of these factors
were present in Bolger, the Court found the pamphlet to be commercial
speech.335 Any analysis of whether speech is commercial, then, should
begin with Bolger.
b. The Commercial Speech Standard
Once a court finds that particular speech is commercial, it applies a
test that is in some respects easier to satisfy than the compelling interest
standard. The Supreme Court established the current test for laws that
restrict commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service
Commission,33 6 and significantly refined it in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v.
Rhode Island337 and Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly.338 Under the Cen-
tral Hudson test, a court first determines whether the speech proposes
lawful activity, and whether it is accurate. If the speech proposes an il-
legal transaction or deceives listeners, the First Amendment places no
limits on government's power to bar or otherwise regulate it.339 This ini-
tial step in the analysis demarks a clear distinction between commercial
speech and other types of speech. Government cannot regulate political
speech, news reporting, or casual conversation merely because it is false
or misleading.34° If commercial speech is false, by contrast, government
may automatically ban it.
If the speech is true and involves lawful activity, government
may regulate it only by a law that satisfies the three Central Hudson fac-
tors. First, government must have a substantial interest. Although Cen-
tral Hudson makes this part of the test sound similar to the "important
and substantial interest" component of the O'Brien test for content neu-
tral legislation,34' 44 Liquormart and Lorillard indicate that the standard
334. Id. at 66-67.
335. Id. at 67.
336. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
337. 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
338. 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
339. Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990). This plurality
opinion distinguishes between speech that is inherently misleading, which can be completely barred,
and that which merely has the potential to mislead, where government must show a substantial in-
terest supporting the regulation.
340. Defamation is admittedly an exception to this rule. Assuming that government meets the
special test applicable to defamatory speech, it can regulate it without showing any interest whatso-
ever. The law of defamation is discussed infra at text accompanying notes 359 to 365.
341. This portion of the O'Brien test is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 273 to 275.
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is actually closer to the compelling interest test, especially when gov-
ernment seeks completely to ban truthful speech.342 Second, the regula-
tion must directly advance that interest. Finally, the regulation must be
proportional; i.e., it may not regulate speech more than is necessary to
advance the government's interest. This third step also closely resem-
bles the final step in the O'Brien analysis.
As in ordinary speech, issues of coerced speech also arise in the
commercial speech context. For example, state and federal laws often
require a party to disclose information to another as part of a pending or
proposed transaction.343 For "ordinary" speech, courts apply the same
standard to coerced speech that they apply to restrictions on speech.3"
In commercial speech cases, by contrast, a different, sui generis, stan-
dard may apply to coerced speech. When a law requires a party to dis-
close accurate factual information (as opposed to a controversial view-
point) to potential buyers or sellers, or as part of a commercial
transaction, courts apply the test set out in Zauderer v. Office of Disci-
plinary Counsel.345 Under this analysis, the state can order disclosure of
facts in a commercial situation as long as disclosure is reasonably related
to the state's interest.346
For purposes of this article, the most important facet of the com-
mercial speech analysis is government's virtually unfettered authority to
insist that commercial communications be accurate. Thus, government
can automatically bar false commercial speech without having to dem-
onstrate any heightened interest, and can order truthful disclosures of
additional relevant information in connection with a commercial transac-
342. Smolla, supra note 234, at § 20:9 contains an excellent discussion of the impact of these
later cases.
343. For example, the FDIC's "Regulation Z" mandates certain disclosures in connection with
home mortgage financing. Other laws mandate a list of ingredients in foodstuffs, as well as an indi-
cation of place of origin for certain manufactured goods.
344. See State v. Lundquist, 262 Md. 534, 537 (Md. 1971) (First Amendment analysis includes
consideration of whether the law is sufficiently narrow to protect a sufficiently valid government
interest).
345. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). See also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), which makes it clear that government cannot mandate messages with
which the group disagrees.
346. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. The Second Circuit recently explained the rationale for this
lower standard:
Commercial disclosure requirements are treated differently from restrictions on commer-
cial speech because mandated disclosure of accurate, factual commercial information
does not offend the core First Amendment values of promoting efficient exchange of in-
formation or protecting individual liberty interests. Such disclosure furthers, rather than
hinders, the First Amendment goal of the discovery of truth and contributes to the effi-
ciency of the "marketplace of ideas."
National Electrical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 113-14 (2nd Cir. 2001).
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tion. This ability to regulate veracity proves especially important in an
analysis of moral rights.
2. Applying the Standard
a. Moral Rights as Commercial Speech
Moral rights claims often arise in a commercial setting. How-
ever, as this article has already demonstrated that the destruction, integ-
rity, and disclosure rights satisfy the First Amendment under different
legal theories, the only moral rights claims that need to be considered are
those asserting the rights of attribution, dissociation, and the Louisiana
display right. This section will discuss when acts violating those rights
qualify as commercial speech, and if so, whether the governing laws
pass the Central Hudson test.
Most attribution and dissociation cases are likely to involve
commercial speech. These two moral rights deal with statements as to
authorship of a work. Statements concerning authorship are particularly
likely to occur when a work is being offered for sale, as knowledge of
the author is an important determinant of value. Thus, a statement made
by an art gallery owner to a potential buyer of a painting is clearly com-
mercial speech. Although statements about the author of a work may not
qualify as advertising in the lay sense of the word, they are akin to
statements about the quality of an ordinary good under § 43 of the
Lanham Act. If statements on a product's label about the alcohol content
are commercial speech,347 certainly a statement about the origin is too.
In both cases, the statement provides a potential purchaser with informa-
tion that may guide the purchaser's decision.
But other cases are less clear-cut. What if a buyer purchases a
painting or sculpture online, and only learns the source when he reads
the invoice in the product packaging? Although that statement is made
in connection with a commercial transaction, it cannot influence the
transaction.348 Similarly, what if that painting hangs in a museum, where
viewers will not see the indication of authorship until after they have
paid for admission? What if the museum charges no admission? In
these cases, the statement of authorship is not part of any commercial
transaction. Nor does the statement relate solely to the speaker's or lis-
teners' commercial interests. Although an indication of authorship could
347. Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995).
348. Unless, of course, the statement somehow gives the buyer the right to cancel the sale.
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have economic consequences in some cases - by making some viewers
more or less likely to buy other works from the author - that indirect
economic effect is not enough to make the speech commercial. If it was
enough, then a newspaper report, or even private gossip, about a person
in business would be commercial speech, as it might affect the future
demand for that person's products. In the situations posed above, the
better conclusion is that the statements of authorship are educational, not
commercial. Therefore, although no such case has yet arisen under
VARA, a significant number of claims of attribution or dissociation may
well involve non-commercial speech.
Similar observations apply to the Louisiana display right. An in-
fringer is likely to display or publish a work when he is offering that
work for sale. But there are also many situations where a work is dis-
played in a non-commercial context. Thus, the commercial speech
analysis will apply in some, but not all, cases arising under the display
right.
In most respects, the moral rights of attribution, dissociation, and
display present the same basic questions for purposes of the First
Amendment. However, the attribution and display rights present addi-
tional wrinkles. The most logical approach is to analyze the simplest
case of commercial dissociation first, and build upon that reasoning
when dealing with commercial attribution and display.
b. Dissociation
The First Amendment is no bar to recovery in cases where a
rightholder sues for dissociation in a commercial context. False or mis-
leading commercial speech is not protected by the First Amendment.349
And a dissociation claim always involves false speech.35  The
349. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission 447 U.S. 557, 593 (1980).
350. As discussed above in supra note 141, the moral rights statutes of several states can be
read broadly to create an additional moral right of "disavowal," a right not to be acknowledged as
the author even of your own work. It is highly unlikely that this right actually exists. But if it does,
it would present serious free speech concerns. Like an ordinary dissociation claim, liability turns on
the content of the speech. However, unlike the typical dissociation dispute, the challenged state-
ment is not false. Nor does government have any significant interest in preventing truthful claims of
authorship. Therefore, a law allowing the author to prevent the statement cannot be justified even
under the commercial speech standard.
At first glance, the "commodification" analysis set out above, see supra at text accompanying notes
263 to 270, might seem useful for the disavowal right. Like the rights in Zacchini and San Fran-
cisco Arts, the moral right of disavowal is arguably a form of property right. However, the com-
modification analysis cannot save a disavowal right. There are two key differences between dis-
avowal and the rights at issue in Zacchini and San Francisco Arts. First, neither the fight of
publicity in Zacchini nor the special trademark law in San Francisco Arts completely barred report-
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rightholder is demanding that her name not be attached to a work that is
not "hers," whether because she did not create it, or because her original
effort has been altered or defaced to a significant extent. Therefore, to
the extent it regulates false attribution in a commercial setting, the disso-
ciation right would be constitutional under the First Amendment.35'
c. Attribution
The right of attribution is in some ways a mirror image of the
dissociation right. Whereas the dissociation right allows the rightholder
to prevent use of her name on works she did not create, the attribution
right allows the true author to demand use of her name on works she did
create. Notwithstanding this close logical relation, from a commercial
speech perspective the attribution right presents certain problems that do
not arise in connection with the dissociation right.
Given that the First Amendment does not limit government's
power to regulate false commercial speech, applying a moral right of at-
tribution presents no free speech concerns in commercial cases of "mis-
attribution", where the defendant has falsely attributed the author's work
to another. The analysis for misattribution is identical to that for disso-
ciation, set out above. However, not all attribution cases fit this mold.
An attribution case can involve either misattribution or "non-
attribution," where the infringer presents the work without any represen-
tation, by words or acts, as to who is the author. Although courts are
sometimes reluctant to allow recovery in non-attribution cases,352 VARA
and the state moral rights statutes as written allow recovery even in cases
where there is no statement about authorship. In a non-attribution case,
ing or other discussion. It simply limited one particular way of discussing the subject. The Court
considered this feature important in both cases. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574; San Francisco Arts, 483
U.S. at 536. A right of disavowal, by contrast, would completely stifle the authorial message, pre-
venting anyone from expressing the idea in any way.
Second, the Court in Zacchini noted that the right of publicity does not deprive the public of infor-
mation, but merely controls who gets to convey that information. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573. In the
case of disavowal, if third parties are not allowed to speak, the public will never be exposed to the
idea, as the author herself will certainly not divulge it. For these reasons, if a right of disavowal
exists, it almost certainly violates the First Amendment.
351. The same arguments would apply to the right of integrity, reinforcing the earlier conclu-
sion that that right is constitutional. Moral rights laws allow recovery for violation of the integrity
right only when the violation affects the author's reputation. An alteration will affect reputation
only when it is wrongly attributed to the author. Therefore, to the extent that an integrity right vio-
lation involves commercial speech - a situation that would admittedly seem somewhat rare - allow-
ing recovery for violation of the integrity right can be justified as a regulation of false commercial
speech.
352. See, e.g., Morita v. Omni Publications International, Ltd., 741 F. Supp. 1107 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (no recovery under Lanham Act for non-attribution).
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however, the speaker has said nothing that is false. To the contrary, the
moral rights law would force him to stop remaining silent, and to make a
statement correctly attributing the author. Non-attribution cases there-
fore present two additional concerns: the lack of a false statement, and
the problem of coerced speech.
However, these concerns do not affect the constitutionality of the
attribution right in cases involving commercial speech. A right of attri-
bution requires a person in possession of the work to disclose only a
simple, accurate fact: the name of the author of the work. Thus, as long
as the coerced statement is made in connection with a commercial trans-
action, the Supreme Court's opinion in Zauderer suggests that govern-
ment can compel it. Zauderer allows government to force parties en-
gaged in commercial speech to disclose accurate information provided it
can demonstrate that disclosure is rationally related to a state interest.353
Government has two interests in requiring disclosure of authorship. The
first is its interest in providing key information to potential buyers. The
second is ensuring that the real author receives appropriate credit for the
work she has produced. Both of these interests are substantial, espe-
cially given the importance of reputation in the world of authorship. 4
A law coercing attribution directly advances these interests by requiring
disclosure. 355  Government can accordingly force the party to disclose
authorship.356
353. Zauderer,471 U.S. at 651.
354. Government's interest in ensuring that the author receives credit may appear less signifi-
cant when an anonymous work is involved. In these cases, the author was initially not interested in
receiving credit. Nevertheless, government may be interested in the author receiving credit even if
the author is not interested.
355. Zauderer does not require that mandatory disclosure be "necessary" to accomplish gov-
emment's goals. Even if it did, the right of attribution would satisfy the standard. Although there
could conceivably be other ways to advance government's interest - for example, a statement by
government about authorship - these alternative means are not as effective. Given that the defen-
dant in a moral rights dispute will typically be the person who owns or controls the work, a state-
ment by that person, and connected to the work, is the only realistic way to ensure that the public
makes the connection between the author and the work.
356. One appellate court decision does admittedly suggest to the contrary. In International
Dairy Foods Assoc. v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2nd Cir. 1996), the court held that it violated the First
Amendment for a state to require dairy manufacturers to disclose whether the cows that provided
milk used in the manufacturers' products had been treated with recombinant bovine growth hor-
mone. The court noted that Zauderer and the other leading cases upholding disclosure requirements
all involved situations where the information was necessary to prevent deception or protect human
health. Amestoy, 92 F.3d at 74. As the evidence showed that bovine hormone had no effect on hu-
man health, the court found the only reason for requiring disclosure was consumer "interest" in how
the cows had been treated. That interest, the court found, was not sufficiently substantial to satisfy
the First Amendment. Id.
Amestoy, however, does not really conflict with the argument in the text. The court in that case ap-
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d. The Louisiana Display Right
The Louisiana display right, by contrast, cannot be sustained as
valid commercial speech. Recall that because of preemption, that right
applies only when the infringer uses an unaltered original or faithful
copy. Use of an unadulterated version of the work cannot be deemed a
false statement. Nor does government have a sufficient interest to regu-
late that speech under the Central Hudson test.357 An infringer should
not be liable for making truthful statements about an author merely be-
cause those statements occur in connection with a commercial display of
the work. The Louisiana display right accordingly does not qualify as a
valid regulation even when the display would qualify as commercial
speech.
In summary, some moral rights laws can be applied consistently
with the First Amendment when the speech in question is commercial.
The rights of attribution and dissociation are categorically valid as ap-
plied to commercial speech. However, the Louisiana display right gains
nothing from the commercial speech analysis. Unless another free
speech argument applies to the display right - as well as non-
commercial attribution and dissociation cases - these moral rights would
be judged by the compelling interest standard, under which their consti-
tutionality would be in serious doubt.
D. Defamatory Speech
Before conceding that the compelling interest standard applies, it
is useful to explore one more branch of free speech law. The law of
defamation exhibits some close parallels to the moral rights of attribu-
tion, dissociation, and display. Like defamation law, these rights are de-
318
signed to protect an author's reputation. Because the special standard
pears to read the Supreme Court precedent too narrowly. Although Zauderer and the other leading
Supreme Court cases do all involve deception or health concerns, the cases nowhere suggest that
these are the only concerns that might justify disclosure. Instead, they suggest that government will
have a substantial interest whenever it tries to prevent some harm that listeners might suffer from
incomplete information. The problem in Amestoy was that the state could demonstrate no harm
other than failure to satisfy consumer curiosity. By contrast, lack of information about the author of
a work is harmful to both potential purchasers (because such information can influence a purchasing
decision) and to the authors themselves.
357. Central Hudson Gas v. Public Service Commission, 44,7 US 557 (1980).
358. The analogy is admittedly imperfect. Moral rights law focus on an author's reputation as
an author. The concept of reputation in defamation law is significantly broader, alluding to all as-
pects of a person's character. As stated in the legislative history to VARA:
the best approach to construing the term "honor or reputation" in H.R. 2690 is to focus
on the artistic or professional honor or reputation of the individual as embodied in the
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the Supreme Court uses in defamation cases does not turn on whether
the defamatory speech is commercial, that area of free speech law may
prove useful in analyzing claims of attribution, dissociation, and display
that do not involve commercial speech.
1. The Standard for Defamatory Speech
The following, although greatly simplified, is the gist of the
analysis used in defamation cases. First, the plaintiff must prove that the
statement in question is false and directly concerns her. Although the
common law made truth an affirmative defense to a defamation claim,
the Supreme Court has established that the First Amendment requires
plaintiff to prove falsity as an element of her case.359
The second step is to determine whether the plaintiff is a public
or private figure. If the plaintiff is a public figure,360 she must demon-
strate that the defendant acted with "actual malice." The term actual
malice is somewhat misdescriptive. Unlike the general tort-law concept
of malice, "actual malice" in the First Amendment context means that
defendant either knew his statement was false or acted with reckless dis-
regard of the truth.36' Absent a showing of actual malice, the public fig-
work that is protected. The standard used is not analogous to that of a defamation case,
where the general character of the plaintiff is at issue.
Legislative History, supra note 38, at 6925. Nevertheless both laws do deal generally with how a
person is perceived by others. Speech that affects that perception should accordingly receive similar
First Amendment protection.
359. Whether plaintiff must prove falsity depends upon her status as a public or private figure.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (public official plaintiff bears burden of
proving defamatory statement was made with actual malice). See also Philadelphia Newspapers v.
Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (private figure plaintiff bears burden of proving falsity if the statement
involves a matter of public interest); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 763 (1985) (private plaintiff suing over issue of no public interest may not have the burden of
proving truth to recover actual damages, but does have the burden of proving actual malice to re-
cover punitive damages). Statements of pure opinion do not constitute defamation. However, state-
ments of opinion that assert knowledge of an underlying fact may be defamatory if the underlying
facts are false. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
360. The first cases that established the standard for public figures involved public officials, or
people running for office. However, in Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts and Associate Press v. Walker, 388
U.S. 130 (1967), the Court extended the same rules to public figures. Determining who is a public
official (not all government officials are included) or who is a public figure - or "limited purpose
public figure"- involves a complex, convoluted, and not completely satisfactory analysis. Thank-
fully, the analysis in this article need not broach that issue.
361. Griffin v. Delta Democrat Times Publ'g Co., 815 So. 2d 1246, 1250 (Miss. Ct. App.
2002), contains a good discussion of the different meanings of malice. The court distinguished tra-
ditional common law malice, which is ill-will or anger, from constitutional malice, which is knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.
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ure plaintiff cannot recover."' This standard can be difficult to satisfy,
as plaintiff is often hard-pressed to find evidence to show that defendant
knew the statement was false.
If plaintiff is a private figure, the actual malice standard is not
constitutionally required as a condition to liability.363 Speech involving
private figures is generally less crucial to a well-informed society, and as
a result receives slightly less protection. A state may allow364 a private
figure to recover upon a showing that defendant acted negligently in
making the false statement.365 Negligence, which is measured by an ob-
jective standard, is easier to demonstrate than malice, which requires a
subjective inquiry.
Interestingly, nothing in this analysis considers whether govern-
ment has any interest in silencing the defamatory speech in the particular
case. This lack of a government interest element in the defamation test
suggests one of two things. It may be that government always has a
constitutionally sufficient interest in regulating false speech that harms a
person's reputation. On the other hand, defamation may be an exception
to the general law of free speech, akin to the special cases of obscenity
and speech that poses a clear and present danger.
2. Application of the Standard
a. Moral Rights Violations as Defamatory Speech
The standard described above evolved in defamation cases.36 6
362. Curtis, 388 U.S. at 155.
363. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974) (actual malice standard not re-
quired by the First Amendment for private figures).
364. Defamation is a state-law claim. Therefore, the Supreme Court precedent dealing with
defamation technically merely limit on how generous a state can be in allowing recovery for defa-
mation. However, the First Amendment protections represent a floor, not a ceiling. A state is free
to choose, either as a matter of policy or because of the free speech protections of its own constitu-
tion, to use the actual malice standard even in cases brought by private figures.
365. However, if the statement involves a matter of public concern, recovery of punitive or
presumed damages is possible only of the plaintiff demonstrates actual malice. Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985). Because moral rights statutes do not
provide for enhanced damages, this limitation is not relevant to the current discussion.
366. Some of the leading cases involving defamation are New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) (public official plaintiff has burden of proving actual malice to recover in libel suit);
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. 749 (private figures must show actual malice to recover punitive dam-
ages); Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (actual malice standard not required by the First Amendment for private
figures to recover on defamation claim); Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986)
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However, it is not limited to such cases. Other Supreme Court cases
make it clear that the same malice standard applies in "false light" pri-
vacy cases 367 as well as cases involving the publication of embarrassing
private facts.368 Although these are technically separate and distinct
torts, there is a thread that binds them. The torts of defamation, false
light privacy, and disclosure of private facts are all concerned with pro-
tecting the victim's reputation or good name. The malice standard is ac-
tually the standard that applies to laws governing speech that harms an
individual's reputation.369
Viewed from this perspective, there are parallels between these
reputational torts and moral rights. As demonstrated in Part I.A, all of
the moral rights help protect an author's professional reputation.3 7' Al-
though different rights deal with different threats to that reputation, all of
the rights give the author some control over the way her authorship is
perceived by the public. Given this focus on reputation, it is tempting to
conclude that the malice standard applies to attribution and dissociation
cases. However, there are some important differences between the tradi-
tional torts and the moral rights that may render the standard inapposite.
At the outset, it is clear that the defamation standard cannot be
applied to cases arising under Louisiana's display right. This statute af-
fords a cause of action when an infringer displays or publishes an accu-
rate version of the author's work that the author would rather remain out
of the public eye.37' In these situations, the infringer has made no false
or misleading statement. Instead, the Louisiana law imposes liability
when the infringer discloses negative, but accurate, works of the au-
thor.3 72 Because the defamation standard applies only when the defen-
dant makes a false statement,37 it is inapplicable to the Louisiana display
right.
367. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).
368. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 481 (1976).
369. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 261 (1964)
370. VARA also talks in terms of the author's "honor." 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2) & (3)(A).
However, courts have not given that term any independent significance, instead equating it to repu-
tation.
371. La. Rev. Stat. § 51:2153(3) (2005).
372. La. R.S. § 51:2153(3) covers all harmful displays that are attributed to the author, without
consideration of whether the display is accurate. As discussed supra at text accompanying note
142, however, the law would be preempted by VARA to the extent that it regulated inaccurate rep-
resentations that the author created the modified work.
373. Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (private figure plaintiff must
prove falsity to recover for defamatory statement involving a matter of public interest).
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b. Dissociation Cases Involving Non-Commercial Speech
The right of dissociation is designed to protect the rightholder's
reputation. If someone else's works are falsely attributed to the
rightholder, the rightholder's reputation as an author may suffer.374 False
statements of authorship are sufficiently akin to defamatory statements
to qualify for the same free speech analysis. Admittedly, the Supreme
Court cases dealing with defamation and the other reputational torts
typically involve statements about a person. Dissociation, by contrast,
involves a statement "about" a particular work. Nevertheless, the es-
sence of the dissociation claim is a statement that a particular person -
the rightholder- is responsible for a work. Because an author's reputa-
tion is defined primarily through her work, the defamation analogy is
clear. A statement that wrongfully associates an artist with a work she
did not produce is defamatory, as it may harm her reputation.
Applying the First Amendment standard, a rightholder suing for
wrongful attribution in a non-commercial setting could prevail only if
she can demonstrate that the speaker acted with the required malice.
The precise showing of malice required would turn on whether the
rightholder is a public figure.375 If so, the rightholder would have to
demonstrate that the speaker knew that she was not the author, or acted
with reckless disregard for the truth in asserting that she was the author.
If the rightholder is not a public figure and the work is not of public in-
terest, she need only demonstrate that the speaker acted negligently.
Whether a rightholder can actually meet that standard turns on the
particular facts of the case. However, it is safe to say that in many cases
the rightholder will have little difficulty satisfying the malice standard.
Unlike the statements involved in many defamation and false light cases,
the issue of whether a particular person created a certain work is often an
objective, easily verifiable fact. Many painters, sculptors, filmmakers,
and other authors attach their names to the work. If an infringer ignores
that indication of authorship and instead names the rightholder as author,
the infringer has at the very least recklessly disregarded the truth. Even
if no name is attached to the work, the rightholder should usually be able
to demonstrate malice. Unless the rightholder's name is attached to the
work, the infringer can attribute that work to the rightholder only if he
has some other reason to believe that the rightholder created the work.
374. Admittedly, the dissociation right under some state laws does not require the author to
prove harm to reputation. However, that provision merely reflects the view that the author is the
best judge of how her art may affect her reputation.
375. Philadelphia Newspapers, 475 U.S. 767 (plaintiff, even if private figure, bears burden of
proving falsity if the statement involves a matter of public interest).
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Without some reason to think that the rightholder is connected with the
work, a statement that the rightholder is the author would be reckless, at
best. In both of these cases, it would not be difficult for the rightholder
to demonstrate that the infringer acted with malice in representing that
the work was produced by the rightholder.
On the other hand, there are likely to be numerous cases in which
a false statement of authorship does not involve the requisite malice.
Particularly troubling in this regard are anonymous and pseudonymous
works. It is conceivable that an infringer could make an honest mistake
concerning authorship of an anonymous work. Of course, a statement is
not honest unless it is based on something. In the case of an anonymous
or pseudonymous work, however, the infringer may have determined au-
thorship by evaluating the style of the work itself. As long as that
evaluation was based on some resemblance, it would be difficult for the
rightholder to show that there was no factual basis for the statement.
Given the amorphous nature of artistic style, it may even be difficult for
a private figure rightholder to demonstrate that the determination of au-
thorship was negligent.
Another problematic situation is a work originally created by the
rightholder, but altered by another. At some point, the alterations will be
significant enough that it is no longer accurate to attribute the work to
the rightholder. But where this magical border lies is anyone's guess. If
the infringer does not realize that changes have occurred, or in good
faith determines that the changes are not enough to require a change in
authorial designation, the rightholder will not be able to demonstrate
knowing falsity or reckless disregard, and may not be able to establish
negligence. Unless the rightholder can bring an integrity claim for the
fact of alteration itself,376 the First Amendment may bar recovery in
these cases.
Overall, most dissociation cases involving non-commercial
statements of authorship will involve facts that satisfy the malice stan-
dard. In many cases, the infringer will have purposefully lied about the
work. In others, the true author is so clear that a statement attributing
the work to the rightholder will involve an intentional lie or reckless dis-
regard of the truth. The main cases in which a rightholder will have
trouble satisfying the malice standard are certain cases involving altered,
anonymous, and pseudonymous works.
376. Of course, the integrity claim may involve a different defendant. The party who altered
the work may or may not be the party who is making the statement of authorship.
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c. Attribution Cases Involving Non-Commercial Speech
The earlier discussion of commercial speech revealed that from a
free speech perspective, the attribution right is far more complicated
than the dissociation right. One arrives at a similar conclusion when ap-
plying the defamation standard. Although the analysis ultimately leads
to the conclusion that most authors can recover when an infringer in a
non-commercial setting fails to give proper authorial credit, reaching
that conclusion requires dealing with several difficult intermediate is-
sues.
First, the analogy between the reputational torts and the right of
attribution is more attenuated than the analogy between those torts and
dissociation. The right of attribution certainly protects the author's repu-
tation. But it does not "protect" that reputation in the same way as the
torts of defamation, false light privacy, or publication of private facts -
or, for that matter, like the dissociation right. In all of these other situa-
tions, the defendant has actually named the plaintiff. Indeed, unless she
can show that people know defendant is discussing the plaintiff, plaintiff
cannot recover under any of these claims. The heart of an attribution
claim, by contrast, is that the author has not been named. Although the
statement of authorship may affect the author, it is no way about the au-
thor, but instead about someone else.377
This difference between the right of attribution and the other re-
putational rights may be very important as a matter of tort law and pol-
icy. But that does not mean it is a difference of constitutional dimen-
sion. Although the common law of torts may, for good reason, limit the
reputational torts to situations where the defendant has actually named
the plaintiff,378 nothing in the First Amendment requires that same limi-
tation. Congress and the state legislatures have elected to create an attri-
bution right, a right that applies when an infringer gives credit to some-
one else without naming the proper author. The only question is
whether that right is constitutional. And the constitutional malice stan-
dard is capable of dealing with all speech that negatively affects an indi-
vidual's reputation, regardless of whether that speech explicitly identifies
377. Attribution is also slightly different than the other claims insofar as it focuses more on the
future than on the present. Defamation and similar torts, as well as dissociation, focus mainly on
harm to current reputation. Attribution, by contrast, seeks to preserve the author's ability to enhance
her reputation in the future, by ensuring she is credited for the work she produces. Although inter-
esting, this difference is not one of constitutional dimension.
378. One policy reason limiting defamation to cases where the plaintiff is named is to prevent a
flood of litigation. Imagine a world in which a person could sue merely because someone else
failed to say something good about him.
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the person who is harmed. A defamatory statement or a wrongful attri-
bution negatively affects an author's reputation by introducing new and
incorrect facts into the set of data society uses to establish the author's
reputation. Attributing the author's work to someone else also distorts
that data set, but in a different way; namely, by omitting facts that the
author intended society to consider. In either case, however, the net re-
sult is the same. In both dissociation and attribution cases, society
thinks less of the rightholder or author because of the infringer's acts.
Because both types of statements harm reputation, both should be sub-
ject to the same First Amendment strictures.
With this hurdle cleared, applying the malice standard to the right
of attribution involves the same basic considerations as apply to the dis-
sociation right. Statements of authorship will in many cases concern ob-
jective, non-controversial facts. As long as the author can demonstrate
that defendant intentionally lied or recklessly ignored the truth - or in
the case of a private figure plaintiff, acted negligently - she should sat-
isfy the constitutional standard. Again, the most significant problems
are likely to arise in cases of altered, anonymous, and pseudonymous
works.
On the other hand, some noncommercial attribution cases also
present a second wrinkle. The discussion to this point has focused on
misattribution. But many attribution laws also allow recovery in cases
of complete non-attribution. In non-attribution cases, the infringer has
said nothing. "' This lack of any statement is crucial as a matter of free
speech law. As a threshold matter, the malice standard allows an author
to recover only on a showing that the infringer has made a false state-
ment. Silence is not a lie, at least absent circumstances showing that
others are proceeding under a false assumption as to the truth. More-
over, it is nonsensical to speak of an author proving that the infringer
knew or had reason to know a statement was false in a case where the
infringer has neither said nor implied anything. Because of this lack of a
statement, the malice standard does not apply. A non-commercial case
379. Anonymous and pseudonymous works might at first glance seem to present a special issue
in a non-attribution case. It is one thing to attribute a work to a particular author when there is no
reason to think that that author produced it. It is quite another to say that the infringer should have
known that a particular author produced a certain anonymous work, and the infringer failed to af-
ford proper credit. But on closer inspection, the obstacle facing the author is basically no greater in
a non-attribution case than in a misattribution case. The key to a case of misattribution is that de-
fendant attributed the work to a third party. Unless defendant had a reason to think that statement
was true, this statement was made with constitutional malice. The author can recover simply by
showing that the statement was false; she need not show that the defendant should have known that
she actually prepared the work.
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of non-attribution must be governed by the compelling interest standard.
Other than the situation of non-attribution, however, non-
commercial claims of attribution and dissociation will be governed by
the malice standard. Such claims will not categorically be constitutional.
Instead, whether such claims violate the infringers' First Amendment
rights requires a case-by-case determination of whether the infringer has
acted with the required level of constitutional malice. Although it is safe
to predict that many authors will be able to meet that requirement, the
actual percentage of claims that fail depends on which authors elect to
sue, and under what circumstances.
E. The Compelling Interest Standard
Although the compelling interest test is the starting point in a
First Amendment analysis, there are a number of other standards that
apply in certain categories of free speech cases. Sections B, C, and D of
this Part III discuss three of these special standards and demonstrate how
they can be applied to most of the existing moral rights. The net result
of this analysis is that virtually all of the moral rights currently in force
in the United States can be justified as valid content-neutral regulations,
restrictions on commercial speech, or laws protecting authors' reputa-
tions. Only two narrow moral rights - the Louisiana display right, and
the right, in a non-commercial setting, to coerce a statement from an in-
fringer that gives the author credit for her work - cannot be sustained
under any of these alternate theories. In these narrow categories, the
compelling interest standard must apply.
A claim of non-attribution involves the special question of co-
erced speech. The infringer has made no representation concerning ori-
gin. The author wants to compel such a statement, not to cure any lin-
gering misperceptions, but merely to ensure that the public knows all the
facts. Unlike the case of commercial speech, however, no special stan-
dard applies to forced non-commercial speech, even when that speech
involves nothing more than uncontested statements of fact. Laws that
coerce speech must meet the compelling interest standard, just like laws
that limit speech. 380 Government cannot force me to declare that I am
five foot eleven inches tall in my stocking feet unless it can demonstrate
a compelling interest to make me do so, and that the requirement is nar-
rowly tailored to meet that governmental interest.
380. Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (the right not to speak ap-
plies even to pure statements of fact).
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A law requiring attribution serves no compelling interest.3"' This
is not to say that government is uninterested in ensuring that authors re-
ceive proper credit. Indeed, government has an important and substan-
tial interest in the question of credit.382  But "compelling" is a much
higher standard; a standard that government rarely satisfies. In order to
demonstrate a compelling interest, government must at a bare minimum
demonstrate a real threat to public health, safety, or order. Even if one
could stretch the notion of health and safety to matters such as cultural
health, a failure to attribute authorship presents no grave threat to cul-
ture. The speaker's silence does not create the risk of serious cultural
harm. It merely fails to provide society with a piece of information it
might deem useful. Any harm to society or cultural is marginal rather
than catastrophic. As much as we might wish to the contrary, govern-
ment cannot force people to educate others, at least outside the commer-
cial context.
Second, even in the unlikely event that ensuring proper credit was
deemed a compelling interest, a law requiring attribution is not narrowly
tailored to achieve that goal. There are several other ways that govern-
ment could help ensure that an author received credit for her work. The
author is always free to claim that credit by herself. Government could
assist the author by providing funds for the publication of authorship
claims, or make its own official statements of authorship. Although
none of these options is as effective as requiring a statement from the
person in possession of the work, from a First Amendment perspective
they are preferable because they do not force anyone to speak against his
will.
For many of the same reasons, the Louisiana display right does
not satisfy the requirement of a compelling interest. Government does
have a general interest in protecting reputation. However, its primary
interest is in protecting that reputation from the taint caused by errone-
ous information. The Louisiana law, by contrast, protects reputation
from the truth.383 Government's interest in protecting reputation is di-
minished significantly when government tries to squelch truthful, but
unpleasant, facts about a person.384 Because the state cannot demon-
381. Whether moral rights in general serve a compelling government interest is subject to some
debate. However, this article need not address that broader question. The issue here is whether the
narrow right to coerce attribution in non-attribution cases serves a compelling interest.
382. Therefore, as discussed supra at text accompanying notes 353 to 356, a law that requires
disclosure of authorship in a commercial setting presents no First Amendment problems.
383. As discussed supra at text accompanying note 140, to the extent that the Louisiana law
deals with a distorted display, it is preempted by VARA.
384. The Louisiana law could in the alternative be analogized to a right of privacy. But the
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strate that its law serves a compelling interest, it violates the First
Amendment if that law is used to impose liability on someone who pub-
lishes an accurate version of an artist's work."5
In conclusion, allowing recovery for non-attribution in cases of
noncommercial speech, or under the Louisiana display right, would be
facially inconsistent with the First Amendment. An infringer sued for
violating either of these rights should therefore prevail by invoking the
First Amendment as a defense to such a claim. An author who wants to
prevent display of her work, or ensure that she is properly attributed for
her work, must look elsewhere for such a right. At present, the only le-
gal option is to include a provision in the contract for sale of the work,
an option that is both infeasible as a practical matter, and of doubtful le-
gal effect.386
IV. A RECAP OF THE MAIN CONCLUSIONS
For purposes of exposition, this article organized the discussion on
a "test-by-test" basis, moving from one of the various free speech tests
to the other. In some respects, a right-by-right analysis might have been
more useful. However, because many of the rights require application of
more than one test, depending on the circumstances, a right-by-right
analysis would have been convoluted. Nevertheless, at this juncture the
reader might appreciate a brief recap of the main arguments that apply to
each right. Taking the rights in alphabetical order, these arguments are:
A. Attribution.
Cases involving the right of attribution (traditionally called the right
of "paternity") invariably involve speech.387 Moreover, federal and state
attribution laws regulate speech based on its content.3 8 On the other
hand, many if not most attribution disputes will involve commercial
speech.389 In cases involving commercial speech, government can pre-
vent a party speaking about a work of art from making false statements
about who is the author of that work. Government can even compel a
compelling interest test also applies to privacy rights. Keeping authorial information secret is not a
compelling interest.
385. Of course, the author may be able to recover under the Copyright law, at least if the work
has not been sold to another.
386. For example, there is significant doubt as to whether such a provision could bind third
parties.
387. See supra text accompanying notes 152 to 154.
388. See supra text accompanying notes 293 to 296.
389. See supra text accompanying notes 347 to 348.
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party to state who is the author of a work being bought or sold, regard-
less of whether the speaker has otherwise said anything about author-
ship.39°
Attribution cases involving non-commercial speech are more diffi-
cult. In these cases, courts should apply the standard applicable to
defamation cases, as attribution similarly affects an author's reputation.
Provided that the author can demonstrate constitutional malice - a show-
ing that varies depending on the notoriety of the author and the work -
the author can recover for a misattribution of authorship even in a non-
commercial context.3 91 However, in a non-commercial case of non-
attribution - that is, where the speaker has said nothing, and the author
wants to force him to speak - the First Amendment bars recovery.39 2
This situation of noncommercial non-attribution is one of only two cases
where the First Amendment will completely negate the moral right.
B. Destruction.
Laws giving an author the right to prevent destruction of her work
involve content-neutral regulation of speech.393 Under the analysis that
applies to content-neutral laws, the destruction right is clearly constitu-
tional. Destruction laws serve two important government goals: the goal
of encouraging artistic production by guaranteeing that the author's
reputation is accurate, and the goal of preserving works of art for soci-
ety.394 Destruction laws accomplish these goals without unduly restrict-
ing speech. A person who wants to criticize art or an author has a num-
ber of other ways to deliver that message.3 95
C. Disclosure.
The Copyright Act provides a defacto right of disclosure in § 106.
Because this right is a traditional part of copyright, it is presumptively
constitutional under the rationale of the recent Supreme Court decisions
dealing with copyright and the First Amendment.396 Moreover, even
without that precedent the right of disclosure would be valid because it is
a content-neutral regulation of speech that serves the important govern-
390. See supra text accompanying notes 353 to 356.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 377 to 378.
392. See supra text accompanying note 379.
393. See supra text accompanying notes 276 to 281.
394. See supra text accompanying notes 300 to 306.
395. See supra text accompanying notes 307 to 309.
396. See supra text accompanying notes 211 to 214.
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ment interest of encouraging cultural production and effects a fairly lim-
ited restriction on speech.397
D. Dissociation.
The right of dissociation is the right not to be associated with a
work that one did not create. As it, like the right of attribution, deals
with statements concerning authorship, it stands to reason that the analy-
sis of this right follows the same general outline as the analysis of the
attribution right. In cases where a party wrongly attributes authorship in
a commercial context, the dissociation right is categorically valid as a
restriction on the truthfulness of commercial speech.398 In cases that do
not involve commercial speech, the rightholder will be required to dem-
onstrate constitutional malice.399 However, a rightholder should ordinar-
ily be able to demonstrate constitutional malice, unless the speaker had
some reason to state that the rightholder prepared the work in question.
E. Integrity.
A good deal of the discussion of free speech and moral rights fo-
cuses on laws giving an author the right to prevent alteration or mutila-
tion of her work. Once it is recognized that integrity laws involve con-
tent-neutral regulation of speech,00 however, it is easy to conclude that
they are constitutional. The analysis is similar to that applicable to the
destruction right, although with some nuances. Like destruction laws,
integrity laws serve two important government goals: the goal of en-
couraging artistic production by guaranteeing that the author's reputation
is accurate, and the goal of preserving for society the integrity of (and
therefore the author's message in) works of art.4"' Those same argu-
ments apply regardless of whether a particular integrity law protects only
originals (like VARA), or also extends to reproductions and derivative
works.402 In the case of a reproduction, integrity laws ensure not that an
original work remains available, but that the message the author in-
tended to deliver through that work is accurately perceived. Moreover,
integrity laws accomplish this goal without restricting speech too
greatly. A person who wants to criticize art or an author has a number of
397. See supra text accompanying notes 319 to 323.
398. See supra text accompanying notes 349 to 351.
399. See supra text accompanying notes 374 to 375.
400. See supra text accompanying notes 282 to 285.
401. See supra text accompanying note 296.
402. See supra text accompanying notes 314 to 316.
2007]
87
Cross: Moral Rights and the First Amendment
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2007
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL
other ways to deliver that message.4 °3
F. Louisiana Display Right.
To date, no cases have arisen under the sui generis provision of
Louisiana law giving an author the right to police display or publication
of her work, in situations where that display would harm her reputation.
Because display of altered originals is already covered by VARA, the
Louisiana law is preempted in those cases. However, the right is not
preempted in cases involving unaltered originals or reproductions. Al-
though not preempted, the Louisiana law is categorically unconstitu-
tional under the First Amendment. Even though the statute regulates
speech in a content-neutral fashion, it fails the O'Brien test for content-
neutral regulation.4 4 For similar reasons, the statute cannot be applied
even in cases involving commercial speech. Nor do the defamation
cases offer any help. Although the infringer's speech does harm the au-
thor's reputation, the speech is true. 4" Because none of the specialized
categories of speech law apply, and because the display right serves no
compelling government interest, it is categorically unconstitutional.
VI. CONCLUSION
All laws that regulate the world of art and literature raise serious
free speech issues. The past few years have witnessed a renewed debate
over whether copyright is consistent with the First Amendment. Al-
though the Supreme Court is convinced that copyright law is constitu-
tional, a significant segment of the academic community remains skepti-
cal. Regardless of whether copyright serves a useful purpose, it places
limits on speech.
Overlooked in the debate over copyright and the First Amendment
is a separate, but equally important question. Like copyright, moral
rights laws limit speech. Moreover, they limit speech in ways different
than traditional copyright. There is no guarantee that the arguments
about why copyright complies with the First Amendment will apply to
the moral rights provided in both state and federal law. The different na-
ture of moral rights calls for a different free speech analysis.
This article provided that analysis. It demonstrated that the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution will rarely prevent an au-
thor from recovering against someone who infringes one of her moral
403. See supra text accompanying notes 316 to 318.
404. See supra text accompanying notes 325 to 327.
405. See supra text accompanying notes 372 to 373.
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rights. The argument involves a number of different steps. Many moral
rights infringements do not involve acts that constitute speech, and
therefore receive no First Amendment protection. Even when a moral
rights infringement does involve speech, several of the moral rights
categorically comply with the requirements of the First Amendment, ei-
ther because they are valid content-neutral laws, or because they regulate
the veracity of commercial speech. The remaining cases call for a case-
by-case approach. However, provided the author can demonstrate con-
stitutional malice - a showing that will ordinarily not be that difficult to
make, given the nature of moral rights violations - she can recover for
non-commercial violations of the attribution and dissociation rights
without running afoul of the First Amendment. The only situations in
which the First Amendment absolutely bars recovery is the case where
the author seeks to coerce another to acknowledge that she created a
work, in a situation where such speech does not qualify as commercial
speech, and cases under the Louisiana display right.
Thus, through a combination of several different lines of free
speech doctrine, it is possible to demonstrate that most of the moral
rights currently in force in the United States satisfy the requirements of
the First Amendment. Of course, the free speech issues are only one
small part of the controversy surrounding moral rights legislation in the
United States. Even if all moral rights were unequivocally consistent
with free speech, there are certain policy reasons to resist expanding the
scope of moral rights protection. However, supporters of strong moral
rights laws can take heart from the conclusions of this article. As long
as moral rights laws are carefully crafted, they can be enforced without
violating the First Amendment. Putting the free speech issues to one
side is useful insofar as it allows the debate concerning the proper scope
of moral rights to focus on the merits or demerits of moral rights them-
selves, not on one hot-button issue such as free speech. In this regard,
the author hopes that this paper will help the debate concerning moral
rights focus on the real policy issue.
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